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The Human Signif icance of Climate Change
David A. Collings
Stolen Future, Broken Present
C
ollings
Stolen Future, Broken Present argues that we are virtually out of time to ward off 
severe, irreversible climate change.  As a result, our future is in doubt and, with 
it, the entire purpose of our present activities.  All of our projects – personal, 
familial, political, religious – are disabled at their core; the challenge is thus to 
create an ethics of the ruins.
Written with uncompromising lucidity, David Collings’ Stolen Future, 
Broken Present argues that we have not yet undergone the ethical and 
philosophical shifts necessary to cope with the temporal dissonance 
associated with climate change.  This is a deeply necessary book at a 
time when many of us have already become numb to predictions of 
environmental disaster.
– Anne C. McCarthy, Penn State University
Collings’ book is a timely and necessarily provocative exploration of the 
intersection between climate change’s volatile history, and an overdue re-
reading of Romanticism and poetics. This book will open a new mode of 
thinking for the humanities of the twenty-first century.
– Penny Fielding, University of Edinburgh
David Collings is Professor of English at Bowdoin College. He is the author 
of Wordsworthian Errancies: The Poetics of Cultural Dismemberment (1994) and 
Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the Political Uncanny, c. 1780-1848 
(2009). He co-edited Queer Romanticisms with Michael O’Rourke (2004-2005) 
and Romanticism and Disaster with Jacques Khalip (2012). 
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Introduction
Lately the news about climate change hasn’t been good.
Once upon a time, not long ago, the scientific consensus held that 
the northern polar ice cap, under the pressure of global warming, would 
melt eventually—”in the latter part of the 21st century.”1 That estimate, 
released in 2007, appeared around the same time as Al Gore’s documen-
tary, An Inconvenient Truth, and reaffirmed a widespread sense that if we 
did not act soon to curb our emissions of greenhouse gases, the worst 
effects of climate change could be dire indeed—but would transpire 
some decades into the future.2 The threat from that ice melt, and from 
climate change more generally, was real but not absolutely imminent: 
we had time to fight for change through the familiar processes of pub-
lic debate, the gradual formation of public opinion, the eventual forging 
of a coalition for Congressional action, and the patient negotiation of an 
international treaty.
That estimate turned out to be much too optimistic. Only two years 
later, new estimates suggested that the Arctic Ocean would be free of ice 
in the summer as soon as 2030 or 2040.3 Thanks in part to the blister-
ing pace with which global economies were emitting greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere, the climate was reacting far more quickly than most 
researchers had previously projected. That shift in the forecast—along 
with similar shifts all across climate science—had immense implications 
for anyone who hoped to preserve the biosphere in anything like its pres-
ent state into the future. The threat no longer loomed far off, near the end 
of the century, but was only two or three decades away. In the wake of this 
and other developments, those following the science on climate change 
felt a greater sense of urgency, knowing the international community bet-
ter act immediately to ward off severe changes to the global climate. That 
imperative strained against the limits of national and international politi-
cal traditions, raising difficult questions. How could scientists bring this 
8 Introduction
news to bear on the thinking of leading politicians, who for the most part 
still used the estimates and targets set in the early 1990s? Furthermore, 
how could nations alter their fossil-fuel economies so dramatically in 
such a short period? What could possibly break through the impasse?
But as it now appears, even that estimate has turned out to be too 
optimistic in its turn. Three years later, the stunning melt of Arctic sea 
ice in the summer of 2012 prompted scientists to rethink those earlier 
studies and to propose instead that the Arctic might be ice-free in late 
summer before 2020. Peter Wadhams, head of the Polar Ocean Physics 
Group at the University of Cambridge, who researches the thickness of 
Arctic sea ice, now estimates that the Arctic will become ice-free in the 
summer well before the end of this decade, and perhaps as early as 2015 
or 2016.4 So in five years, the threat of that dire event moved up from the 
last half of the century to the latter part of this decade, almost obliterating 
the opportunity for serious action. The year 2020, it seems, is the new 
2100. So much for having time—even minimal time—to address this cri-
sis. The questions instantly multiply: What are we supposed to do now?5
What political actions are even feasible? And how exactly are we to alter 
our economic systems to meet this challenge in time?
The news about the Arctic sea ice is bad enough: it tells us that a mas-
sive transformation in the climate of the northern hemisphere is well on 
its way. As the Arctic warms, the difference in temperature between the 
far northern zone and the temperate regions decreases, causing changes 
in the jet stream, which now moves more slowly and more often zig-
zags on its course to the east. As a result, it might swing over Texas, then 
pull warm air straight north over the Dakotas, causing midwinter warm 
spells all across the Midwest, or pull Arctic cold down into the Carolinas 
or even Florida, freezing areas that in the past hardly experienced such 
frigid weather. Furthermore, because it is moving more slowly, it can stall 
over certain regions and cause them to be hit with weather over longer 
periods—leading to longer spells of rain or snow and thus to more flood-
ing or harsher winter storms. The same situation applies all across the 
northern hemisphere. Such is the “new normal” of our time.6 
But that is not all. Much worse news awaits. The melting of the Arctic 
sea ice will lead to substantially higher temperatures in the sea itself, 
high enough potentially to melt methane clathrates—frozen remains of 
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organic life—deposited on the seabed on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf 
and cause the resulting methane gas to escape through the sea and into 
the open air. Scientists have long known about these submerged depos-
its of clathrates, but since most such deposits around the world rest far 
beneath the ocean surface in cold waters, they were not overly concerned 
that climate change would cause them to melt any time soon. But the sit-
uation on that Arctic continental shelf is different: it is so shallow—often 
only around fifty meters below the surface—that the clathrates there 
are vulnerable to rising temperatures on the ocean’s surface. So it is not 
surprising that the warming in the Arctic has already triggered the initial 
stages of this process. 
In March 2010, a team of Russian scientists led by Igor Semiletov and 
Natalia Shakhova published a study documenting a major clathrate melt 
on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, a melt that is releasing quantities “on 
par with previous estimates of methane venting from the entire World 
Ocean.”7 Because methane is around twenty-six times more potent as a 
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, though much less short-lived in the 
atmosphere, and because there are enormous deposits of frozen methane 
crystals in that region of the sea, as in many of the world’s oceans, the 
National Science Foundation issued a press release stating, “Release of 
even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt 
climate warming.”8 On returning to that region of the Arctic in summer 
2011, the research team found much larger “torch-like structures” of 
escaping methane than before, some a kilometer across, suggesting that 
they may have to raise their estimates of the volume of the clathrate melt; 
the most recent rate of methane emissions astonished the very scientists 
who have long been researching this phenomenon.9 
But even that is not all the bad news. The Arctic ice melt is driven in 
part by what scientists call a “positive feedback loop”: as the ice melts, 
open water appears, absorbing sunlight; as a result, it warms up, causing 
more ice to melt and repeating this process in a kind of death spiral. Now 
that the Arctic Ocean is melting rapidly, that process will build on itself 
no matter what we do. Such a vicious circle applies to the melting clath-
rates as well. The more clathrates melt, the more the global temperature 
rises, causing further warming in the Arctic and more clathrates to melt.10
In the Arctic, one positive feedback loop (the melting of the ice) may 
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eventually trigger another, and both, taken together, may trigger similar 
vicious circles elsewhere on the planet. Once these processes kick in for 
good, they will bring into play such powerful physical forces on such a 
wide scale that nothing human beings can do will make much difference. 
One can thus entirely understand why a group of scientists formed 
the Arctic Methane Emergency Group to draw the world's attention to 
this situation and its potentially catastrophic consequences. In the wake 
of the huge ice melt in summer 2012, and Peter Wadhams’s new estimate 
that a full summer melt will occur as soon as 2015, that group now states 
openly that without a huge geoengineering project to increase Arctic ice, 
global climate catastrophe is inevitable.11 So far this is a minority view, 
albeit from those most directly involved in Arctic climate research. The 
scientific community as a whole has not yet endorsed those findings. 
Nevertheless, the fact that researchers closely attuned to this crucial 
region of the planet have arrived at such dire conclusions is a good sign 
that we’ve reached the final moments in which we might salvage a future 
for the biosphere we know.
The news about the Arctic is so bad that we must all be forgiven for 
asking two or three questions almost immediately.
 Why didn’t anyone tell us this was happening? Major media outlets have 
at times covered the astonishing ice melt in the Arctic, but they have sel-
dom discussed its wider implications or its potential impact on the future 
of the planet. But their relative silence in this regard is not surprising. 
The national media in the United States, at least until the recent past, has 
pretended that there are “two sides” to a “debate” as to whether climate 
change is real and whether human activities are causing it—questions 
that have been settled in the scientific community for over twenty years. 
Their hesitant, half-hearted, and often inaccurate reporting on climate 
change is so notorious it has led scientists to issue firm, even resound-
ing statements on the subject, to ponder at length how they might get 
the message out—and to throw up their hands in frustration that all their 
efforts in this regard have gone for naught.
 Why has the situation changed so fast? Isn’t climate change supposed to be 
a gradual process? The response of the biosphere can take many forms, not 
all of them gradual. But we could assume that at least our contributions to 
the problem might increase at a steady pace. As it turns out, however, that 
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assumption is wrong. A few years ago, we might reasonably have expected 
global greenhouse gas emissions to rise at a gradual pace. But as it turns 
out, those emissions have risen much more rapidly since the early 1990s 
than anyone expected. Scientists have been warning us for a long time to 
change our ways, but instead we have dramatically worsened the problem. 
Why should we be surprised when the biosphere responds accordingly?
What are we supposed to do now? Do we have time left to do anything at 
all? Anyone who tries to answer these questions is in a real dilemma. To 
say that we do have time is to endorse what might be a false optimism, 
supporting the belief that our usual approach to political problems—
the slow, incremental task of building support and crafting a coalition 
for Congressional and international action—will work in time. Nothing 
could be less sure. In fact, given our deplorable track record in recent 
years and the enormity of the challenge, our chances for rising to this 
challenge in time seem ridiculously small. On the other hand, saying that 
we are truly out of time is to pretend to have a knowledge we don’t actu-
ally possess. Things are not looking good for planet Earth, but we cannot 
yet be certain that all hope is lost. Our understanding of the clathrate melt 
in the Arctic, for example, is still at its beginning stages, as further com-
ments from the primary researchers on that topic suggest.12 Moreover, 
the global climate is so complex that certain geophysical patterns might 
be emerging of which we know even less. We can’t claim to have mastered 
the situation. Without that mastery, it would be foolish to declare with 
some fanfare that we are truly out of time.
For the last decade or two we have known that we live at the cross-
roads of history, charged with the task of deciding the fate of the Earth 
and thus of humanity. So far we have been incapable of resolute action, 
still caught within the tides of our traditions and habits, as if utterly dis-
abled in the face of the task.
In the meantime, time is passing. The developments in the Arctic—
and elsewhere—suggest that we may have already made our choice, that 
we are now venturing down the path of destruction. We can’t be sure this 
event has taken place, but we certainly can’t proceed with the confidence 
that we still have time. We are now caught in a surpassingly strange, hor-
rific moment—a moment when we cannot help but think, is it too late? 
Do we still have a future?
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Other books have described the physical realities of the climate. 
Others have reviewed the host of things we could do to reduce our 
greenhouse gas emissions and discontinue other practices that damage 
the biosphere. Still others have explained very well our options for using 
new technologies, converting to renewable energy, and adopting new 
policies on the national and international scales for making those trans-
formations possible. All of these books and others have urged us to take 
action in time.
This book will take up those themes as well; it must do so to describe 
the basics of our present situation. Without question, we must grasp the 
essentials of the problem, the practical dimensions of the solution, and 
the implications of both for what we should do.
But the emphasis of this book ultimately lies elsewhere. If we stick 
only to the scientific, technical, and political questions, if we imagine 
that we can face this challenge as knowing and planning creatures, we 
neglect the implications of this moment for every level of our human 
being. Moreover, if we urge action now, as we must, and then stop there, 
we sidestep the wider implications of the possibility that, despite all 
the warnings and efforts of the past couple of decades, we will not take 
action in time. What if it is now too late? What if we now face a disap-
pearing future?
Once we ask these questions, the entire conversation changes. We 
have long known what is at stake; no one aware of climate change has 
doubted that it threatens the viability of the world we know. Climate 
change is not just a crisis for the biosphere; it is a crisis for our very sig-
nificance and purpose as human beings. It represents a stunning change 
in the climate of all human emotion. But now we face the possibility that 
we will not be able to avoid passing the point of no return—of triggering 
severe, irreversible climate change. 
In the past those who have commented on climate change have 
warned us to act before reaching this point, drawing on this dire threat 
to motivate us. Nearly every book on climate change has ended on an 
optimistic note, explaining how this crisis is ultimately an opportunity, a 
chance to turn things around, to create an environmentally friendly econ-
omy and a newly responsible society. This way of thinking about the chal-
lenge corresponded well to the nature of the threat over most of the last 
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two decades, when we still had confidence we had time to make a differ-
ence. Over that period, it made sense that we could scarcely confront the 
dire realities of climate change without a certain optimism, without that 
shift from horror to the possibility of transformation. As a result, we have 
seldom if ever truly looked into the prospect of a disappearing future.
To some extent this way of thinking must still apply: after all, the 
demand for urgent action is now greater than ever and has, if anything, 
become a supreme ultimatum. Without question, we must do everything 
humanly possible to change our society and to avoid triggering ulti-
mate calamity.
But if we are honest, we must admit that the events of the past few 
years undermine the prospects of a happy ending more than ever. Nearly 
all of the time for action has slipped by. It is thus time for us to face this 
crisis in a new way—not to abandon our efforts for change, not to forget 
the range of excellent initiatives for shifting our economies onto a new 
basis, but to contemplate, for the first time, what it means for us if we fail. 
Doing so will be difficult; it will require new resources of honesty, new 
capacities to endure dark thoughts, and new reserves of patience for the 
intolerable. It may ask more of us than we have to give. 
If we continue to insist that we have time in the face of increasing evi-
dence that it is running out, we would be less than honest: sticking with 
that familiar optimistic scenario to the exclusion of all else would commit 
us to a form of repression, defensiveness, willful blindness—indeed, to a 
version of denial itself.
This moment thus requires us to do something we seldom imag-
ine: fighting for the planet even if it may be too late, sticking with all our 
efforts—and increasing them—precisely when we begin to admit that 
the cause may be lost. The developments of these recent years suggests 
that our whole way of imagining the crisis must change: these days we 
are stuck with the anguish of the last-ditch effort, the attempt to snatch 
victory out of the jaws of defeat—with that minimal, desperate slogan: 
never say die.
We cannot turn away from the new realities of this moment. We now 
face questions not simply about the scientific, technological, economic, 
or political dimensions of this crisis, although they remain crucial, but 
also about its human significance. If we cannot face them, we will have 
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lost something precious: our capacity to live with at least a minimal dose 
of integrity and truth.
These questions are among the toughest we will ever have to face. In 
some sense they are impossible to answer. But in this book, I will attempt 
to face them nevertheless—not to answer them, not to give the illusion 
we can truly know what we are doing under their pressure, but to explore 
what it is like to dwell with them, to live under their weight and darkness: 
What is the present for, if the future is on the verge of disappearing? How 
are we to live if that future is in doubt?
Those questions are supremely tough in part because they come to us 
in addition to the demands that our existing discussion of climate change 
impose on us. Those demands are already considerable; they have been 
so stark that we have scarcely been able to engage them well. Before tak-
ing up the core questions of this book, then, it may be wise to linger over 
these latter demands, familiar as they are.
Why have we been so stuck? What has made it so hard for us to face 
the current crisis as if we were actually sane and responsible people?
The honest answer, I think, is that this is an unprecedented crisis, pos-
ing challenges to us that we have never faced before and in response to 
which we are utterly at a loss.
First of all, if we are to tackle the fundamental aspects of climate 
change, nearly all of us are forced to examine realities well outside our 
expertise, to read, learn, and judge scientific findings for which we often 
have little preparation. Previous crises did not demand this task of us. 
For most of the modern era, people could read the newspaper or speak 
with friends to assess for themselves the state of public affairs; no special 
expertise was necessary. Even in the nuclear era, citizens did not have to 
learn the physics of the nuclear reaction to realize what had taken place 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: those events were real and the devastating 
effects of those weapons palpable.
In our era, however, we are asked to grapple with a phenomenon that 
is not a singular event, not a known threat, but the context for possible 
events—a context that we must learn about through the careful work of 
hundreds of scientists. Moreover, it is never obvious whom we can trust 
to mediate that work to us, to explain what the science has actually found: 
since so many participants in the debate deny that there is a problem, 
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or suggest that there is genuine disagreement between scientists about 
whether climate change is real, we are not sure whom to believe. For no 
previous crisis has a similar situation been the case.
Our hesitation in accepting the reality of the challenge arises as well 
from the tendency to trust our own experience. If our lives and environ-
ments feel mostly familiar to us, it is hard for us to accept that something 
is dramatically amiss. Intuitively, we hesitate to act on any claim that is 
not evident to us in our own experience, not visible to the naked eye, not 
confirmed by authorities we have already chosen. In this regard, climate 
change is truly unprecedented: it touches us right where we live, calls us 
to consider our moral responsibility to ourselves, to others, and to the 
future—without offering us any obvious confirmation. It asks us for a 
serious moral commitment without providing us with the foundations 
we usually ask for when taking that kind of step.
But that is not all. If we do accept the reality of climate change, and 
our responsibility for causing most of it, that realization is so wounding 
that we may not wish to grapple with it any further. The prospect that 
the planet’s future is in danger is most likely to fill us with anger, horror, 
and desperate hope. Underneath all these responses lies a sense of great 
dread. And we have almost nothing to help us live with that dread.
There is little or no precedent for that emotion. Even at the height of 
the nuclear arms race, when people were forced to contemplate the pos-
sibility of global annihilation, at least they were aware that the conflagra-
tion could erupt from something other than the ordinary course of their 
lives. A nuclear war would be a devastating interruption of the way things 
were. Climate change is different: it threatens to transform our entire 
world if we stick to our current habits, founded as they are on the extrav-
agant use of fossil fuels. Our way of living threatens itself. No previous 
generation of human beings has ever confronted that possibility—at least 
not on the planetary scale. 
This shift from a singular horror to everyday disaster is hard for us to 
accept: somehow, a cataclysmic event is easier to understand than climate 
change. After all, such an event isn’t that different from the thought of our 
own deaths. Most of us are quite aware that our lives might go horribly 
wrong at any moment. We know that a random accident could kill us, 
disfigure us, or change our personalities before we have any warning at 
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all. Even worse, a freak event could destroy all the people we love. That's 
just the way things are.
But climate change is different. Nowadays, our everyday lives are the 
source of the problem: everything we depend upon to live as we do—
the energy we use to get around, to heat or cool our homes, to power 
the industry that produces the goods we use—is also pumping enough 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that eventually our climate will 
be transformed. The societies in which we live are causing events to 
take place that could directly threaten how we live. It's not that there is a 
chance something horrible might happen; this time, we know it will hap-
pen if we stay calm and carry on.
Even worse, once we decide to confront this pain and take action, 
we realize that the task may be beyond our capacity. The most dire chal-
lenges of the past look easy in comparison to what we face. Consider the 
long drive to abolish slavery in the United States. Abolitionists fought for 
generations to eradicate that institution without success. Slaveholders, 
however moved by moral appeal, often felt incapable of liberating their 
slaves because in doing so they would lose too much “property”; to treat 
their slaves as free human beings would simply cost them too much. 
Most chose prudence over humanity, allowing financial considerations to 
trump ethical principles. The same thing is happening today: we in the 
developed nations are the equivalent of slaveholders, resting easy on the 
fierce subordination of the world’s ecosystems (and more). 
In the United States, it took a war to bring about abolition. That event 
came at a great cost and nearly tore the republic apart. Yet that fight could 
succeed in part because abolition sought to undo an institution that was 
closely linked to one region of the nation. Today, climate change arises 
from the actions of people throughout America and around the world. 
No force will wage war against us to force us to change. As a result, we in 
the United States and elsewhere will have to renounce our privilege vol-
untarily. We will have to call on all our ethical reserves to make a whole-
sale renunciation of privilege. There really is no historical precedent for 
our doing anything of the sort.
The problem is not that we are uniquely corrupt, hopelessly selfish; it 
is rather that history now confronts us with a challenge to which no prior 
generation has ever arisen. We’re being asked to do the impossible. 
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No wonder we’d rather do virtually anything to evade the task. None 
of us really wants to believe it is happening. We almost automatically 
put up great resistance to accepting it. Even those of us who react with 
despair or anguish typically move on quite soon to the realities of ordi-
nary life. On some level, all of us are in denial. Who would welcome the 
thought of such a profound transformation? Facing the facts is the last
thing any of us might wish to do.
If that is the case, then the strangeness of our response to it begins 
to make sense. The prospect of climate change is so unwelcome that the 
widespread outcry against its reality seems virtually inevitable. Climate 
change is nothing less than an assault on who we think we are: it exposes 
the fact that the economies of the developed world are founded on a 
lie, that our way of life takes for granted the eventual destruction of the 
Earth, and that persisting with it makes us complicit in a great crime. 
Nobody wants to accept those realities. It is thus remarkably satisfying 
for many people to turn our instinctive denial into a full-fledged, explicit, 
and articulate claim that nothing is amiss.
It is quite obvious that in doing so, we would cease to function as sane 
and responsible adults. At this stage of the evidence, to embrace denial 
is ultimately to choose the destruction of the Earth. But it does not fol-
low that doing the opposite—choosing a sane response—is welcome to 
us, for it asks us to transform the foundations of our lives. To overcome 
denial requires us to accept that we have been living a lie for many gen-
erations, that our entire civilization is on the course toward committing 
ecocide—a crime much greater than genocide, though intimately bound 
up with it—and that our most intimate assumptions are monstrous 
if not worse.
If we do manage to rise to this challenge, we will have accomplished 
a feat virtually unique in human history. If we do not, our failure will be 
understandable, even if it will make us uniquely horrific. Either way, our 
generation will be the only of its kind in the history of the species. No 
wonder this moment feels so strange.
But the difficulty of our situation is still greater. Even if we are entirely 
persuaded we must do something and we attempt to do so on our own, 
it’s not as if any one of us, or even a large social movement, has the power 
to do enough. In our own lives, we might take many steps to do much less 
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to harm the biosphere, but those individual actions can never be enough 
as long as industrial and agricultural enterprises, and indeed entire 
nations, continue on with business as usual. As a result, we are caught 
in the contradiction between our willingness to act and the radical lim-
its of our agency, between ethical principle and pragmatic reality. We 
might fight hard to push beyond that contradiction, to force the nations 
to change, but so far very little transformation has taken place; accord-
ingly, we have little choice but to live within a social context still shaped 
by a denial we may not share, still caught up in habits we wish to break. 
Because we cannot produce the infrastructure of our society on our own, 
or manufacture the goods we use, we may end up inhabiting an economic 
system we deplore. 
Faced with these seemingly impossible odds, we may resort to any 
number of plausible responses. We might, for example, simply throw up 
our hands in despair. In all bitterness, we may conclude that the task is 
too huge, the cost too great, the resistance so formidable, that it is impos-
sible to worry about climate change any further. After all, we might argue, 
its worst effects won't happen until after we are dead: let later genera-
tions face them.
But here again, climate change won't let us pass it by. True enough, 
the idea that those effects will take place well into the future is surpris-
ingly familiar across the political spectrum. Many people evidently 
assume that climate change will really come down hard on someone else, 
probably their grandchildren. Even James Hansen, one of those who first 
brought the concept of global warming to the attention of Congress and 
an advocate for greatly decreasing our greenhouse gas emissions, titled 
his recent book Storms of My Grandchildren. And James Garvey, in his 
excellent book, The Ethics of Climate Change, bases his analysis on our 
ethical obligation to others, especially to those in future generations.13 
But do we really think that what happens to later generations is only 
a matter of our ethical obligation to them? The attitude we display as we 
carry out most of our activities tells us otherwise. If we build a city, don't 
we want it to endure? If we enjoy our local traditions, don't we want them 
to retain their charm? If we educate the young, don't we want them to 
flourish? If we bring about a medical breakthrough, don't we want it to 
help people live long and healthy lives? If we create a work of art, don't 
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we want it to be enjoyed by posterity? If we write a book, don't we want 
it to be read? If we cherish the great cultural and historical achievements 
of the past, don't we want to pass them down to others after us? In short, 
what actions do we take that do not imply a relation to the future? What 
would be the point of our lives if the future were to disappear?
The future is never just for the people of the future; without that future, 
what we do now loses its force. Without a future, there is no present and not 
much of a past. Climate change isn't just about our obligation to others. 
It's about our own lives, too.
If we give up on climate change, we cancel the present. We choose to 
make all of our ordinary activities meaningless, as if we want to become 
shadows of ourselves, or as if we want to float forever in a world with-
out foundations. None of us would choose such a fate. Yet choosing the 
opposite—a radical change in who we are—is immensely difficult as 
well. One option is horrific, the other impossible. But no other options 
are available.
At every turn, climate change puts us in new situations. It is truly 
unprecedented, not just as a material reality, but in its impact on our ordi-
nary lives, our ability to understand it, our willingness to face its implica-
tions, and our capacity to discuss those implications for our societies. If it 
throws us off, if it inspires odd reactions in us or others, we shouldn't be 
surprised. Climate change is intrusive, insidious, anonymous, implacable. 
Yet it won't let us turn away. Endlessly, ruthlessly, climate change inter-
rupts us, throws us off, and asks of us what we barely know how to give.
To take the full measure of that challenge, this book must of course 
bring into view the practical realities of our time. But the purpose in 
doing so is always to ponder their further dimensions, to think about 
their implications for all that we are.
In the chapters that follow, the first key step is to assess our current sit-
uation as honestly as possible, confronting it without denial and without 
reserve. Only on this basis can we begin to ponder the full implications of 
our dilemma. The task is not simply to review the facts but to allow them 
to sink in, to speak to us where we live, and to overcome our resistance to 
their full implications. Accordingly, I will first go back to the basics and 
grapple with climate change itself—to understand its impact on any one 
of us where we live. The next step, equally essential, is to consider what 
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we can do to remove the causes of climate change and to ask whether we 
can take action in time to make a difference. The third step, key to any 
understanding of our present dilemma, is to consider why we are so hesi-
tant to take action on the scale required—and whether, given our enor-
mous population as human beings on a small planet, doing so will finally 
solve our environmental crisis. These initial steps will be the concerns of 
chapters one through five. 
After exploring the physical and political realities as directly as pos-
sible, the book will then take up its core challenge of thinking about the 
human implications of the dilemma before us and to delve into their ulti-
mate consequences. It will ask, what is it like to be alive at this strange 
moment? What is the present for, if the future is disappearing? How 
can we respond, if the point of our lives is dissolving, yet we live on? In 
exploring these questions from chapters six through eight, the book will 
bring forward the impact of the environmental crisis on our own lives, 
sketching the outline of an intimate disarray we are now beginning to 
experience in full force. 
Having considered these tough, harrowing questions, the book will 
then seek a way through that disarray to a basis for living with integrity 
even in the midst of the ruins. What can anchor our actions on behalf 
of others and for the sake of all living things if the damage to the Earth 
is nearly irreversible, if the prospects for warding off disaster are dim-
ming? How might we respond to natural forces with respect if they now 
threaten us with greater violence than before? Here the book will pro-
pose that our best option is to own disaster, to accept responsibility for 
what humanity has done to the biosphere, and thus commit ourselves to 
making reparation—and on that basis, to take concrete ethical actions in 
our own lives no matter what others may do. It will suggest as well that 
we may greet the ferocity of the whirlwind with awe, accepting at last our 
limited place within the biosphere and finding a renewed foundation for 
enduring whatever may come.
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Chapter 1
Climate Change Will Happen to You
By now, many of us have some sense of the basics of climate change. 
We've seen images of melting ice, stranded polar bears, and calving gla-
ciers. We've examined the charts depicting the rise in atmospheric car-
bon dioxide or heard about them. We've surmised whether Hurricane 
Katrina and various floods or droughts were caused by global warming. 
Maybe we’ve seen An Inconvenient Truth or read books about climatol-
ogy. In fact, if polls are to be believed, most Americans accept the basic 
reality of climate change and would like the nation and the international 
community to do something about it. 
But many of us might also hesitate to accept aspects of the science 
about climate change—whether it’s actually happening or whether 
human activities are causing it. Since nothing I will say in the rest of 
this book will make much sense unless readers grapple first with these 
questions, if you are still cautious in these respects I recommend that 
you turn now to the Appendix, where I discuss them, and then return to 
this chapter. 
Working through those concerns carefully is essential: if our deci-
sions are to have a firm basis, if we are to live with real deliberation, 
we should not skip over any stage of the process. It’s not likely we can 
become fully conscious of our situation as human beings without having 
paused to learn the fundamental physical facts of climate change. If you 
have already done so, keep reading: this is the chapter for you. 
As it turns out, recognizing the reality of climate change—and its 
being caused by human beings—is only the start of a deep engagement 
with what confronts us. The further we go and the more we recognize the 
potential impact of climate change on our own lives, the more we may try 
to protect ourselves from what we learn so that we can continue with our 
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lives in good conscience. Often it is quite easy to do so. For good reason, 
the typical discussion of global warming sticks close to the science; the 
difficulty of the subject for lay readers and the need for an explanation 
that can cut through the fog of rancorous debate require that the subject 
be handled with as little fuss as possible. But as a result, even the best 
presenters of the science write as if the facts will speak for themselves, as 
if there are no obstacles in our lives that would interfere with a full accep-
tance of what they say. In fact, few of us are free of such obstacles; most of 
us filter what we hear in some fashion or indulge a tendency to simplify 
or deny, misconstrue or exaggerate, the full import of the facts—at least 
in part, and perhaps unconsciously.
Delving further into climate change, in short, requires an increas-
ingly direct confrontation with realities that we would rather ignore. 
Accordingly, for nearly all of us, the chief task is to break through the 
tendency to keep the entire problem at a distance from our actual lives. 
The challenge is to identify and confront the most representative ways we 
evade what the scientific research teaches us and thus to encounter the 
truth as fully as we can.
So let’s begin with perhaps the first key objection one might make 
to the notion that climate change is a serious and immediate threat 
to humanity.
Yes, a voice protests, climate change is real and will have serious conse-
quences, but not right away; we have plenty of time to figure out what we'll do 
to keep its worst effects from taking place.
To some extent, my discussion of our current situation in the open-
ing pages of this book may provide an adequate, if hasty, reply. But to 
respond more fully to this objection, it may be valuable to slow down 
here and outline the overall context of contemporary scientific thinking 
on this question.
This objection relies on the scientific uncertainty with regard to exactly 
how much harm greenhouse gas emissions will eventually have. The esti-
mates in the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (henceforth IPCC), the international body that assembles and 
summarizes the current state of scientific knowledge for the benefit of 
the world’s governments (and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along 
with Al Gore, in 2007), have indeed varied widely. More importantly, 
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however, the sense that we have time to put together a response is also 
implicit in the slow pace of negotiations over international agreements 
about emissions—not to mention the even slower pace of compliance 
with the cuts already specified in the Kyoto Protocol. (Very few nations 
that signed those accords have begun to make substantial cuts in their 
emissions, despite the publicity over their promise to do so.)14 The same 
patience is evident in the fact that these negotiators either set modest 
cuts in emissions (as at Kyoto) or distant dates for compliance.
The greatest virtue of this patient approach is its realism about the dif-
ficulty of finding agreement, changing our carbon-based culture, and cut-
ting emissions deeply enough to make a difference. Anyone who reflects 
on how difficult it will be to transform our societies to the necessary 
degree must empathize with the bone-deep pragmatism of negotiators, 
their acceptance of the political conditions we face and the necessity of 
working within them to achieve anything that will matter.
But very little in the scientific research can justify such patience. 
For one thing, a portion of the carbon dioxide we emit remains in the 
atmosphere for a century or more. As a result, even if we soon curtail the 
amount of carbon dioxide we produce, levels of that gas will remain high 
throughout the rest of this century at least, forcing changes to the climate 
throughout that long period. In effect, our actions long ago are being felt 
today, and our actions today will be felt for many decades to come. The 
longer we continue our current habits, the greater the difficulties future 
generations will have to face. Unless we are fairly certain that today's 
emissions will do no harm later on, we should do what we can today.
Moreover, although views differ about the effects that will follow from 
our emissions, it would be foolish to assume that only the more opti-
mistic projections are true. If the science is uncertain in this regard, we 
should listen to the full spectrum of considered judgment before opting 
for a slow-motion strategy. If we listen in this way, we will soon discover 
that things may be substantially worse than we might think. 
The major debate among climate change scientists today is not 
whether climate change is real but whether it will have a more severe 
effect on Earth's ecosystems in the future than we previously thought. 
One element contributing to this debate is research into the problem 
of positive feedback loops of the sort I mentioned at the beginning of 
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this book. These vicious circles emerge when the warming temperature 
causes the release of more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, which 
cause a further increase in temperature, and on around again. Once these 
vicious circles become strong enough, they constitute “tipping points” 
that lead to an irreversible sequence of events and an unstoppable rise in 
temperature. The more gases we emit and the longer we wait to change 
our habits, the more likely we will cross these tipping points, making it 
even more difficult to postpone the arrival of serious climate change with 
all its consequences.
In his book on the subject, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists 
Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change, Fred Pearce reviews a wide array 
of potential “positive feedback loops” that could arise in a number of 
regions of the world. Some of these tipping points may indeed be decades 
away. But we threaten to cross others in the fairly near future, if we have 
not done so already.15 
Several key examples of tipping points are those I explored at the 
beginning of this book. As I mentioned there, the stunning melt of the 
Arctic sea ice in the summer of 2012 suggests to many observers that this 
process has now crossed the tipping point and become irreversible.
A second example, also related to the discussion in the introduction, 
is the possibility that the methane clathrates on the seabeds around the 
globe will begin to melt and release gas into the atmosphere.16 If this 
feedback loop gets going on any large scale, we are in for big trouble, for 
there are untold quantities of methane capable of being released in this 
fashion. One estimate suggests that the methane in the clathrates in all 
the world's oceans is around four thousand times the amount in today's 
atmosphere.17 
Researchers typically guess that such a clathrate melt will take place 
only at much later stages of climate change. In 2008, Mark Lynas sug-
gested that this potential clathrate melt might take place on an Earth 
that had warmed 5° Centigrade over preindustrial temperatures.18 But 
already, as I mentioned above, the clathrate melt is beginning on a shal-
low continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. That relatively local event does 
not suggest that the clathrates around the world are about to melt as well. 
But because clathrates exist in such huge numbers, even a melt in only 
a small fraction of their total bulk would be enough to shift the Earth’s 
Climate Change Will Happen to You 27
climate severely. We are already seeing what might be the beginnings of 
that event, in which case it is making itself felt at temperatures far lower 
than we expected, and several decades earlier as well.
There is yet another worrisome instance looming not far from the arc-
tic region. One of the most pressing instances of a possible tipping point 
is the melting permafrost throughout the far North—in Siberia, Alaska, 
and northern Canada. When it melts, it releases immense volumes of car-
bon dioxide and methane. Once the release of these gases hits a certain 
point, it will cause so much further warming—and further melting of the 
permafrost—that the results will be irreversible.
The tipping point for the permafrost is not far away. One study that 
appeared in January 2011 strikingly predicts that the feedback loop in 
the far North will cause the arctic permafrost to become a net source 
(not sink) of carbon and methane after the mid-2020s and will be strong 
enough to cancel between 42 and 88 percent of the planet’s land-based 
capacity to absorb those emissions.19 
These examples may imply that only the feedback loops of the far 
North—the Arctic ice, the clathrates, the permafrost—are of concern. 
But consider what is transpiring in the Amazon region. Rising tempera-
tures and an associated decline in rainfall have led to the drying of the 
Amazon rainforest, causing trees there to grow less and making them 
more vulnerable to decay and to wildfires, as well as to the very serious 
droughts of 2005 and 2010.20 This process has gone so far by now that by 
some estimates this ecosystem now releases more carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere than it absorbs.21 Think about it: the Amazon, once famous for 
being one of the Earth's best ecosystems for soaking up immense quanti-
ties of carbon dioxide—and for pumping huge quantities of oxygen into 
the atmosphere—may already be helping to drive global warming rather 
than alleviate it, and if not, is likely to do so very soon. Once we cross that 
tipping point for good, an entire array of planetary systems that dominate 
not far from the Equator will be transformed as well. That example sug-
gests that the Earth’s systems in every region are vulnerable to severe disar-
ray; no area of the biosphere is safe.
As realities like this suggest, if we ignore the causes that set these 
vicious circles into motion, we will face an impossible challenge, for in 
the following years, the results could wipe out any gains we might make 
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in reducing our greenhouse gas emissions. The Arctic sea melt is already 
irreversible. If any one of these other processes crosses the tipping point, 
we are in for major trouble. Yet all of these tipping points are drawing 
nearer every day. Our contribution to climate change right now is signifi-
cant enough, but once very large ecosystems get into the game, they will 
dwarf what we can do.
There you go again, another voice objects; you are sounding much too 
loud an alarm. Climate change is real and is caused by human beings, but 
don't make any reckless statements about its potential effects. Don't get carried 
away; cut back on statements that go too far, that warn against all kinds of 
horrible and devastating consequences. Some “skeptics” apply this advice to 
nearly all discussions of climate change, advocating what they regard as a 
“moderate” estimate of global warming's dangers; others, such as Claire 
Parkinson, a clear-sighted scientist well within the mainstream who oth-
erwise has a great deal to teach us, targets more narrow claims.22 
No doubt it is best for all participants in the debate to stick as closely 
as possible to demonstrable findings. But because this argument places 
far more emphasis on curbing wild talk than the danger of the crisis itself, 
it ultimately treats caution and politeness as more important than the 
future of the planet. Such a preference reveals an excessive distaste for 
the language of crisis. This kind of talk, some think, is always irresponsi-
ble, just a form of panic-mongering. Evidently, a responsible, sane person 
should avoid speaking of an emergency or doing anything reckless, like 
proposing that we consider modifying our way of life. But to focus on 
excessive statements rather than the underlying threat of climate change 
diverts attention from the most pressing concerns to relatively marginal 
ones. It's as if these authors live in a house that is starting to burn down, 
but would do anything rather than actually sound the alarm: that would 
be noisy and rude! 
This preference for understating the severity of the threat, as it turns 
out, is shared not only by a handful of scientists but may characterize the 
general tone of climate science overall. One recent study suggests that 
“scientists are biased not toward alarmism but the reverse,” toward “err-
ing on the side of less rather than more alarming predictions,” possibly 
because researchers generally adhere to the “scientific norms of restraint, 
objectivity, skepticism, rationality, dispassion, and moderation.” The 
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authors of this study argue that climate scientists have more often under-
stated the potential impact of climate change than the opposite, fearful of 
coming across as alarmist or incautious in their findings.23 
While in many contexts this bias toward caution may serve scientific 
research well, in the arena of controversy over climate change it may rein-
force our belief that the situation is not that dire after all. In short, it can 
feed into our sense that things are all right and will work themselves out 
in some fashion. Such a viewpoint is clearly a mode of denial, even if one 
who espouses it is otherwise remarkably insightful. As Parkinson herself 
admits late in her book, she is less concerned about the future than oth-
ers because she believes that “surely” inventors will create new energy 
alternatives that will make fossil fuels a thing of the past, and by implica-
tion will do so in time for us to avoid the ill effects of climate change.24
But it is naive to suggest that a solution will simply appear or that it even 
if it does it will take effect immediately. Inventions take time to manu-
facture and even longer to produce on a massive scale that this occasion 
requires. Only a supreme confidence, however unjustified—only a belief 
in the secular equivalent of a miracle—can explain such a distaste for 
talk of crisis.
All right, one might say, it's happening, we're causing it, and it may be 
worse than we thought. But from what I see, it may not happen here. After 
all, most of the images we associate with climate change depict what is 
happening elsewhere—in the Arctic, for example, or around the distant 
islands that will soon be swallowed by rising waters. Seldom do we see 
images of the effects of climate change on us where we live. Of course, we 
are aware that our summers are warmer than before, our growing seasons 
longer, our climate more erratic and surprising. But so far very few of us 
have been lost on melting sea ice or swamped by the rising tides.
Most of us are so used to thinking about climate change in this man-
ner that it is very difficult for us to get beyond it. Perhaps only a brutal 
restatement of our situation will get us out of the habit and help us focus 
on what will happen to us in our own immediate surroundings. So here 
it is: climate change is devastating, absolutely powerful, undismissible, 
even if in our darker, most selfish moments we might want to say “damn 
the ice caps” or “the hell with Tuvalu,” even if we might wish to mutter 
so as no one can hear, “pfft to plankton” or “good riddance to the coral 
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reefs.” Climate change won’t just harm others, forcing the Peruvians to 
suffer from thirst or sweeping more Bangladeshis away in flooding seas; 
on the contrary, we better pay serious attention, for our own way of life is 
on the line.
For one thing, as I mentioned in the introduction, the changes in 
the Arctic are already altering weather patterns over the northern hemi-
sphere. Just consider the strange events in the United States in 2012: the 
huge thunderstorm and tornado complex—the derecho—that swept 
over central and eastern portions of the country starting on June 29; 
the vast wildfires in the West beginning as early as April; the massive 
drought in the Midwest, threatening food crops and on occasion closing 
Mississippi River traffic; and Superstorm Sandy that wreaked havoc over 
major parts of the Northeast in November. In that single year, the altered 
climate caused significant harm to nearly every region of the country. 
And that’s just 2012: the same pattern is borne out by the bizarre epi-
sodes—too many to list—in the seasons since then. Researchers now 
state outright that there is a strong link between climate change and 
these extreme weather patterns. According to the Environment America 
Research & Policy Center, the frequency of extreme precipitation events 
has increased by 30 percent from 1948 to 2011.25 Are you confident that 
you will escape such events in the forthcoming years and decades?26 
Climate change will be just as real where you live as anywhere else on 
Earth. In the United States, it will raise average temperatures; increase the 
amount of moisture in the air, making heavy precipitation events (of rain 
or snow) more likely, thus causing an increase in flooding and landslides; 
increase the number of blisteringly hot days in the summer; change the 
water cycle and increase evaporation, in most regions resulting in a drier 
landscape and more frequent droughts; and create the conditions for 
more insect and waterborne diseases. It will force the migration of local 
species into new habitats further north, as well as the absorption of spe-
cies moving from the south, thus altering the balance between mutually 
dependent forms of life within each local ecosystem. The changes to the 
water cycle will alter the rivers, streams, and open landscapes throughout 
the country and the fundamental character of each region. These changes, 
and many more, are likely to have an adverse effect on food production, 
outdoor activities, seasonal rituals, the physical structures we have built, 
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public health, and local and regional economies. We may end up living in 
natural systems that are not only rapidly changing, but also much weaker 
and in some cases dying out altogether. We'll be far less comfortable right 
where we live than we once were.27 
At first changes of this kind may seem overstated. For example, the 
fact that the zones with a particular average annual temperature will be 
shifting northwards might not initially sound so bad. After all, one might 
argue, ecosystems further south hang together quite well; wouldn't they 
fare equally well if they moved to the north? But many species are less 
able to compete with or displace species that already live in regions to 
the north, to reproduce quickly and thus adjust to new living conditions, 
and to move across miles of territory in a few years, suggesting that some 
portions of an ecosystem will migrate successfully while others will not. 
Some species might be mobile enough to move on, but if they did so, 
would lose access to their sources of food or to the habitats (river valleys, 
mountains) where they previously flourished. Forms of life that flour-
ish in mountainous terrain may have only so far up the mountainside 
to migrate before running out of room. Unlike animals or birds, plants 
rooted in the soil might find it difficult to move quickly into new terrain. 
Many species will adapt to new conditions, but many others will not. 
Studies show that in the second half of the twentieth century, species on 
average migrated toward the poles at the rate of four miles per decade, 
while the zones in which they live—those defined by specific average 
temperatures—have migrated far more quickly, about thirty-five miles 
per decade.28 Over time, as warming continues, the species that can't 
move very fast will find themselves within much warmer temperature 
belts, will be unable to flourish within a climate too hot for them, and will 
succumb to natural forces.
Such pressures can take many forms. Consider the changes taking 
place in the pine forests of western North America, especially in British 
Columbia. The pine beetle, a native insect in those regions, is now repro-
ducing at a much greater rate than before; thanks to the warming winters, 
the warmer summers, and the reduction in summer precipitation, it is 
becoming a much more dominant species in those habitats than before. 
As a result, it is killing millions of acres of trees, converting the boreal for-
est of British Columbia from a carbon sink to a net emitter of carbon.29
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Such vast damage in those forests, needless to say, will have profound 
impacts in the entire ecosystem, changing the water cycle, the growth 
patterns across the formerly wooded landscape, and much more. This 
transformation is largely due to the activities of a single species and per-
fectly illustrates how the complex interactions between species in ecosys-
tems make them terribly vulnerable to climate change.
But changes due to the expansion of single species throughout a 
region are relatively subtle compared to the even broader transforma-
tions that every ecosystem will have to undergo. The effect of pine beetles 
in western forests pales in comparison to the even more dramatic effects 
of rising temperatures on the water cycle. The warming of the ecosystem 
increases evaporation and causes the gradual drying of the land, kill-
ing trees even where they are not vulnerable to insects. Recent research 
into the state of forests throughout the western United States shows that 
they are already experiencing a demographic shift—an increase in the 
number of trees dying and a decrease in the number of new trees grow-
ing per year—and that as a result they are approaching “thresholds for 
abrupt dieback.” The drier conditions as well as the increasing activity of 
various species of insects is leading to rising mortality in those forests.30
Evidently, climate change often works through several effects at once, 
each compounding the impact of others, creating conditions that are 
worse than any single process could bring about.
Similar changes are taking place in every region of the United States. 
In the Northeast, for example, climate change will drive the maple for-
ests further north, eventually depriving the region of the autumn colors 
distinctive to the region, and the rising seas and increasing intensity of 
storms will lead to greater storm surges, damages to wetlands, coastal 
flooding, and erosion (as the stunning effects of Superstorm Sandy have 
made abundantly clear). The Southeast will become so hot and dry that 
its pine forests may disappear; oxygen depletion in the region's lakes will 
kill off fish in lakes and streams; and more powerful tornadoes and hur-
ricanes will damage inland regions and coastal areas alike. The Southwest 
faces a dramatically altered future, one in which droughts will be longer 
and more intense than they were in the past, causing rivers and lakes to 
diminish and fires to spread more easily. The reduction in the snowpack 
over the Sierra Nevada in eastern California will lead to severe water 
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shortages in much of that state; in mid to late summer, people there may 
turn on the tap and find no water coming out. Needless to say, these and 
other changes will harm each region's food supply, sources of energy, dis-
tinctive landscape, and quality of life—if such a drab list of consequences 
can possibly capture the scale and intensity of what will take place.31 
It's not difficult to extrapolate this pattern to the rest of the planet. 
Clearly, climate change will have severe consequences for ecosystems 
around the world. Forests all across the world are in serious danger.32
Moreover, the stress on ecosystems is putting a fair portion of the plan-
et’s species under terrific pressure. Although it boggles the mind to sum 
up the possible effects on the Earth as a whole, some scientists have 
attempted to do so: one often-cited study by scientists on several conti-
nents who examined 1000 species concluded that under a mid-range esti-
mate of the severity of climate change—that is, with an increase of only 
around 2° Celsius above preindustrial levels, and only 1.2° over current 
temperatures—15 to 37 percent of Earth's land species could be “com-
mitted to extinction” by 2050, although a more recent study qualifies 
those findings and provides a somewhat less pessimistic assessment.33 
What about the sea? We often forget that climate change acidifies the 
oceans, harming organisms that rely on calcium carbonate to form shells 
or skeletons, including the coccolithophores, one of the most abundant 
types of plankton. The prospect that the further absorption of carbon 
dioxide into the oceans could damage the plankton, the first links of the 
marine food chain, is especially chilling. Scientists do not understand the 
potential effects of further acidification well, but given what we do know 
already, we have little reason for optimism.34 One study states that the 
oceans are acidifying at a rate ten times faster than they did 55 million 
years ago during a period of mass extinction for marine life, and another 
finds roughly a 1 percent decline per year in plankton since 1950 due to 
warming temperatures at the ocean’s surface.35 A recent study conducted 
by the International Programme on the State of the Ocean found far 
greater declines in oceanic life than expected; Alex Rogers, its scientific 
director, stated, “[A]lmost right across the board we're seeing changes 
that are happening faster than we'd thought, or in ways that we didn't 
expect to see for hundreds of years.”36 
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So far I have emphasized how climate change will put nearly all eco-
systems into severe disarray and force a good portion of the Earth’s spe-
cies into extinction. But for human beings, these biological realities are 
only part of the picture. For us, such vast damage will also deplete the 
pleasure we take in natural beauty—in the blossoming of a tree, the cry 
of a bird, the subtle coloring of a fish, the scent of bark, the interweav-
ing of forms on a tangled bank. The devastation of Earth’s living forms 
is also a traumatic blow to the beauty of the common day, the poetry of 
everyday life. 
So what, someone might respond; we've always had extinction, and 
we always will; there is nothing here to be upset about. But this time we're 
not talking about one species giving up its habitat to another over many 
decades or being pushed out under ordinary processes of natural selec-
tion. We're talking about a volatile combination of factors: wiping out 
the ecological niche of many species; making complex biological inter-
relations vulnerable to unforeseen interactions; and putting entire eco-
systems under duress. In fact, extinction at this pace and at these numbers 
deserves a stronger term; it is not just extinction, but the death or at least 
decay of entire natural systems, if not of the Earth itself. Some previous 
events in the planet's history caused a similar devastation—the impact of 
meteors, for example—but do we really want to compete with meteors to 
see which force can mess up the Earth the most?
All this is bad enough. But at the moment we are causing much more 
than climate change. If you factor in everything else that advanced indus-
trial civilization is doing to our local and regional ecosystems, the situa-
tion becomes even more difficult. All kinds of familiar practices on which 
we in the United States rely today—monoculture agriculture; the deple-
tion of water aquifers; the release of vast quantities of nitrogen into eco-
systems from fertilizer; large-scale farming of chickens, pigs, and cows, 
creating unprecedented quantities of manure effluent; the destruction 
of wetlands; the expansion of cities, suburbs, and exurbs; strip mining, 
mountaintop coal mining, and oil drilling in formerly protected areas; 
the release of untold quantities of plastics into the world’s waterways 
and oceans; overfishing; and the inadvertent importation of exotic spe-
cies, to name a few—already place our ecosystems under duress. To add 
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climate change, with all its consequences, to this pressure simply multi-
plies the danger.
All these factors make it clear that the transformations to ecosystems 
will take place right in our own neighborhoods. If you need an image to 
capture the relevance of climate change for you and yours, take a look 
at the natural life that surrounds you wherever you live and imagine it 
damaged or disappearing. Then remember for a moment that if climate 
change decimates an ecosystem, it won't come back—at least not in the 
form we know, and not for millennia. It will be gone for good.
Very well, someone might reply, that may be true for most regions, but 
some areas will no doubt benefit from climate change: their growing seasons 
will expand, more life will flourish there, and the winters will be more temper-
ate. Isn't climate change good news for some people?
It's true that climate change models have suggested that some areas 
may experience warming that will improve the growing season, for exam-
ple, or reduce the discomforts of winter. But it's naive to imagine that 
these changes are truly beneficial. As we've already seen, the warming 
climate has devastated the boreal forest of British Columbia; the loss of 
those cold winter nights, and of the shorter growing season, has not been 
a benefit there. Any so-called benefit to other regions is likely to have 
similar effects. 
Nevertheless, it's worth taking this objection seriously and thinking 
it through with another thought experiment. If we imagine that some 
region would actually benefit, then what might follow? For one thing, can 
we suppose that the people who live in the lucky region rely exclusively 
for their well-being on what happens there? Or do they live in houses 
built of imported materials, drive cars manufactured in other regions, 
eat food grown elsewhere? Conversely, do they sell their own wares to 
people who live elsewhere? What supports the economy of their region? 
If ecosystems in other regions are suffering, so also will the economic 
base in those regions, and the trading relationships will suffer as well. No 
region can imagine that it would survive easily on its own.
But for a moment, let's take this experiment to a second level and 
imagine that it could thrive all by itself. Perhaps people in a particular 
region would be very good at creating a self-sustaining economy. Very 
well. But if residents of other regions are suffering, doesn't it seem likely 
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they would migrate to the areas that lucked out? As a result, wouldn't 
those better-off areas be overwhelmed with people seeking a better life? 
What's more, does it seem likely these migrants would have been able to 
sell their homes at a good price? Would they always have secured jobs 
that paid them as well? The people in the lucky zone might find them-
selves trying to accommodate an inflow of stressed-out, disadvantaged 
people hoping to find a good place to live. If nonhuman species will have 
to migrate, people will too. What’s more, they will often have to migrate 
across national borders, leading to a whole range of crucial political ques-
tions. Once you factor in human mobility, you change the entire dynamic: 
a region whose climate might not be bad will have to face a massive social 
transformation, one that may stress out the region's ecosystem in turn.
So it simply isn't credible to suggest that climate change would benefit 
anyone in the long term. Because of the intricate web of our economies 
and the inevitability of migration, there are no guarantees. Perhaps if 
those who lived in this hypothetical lucky region put together a self-sus-
taining economy—and declared political independence, surrounded the 
entire zone with a thirty-foot fence to keep everyone else out, and taxed 
themselves silly to create a state-of-the-art military that could defeat any 
invaders—then they could live in relative abundance (if also in a state of 
perpetual selfishness and paranoia). Does that sound like a good future?
All right, says one last voice, even if everything you say is true—even if 
climate change will alter the ecosystems where I live or cause a massive social 
transformation in my region, what difference does it really make to me? I 
don't care about nature; if a lot of species go extinct, it's not going to affect me. 
Ecosystems may come and go, but in the modern world, what does it matter? 
I don't really object to social change in my neighborhood, either; by now we're 
all used to new developments of that kind. As long as I have a job and can live 
in my urban environment, with a car, a cell phone, a nice Internet connection, 
good heating, a working air conditioner, and plenty of food at my local super-
market, everything's going to be fine.
The voice that speaks here is at last the distinctive, perhaps mostly 
unconscious, voice of our own innate, indestructible narcissism. That 
profound cluelessness arises in all of us at the prospect of our own mor-
tality: though we acknowledge the reality of our eventual deaths on some 
level, we don't often live in accordance with that insight. The same applies 
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even more to the thought of what may happen to the Earth. Perhaps the 
greatest help to our narcissism in the face of global warming is the air 
conditioner: evidently, as long as we are assured we'll be able to live in 
a relatively comfortable indoor temperature in perpetuity, we sense that 
there is nothing much to worry about.
This version of the near future may seem surprisingly plausible. 
Perhaps even if the seas rise, the planet warms, and vast portions of the 
Earth are devastated by climate change, wealthy people living in some 
places will live in circumstances not entirely different from what they are 
used to. If they wish, they might well ignore the bad news arriving from 
around the country and the world—at least for a while. They might even 
dismiss the changes to the climate of their region, the dying forests on 
nearby mountains, the shrinking local rivers, and the new vulnerability of 
many plants, birds, and animals that live in their vicinity. But eventually 
they will find it difficult to ignore the dust storms that may result from 
the drying of vast regions; the dwindling water supply; the much harsher 
snowstorms, rainstorms, tornadoes, hurricanes, or windstorms; the occa-
sional severe floods (surprising, no doubt, given the general drying of the 
landscape); or the landslides and avalanches in nearby terrain. 
But natural disasters will only be part of the story. The slow devasta-
tion of ecosystems around the world will eventually take its toll. We are 
not likely to welcome the consequences of stress to agricultural regions, 
leading to rising food prices; nor of stress to the local water cycle, result-
ing in a lower water supply and perhaps water rationing; nor of global 
warming itself, causing occasional summer days with brutally high tem-
peratures. We will not be happy that climate change will cause long-term 
difficulty for many industries, including fishing, forestry, tourism, and 
outdoor recreation, and will impose immense costs on regions recover-
ing from natural disasters. Nor will we be pleased when climate change 
begins to eat away at the nation's economic growth rate—or more likely, 
cause a perpetual negative growth rate, forcing us into a permanent and 
devastating Climate Change Depression. It will be especially challenging 
to deal with these and other difficulties while also helping an increasing 
number of retirees meet their monthly expenses and pay for their medi-
cal care. Moreover, the consequences of international chaos on ordi-
nary lives might be painful as well. When nations begin to enter severe 
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domestic crises, endure new rounds of terrorist activity, or wage war 
against each other over basic natural resources, food supplies, population 
pressures, or rights of migration, one may find one’s own nation at war as 
well—or suffering the economic or political consequences of that unrest 
in other ways, even potentially within its own borders.
To imagine that we can shield ourselves from all these trends by 
retreating to living spaces, turning on the air conditioner, and enter-
taining ourselves in some fashion simply ignores reality. In one way or 
another, the transformation of the planet will seep through those walls. 
We may find ourselves incensed at the result and might even mutter: why 
didn't they tell me it would be like this?
There really is no evading it: climate change is well under way, caused 
by human beings, and it will happen to you. 
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Chapter 2
What We Could Do
So if climate change is taking place, will intensify further in the coming 
years, and will hit us where we live, what can we do? If we accept the 
findings of scientists about climate change, the path before us is clear: 
since we human beings are contributing to the problem, we should do 
as much as we can, as soon as we can, to reduce our contributions to cli-
mate change. We should do so on every level: as individuals, families, 
businesses, industries, states, nations, and the international community. 
We should use every technology already known to us to reduce our emis-
sions; be inventive in finding, testing, and implementing new technolo-
gies; create smart and workable public policies and real-world arrange-
ments to help smooth the transition to new practices; and handle the 
many historical, cultural, social, economic, and political obstacles to this 
transition with grace and sensitivity—while moving ahead as quickly as 
is feasible.
The trouble is that we have not taken these steps with the clarity and 
dispatch we need. In fact, we have done the opposite. Most nations have 
continued with business as usual, delayed real action, perhaps taken par-
tial steps at most, and waited for others to sign on before starting up a 
serious effort. But the climate continues to change, and time is waning. 
Even as scientists warn us that waiting further could be disastrous, we 
persist in a resolute inertia.
At this late hour, then, we need to take a double approach to the chal-
lenge before us. On one level, we must examine carefully the entire range 
of measures we could take for reducing the harm we do. To this end, 
we could rely on those expert guides who explain how to use existing 
sources of energy more efficiently; how to create, distribute, and use new, 
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sustainable sources of energy; and how to reduce or end other practices 
(outside of energy use) that contribute to climate change.37 
But doing so is not enough. If we are to be honest about what we must 
do, we need to take into account the obstacles that prevent us from taking 
action. Even if we have a set of potential strategies in hand, they will not 
do much good if they are too expensive, take too long to implement, or 
harm the environment. Furthermore, what will it take to overcome polit-
ical opposition, to change actual attitudes and behavior, and to inspire 
action on the vast scale that is required? This aspect of the question is the 
most crucial, because so far it has proved the toughest to solve.
Accordingly, we have little choice but to examine our potential course 
of action taking all of the relevant factors into account. A thorough, com-
prehensive look at energy efficiency and technology, however necessary, 
cannot take us far without an honest appraisal of our collective willing-
ness to act and to change.
Let’s start with a basic principle: we simply must shift from our cur-
rent heavy reliance on oil, coal, and gas to less destructive fuels. Some 
might argue that the recent shift from oil or coal to the relatively less 
harmful natural gas is at least a step in the right direction, but it turns 
out that enough natural gas (or methane) escapes into the atmosphere 
during the drilling process to cancel out any such benefit.38 We can’t fix 
anything by shifting from one fossil fuel to another; our only real option 
is to rely on renewable energy, if we must use energy at all. But at this 
point we cannot rely very much on alternative sources of energy; a key 
task is to figure out what technologies might work best and how soon we 
can implement them.
Several sources of energy are very promising but may simply create 
more problems than they might solve. Many experts suggest that nuclear 
power is an excellent long-term option for providing energy at a com-
paratively small cost in injury to people, footprint on the landscape, 
and the storage of waste, especially when compared to fossil fuels. But 
it's clear that creating a new generation of nuclear power plants would 
be extremely expensive and time-consuming; since few plants are cur-
rently in the process of being built and each plant takes roughly a decade 
to come on line, nuclear power cannot help us right when we must take 
huge strides toward cutting our emissions. Furthermore, because of the 
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events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, we all have seri-
ous questions about the safety and reliability of nuclear power. Even if 
the engineering details make nuclear power intriguing, as a real-world 
matter, implementing it raises too many questions and—even if it should 
win public approval—would take far too long. It's not a viable option.
Geothermal energy has the great advantages of being inexhaustible, 
creating no byproducts, remaining constant through time (unlike solar 
or wind energy), interfering in no natural motion of the winds or tides, 
and requiring no extraction from the Earth (a claim that not even nuclear 
power can make, reliant as it is on the mining of uranium). But it, too, 
requires us to intervene into the Earth's systems, for when we drill some 
distance beneath the surface, we may risk triggering seismic disruptions, 
even small earthquakes. A greater problem is that over much of the Earth, 
bedrock of a sufficiently high temperature (300°) is found very far below 
the surface; in most of the western half of the United States, for example, 
geothermal engineers would have to drill down four miles or more, and 
in most of the eastern half, over six miles.39 Drilling that deep on a large 
scale is technically and financially difficult and will be feasible only after a 
lot more research and testing.
This sort of problem applies not only to alternative forms of energy, 
but to the possible transformation of our use of fossil fuel as well. Many 
observers suggest that we cannot rely on renewable sources alone; we 
will also have to burn coal and natural gas—not as we have done in the 
past, releasing ruinous quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, 
but by capturing and storing it deep in the ground. Although the process 
of capture and storage will take up part of the energy the plants gener-
ate and will thus raise energy costs, at least it will not harm the atmo-
sphere. The real problem in this case—and it's a big one—is that this 
technology is largely untested; so far not a single coal plant has actually 
tested carbon capture technology in any serious way. Moreover, just as 
the Environmental Protection Agency is pondering whether to ban the 
release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere from future coal-burn-
ing plants in an effort to force them to capture carbon, the low price of 
increasingly available natural gas is removing incentives for utilities to 
build such expensive plants at all.40 Nevertheless, Carbon Engineering 
has created prototype carbon cleanup systems in Calgary, Alberta, 
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and now hopes to market its techniques to oil companies and others. 
Experimentation with this technique is still in its early stages; according 
to one report, David Keith, the president of this company, “says he thinks 
it may be possible to lower the cost of capture toward $100 a ton as the 
company grows.”41 Because the study of this technology is at such an 
early stage and its potential use so expensive, we cannot presume to rely 
on it in a large scale in the near future. Yet in his mission to find out how 
to create an energy system that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
90 percent in the United Kingdom by 2030, George Monbiot suggests 
that that nation get half of its power for electricity from plants that burn 
natural gas (not coal) while using capture and storage technology. Think 
about it: he's suggesting that half of the electricity come from a technology 
that he admits is largely untested. Does that sound like a solid plan to you? 
But what other choice does he have? Renewable energy of other kinds 
won't supply enough power to keep Britain going. His dilemma is typical 
of this entire discussion. We need technologies we do not have, and we 
need them yesterday.42 
Luckily, bad news of this sort is not the whole story. Other technolo-
gies at first do not seem promising but on a second look turn out to be 
potentially helpful. Biofuels—fuels created from trees or plants—are 
technologically viable, but creating an incentive for people to tear out 
native ecosystems and grow crops to be sold for this purpose—especially 
in Brazil, where their planting has helped destroy vital ecosystems—
undermines the whole purpose of this transition, which is to sustain and 
enhance the ecosystems we still have.43 Removing crops for food and 
replacing them with plants for biofuel can also lower the food supply and 
raise food prices around the world.44 A more responsible and sustainable 
practice of using only waste products or byproducts of farming or forest 
management might work, if conducted very carefully, but would produce 
only a fraction of the energy we need.
But a related alternative to biofuels has great promise. Burning the 
methane emissions from public landfills, sewage plants, and farms 
addresses two problems at once: it reduces those emissions and trans-
forms them into a locally sustaining form of energy. The technology is 
readily available; cattle and pig farmers use this technology to burn 
manure to generate electricity for their own use or for sale back into the 
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grid.45 Moreover, it is being used very effectively in Kristianstad, Sweden, 
which burns biogas from a landfill, sewage ponds, wood waste, and tree 
prunings, heating homes and businesses without relying on other renew-
able energies.46 This technology burns a bit of biofuel along with the gas 
arising from garbage and waste and may thus provide a good alternative 
to the more familiar version of biofuel. A municipal biogas plant has 
the advantage of potentially being under local control: presumably you 
wouldn't have to move heaven and earth to get a local biogas plant up and 
running; you'd just have to create the necessary will in your own com-
munity. With enough initiative in cities and towns throughout the world, 
this technology could be implemented widely. 
An alternative to geothermal energy also has real merit. Without drill-
ing deep into the Earth, we can still use its warmth as a source of energy. 
Below five feet or so, the ground has a constant temperature; if you lay a 
network of pipes in the ground below that depth and run water through 
those pipes, you can draw the heat from the Earth, concentrate it, put it 
through a heat exchanger, and use it to warm or cool your house.47 While 
the initial cost is high, this source of energy pays for itself in a few years. 
The largest obstacles to its widespread adoption are public ignorance, 
the large initial cost, and the lack of trained technicians in many loca-
tions throughout the nation.48 Governments and utilities, however, pro-
vide incentives for homeowners to install these systems, and with greater 
demand, more publicity, and a concerted public effort, people might be 
able to use this technology throughout the country effectively.
What about solar and wind energy? These have the merit of being 
familiar to us, but it will take a major effort to supply them in the abun-
dance we require. Our use of these energies is rapidly increasing, their 
cost continues to fall, and their advantages are becoming clearer to the 
public as time goes by. But at current rates of implementation, they 
will contribute only a fraction of energy needs even in a decade or two. 
Furthermore, since the sun does not shine forever, nor does the wind 
blow at all times, we can fully use their energies only when we've learned 
how to store and release the power they provide on demand. A large shift 
from gasoline-powered to electrical cars would help out in this regard, 
since the car batteries would serve as an effective form of electrical stor-
age. But for an effective system, we need to create stations to store the 
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energy these sources provide and relay that energy to consumers on 
demand. One solution is to pump water into a reservoir when the elec-
tricity supply is available, then release the water to flow downhill and 
generate power when it is needed.49 These pumped storage facilities—or 
better alternatives, when they become available—will be necessary com-
ponents of the overall system. Moreover, to bring these energy sources 
into a system of sustaining power, we need a smart grid, an updated, high-
tech electricity distribution network that can withstand the sudden varia-
tions in power provided by the sun or wind, connect all the points in the 
system, and use the energy contributed by households (from small solar 
units). In short, we need a lot more than solar panels or wind turbines: 
we need a new, sophisticated, national grid.
But that is not all. Installing large solar plants will take up huge 
amounts of open land in the nation's sunny places—land now used by 
plants, animals, and human beings. Putting in industrial-sized wind tur-
bines on mountaintops, for example, or in promising offshore locations 
will directly intrude on relatively unharmed ecosystems or pristine vistas. 
Furthermore, as it turns out, large wind turbines are noisy: they cause 
a low-level vibration to be heard for a mile or more in the surrounding 
vicinity. Despite their ability to harness sun and wind for human pur-
poses, these technologies come at a real cost: if we really want to reduce 
our carbon footprint, we will end up greatly expanding our physical foot-
print on the land and sea. The reality is that many people will resist these 
intrusions: the opposition to wind farms around the nation, even from 
local environmentalists, is substantial. The same will be true once we 
begin to install industrial-sized solar power plants. 
We could, however, decrease the footprint of immense solar power 
plants by making the generation and use of solar energy an ordinary 
feature in millions of ordinary households. David Crane and Robert F. 
Kennedy, Jr., point out that the cost of solar panels has fallen by 80 per-
cent over the past five years and now competes with the cost of the nor-
mal electricity supply in twenty states. But few people are choosing it over 
electricity from the grid because of permitting requirements imposed by 
state and local governments; complying with those requirements now 
costs more than the solar equipment itself. If our governments changed 
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the rules, as the federal government in Germany has done, it would be 
much easier for people to shift their homes to solar energy.50 
So how feasible is a large reliance on solar and wind energy? Clearly, 
we have a lot of work to do. Just building a national smart grid is already 
a massive infrastructure project; to get it done, we'll need a lot of money, 
greater technical expertise, and several years of concerted effort. Building 
a sufficient number of wind and solar farms will also require a lot of 
advance research, time to put them in place, and a lengthy effort to win 
public approval. We need key technological breakthroughs to make 
energy storage cheap and viable. We also need to think carefully about 
exactly how much of a physical footprint we want to impose on the land 
and sea for these purposes. But the declining cost of solar energy and the 
possibility of producing it on the household level may make aspects of 
this transition easier. Ultimately, these forms of energy could be part of 
the solution, but they may not be available on a sufficiently large scale 
and with a truly workable infrastructure for many years.
Let's turn for a moment to another key aspect of the question, the 
reduction in energy use. As it turns out, industrial electric motors use 
more energy than highway vehicles. As one energy efficiency expert 
argues, a wholesale turnover to new, much more efficient motors would 
cut the energy these machines use in half and pay for the new machines 
fairly quickly (between a few weeks and sixteen months).51 New meth-
ods of casting metal, new technology for industrial pumps, recycling, and 
combined heat and power systems (CHP) can each have a major impact: 
according to the Department of Energy, the widespread use of CHP sys-
tems, for example, which recovers otherwise wasted heat, would save the 
“equivalent to the output of 40 percent of the coal-fired generating plants 
now producing electricity in the United States.”52 Increasing energy effi-
ciency in homes and buildings, in lighting and appliances, would also 
save a large share of the energy we now consume.53 All these transitions 
use existing technology, would pay for themselves soon, would decrease 
costs, and are already being implemented by smart businessmen and 
citizens. In short, this is a no-brainer: reducing energy use in these ways 
alone would make a serious difference.
But reducing our greenhouse gas emissions involves much more 
than changing our extraction and use of energy. According to the IPCC, 
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forestry practices—primarily deforestation—causes just over 17 per-
cent of all our greenhouse gas emissions.54 Deforestation damages the 
Earth twice over: it directly releases carbon dioxide and damages a for-
est's long-term role as a carbon sink. Since forests around the world are 
already under severe stress from climate change, as I discussed in chapter 
one, slashing and burning forests, clear-cutting them, or replacing them 
with farms or ranches only contributes to an already acute problem. 
Deforestation will have to end if we are to have the slightest chance of 
avoiding the worst consequences of climate change. But it is much easier 
to envision this change than to carry it out. Even if we added the ending 
of deforestation to the proposed international climate treaties, there is no 
guarantee that the signatories would actually carry out their obligations. 
This is a tough one: somehow, we need to create new strategies that will 
truly stop deforestation.
Most of us intuitively know how we could meet this challenge. We 
in the developed nations should protect our own forests, of course, but 
should also pay less wealthy nations for protecting theirs, help them cre-
ate effective environmental agencies to monitor those ecosystems, and 
start buying out local farmers and ranchers on the periphery of forests 
to return recently cleared land to its prior use. In short, we need seri-
ous international initiative, political and financial, to make this happen 
in a way that will matter. The problem, of course, is that funding these 
measures will require the adoption of an international treaty on climate 
change, a goal that continues to be elusive, as well as the consent of a 
majority of voters in developed countries. In some nations, especially the 
United States, there may not yet be a majority in favor of sending real 
money overseas to address climate change. It will take many years of 
hard work to put the necessary agreements in place and to pass the key 
legislation.
Our use of soils, while the focus of much less public attention, is also 
crucial. Since the soil contains three or four times as much carbon as 
plants and trees, tilling the soil—all by itself—can contribute substan-
tially to global warming, for it releases that carbon through erosion and 
dust. Over most of human history, plowing the land has contributed 
more carbon to the atmosphere than the burning of fossil fuels; by one 
estimate, the latter surpassed plowing as a source only in the 1970s.55 The 
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mechanization of agriculture, of course, alters the picture; by now, the 
manufacture of fertilizer and herbicides, the use of fossil fuels to power 
farm machines, and the release of methane and nitrous oxide into the 
atmosphere, especially from the application of nitrogen-based fertilizers, 
makes the situation even worse. The 2007 IPCC assessment estimates 
that today agriculture contributes around 13.5 percent of greenhouse 
gas emissions worldwide. Luckily, we already know the basics of how to 
reverse these practices; according to one study, with smart soil manage-
ment, the greater use of cover crops, no-till agriculture, manuring, and 
agro-forestry, we could sequester between 5 and 15 percent of the world's 
annual fossil-fuel emissions in the soil, transforming a contributor of car-
bon into a major carbon sink.56 
But making this shift will require a wholesale transformation in agri-
culture. In the United States, that's not an industry that yields easily to 
public pressure, nor is it a political constituency that accepts the urgency 
of action to save the climate. How exactly are we to bring about the nec-
essary change of attitudes and practices to make a difference? Certainly 
the federal government could impose new regulations on farm practices 
or new taxes on certain goods. But farmers could block new rules by liti-
gation or delay new legislation through political pressure. Finding a solu-
tion on this one is difficult.
Several patterns emerge from this brief discussion of these questions. 
For one thing, there are only a few technologies that are ready to go, that 
can be implemented without difficulty, and that we can build on a suf-
ficient scale to make a real difference. For the most part, new techniques 
require skills we don't yet have, infrastructure that isn't built, or public 
approval that will be difficult to gain. As Fred Krupp, President of the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and Miriam Horn argue, entrepreneurs 
and inventors are busy creating next-generation technologies that may 
soon provide solutions to many of our energy needs, but only political 
intervention to increase the cost of generating greenhouse gases (through 
the mechanism, for example, of a cap-and-trade system, possibly of the 
sort that California is now launching) would make it possible for these 
innovators to generate energy on the scale we require.57 In a similar vein, 
Thomas L. Friedman urges the United States to forge into the lead on cre-
ating new energy technologies, demanding that our government produce 
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an “ecosystem for energy innovation” by developing “an intelligently 
designed system of policies, tax incentives and disincentives, and regula-
tions …”58 But so far, no such system is in place, and as a result the new 
energy economy has not yet taken off. Some new technologies are avail-
able, and in those cases, we should move without delay—to build biogas 
plants, for example, to shift to a new generation of industrial engines, and 
to improve efficiencies in our households. But to surmount the difficulty 
on a vast scale will require enormous political will. Even that is an under-
statement, since that political will can come from only one place, a huge 
upwelling of popular support for these changes.
Everything in this discussion thus comes down to the political situ-
ation in nations around the world, but especially in America, still the 
world’s dominant economy and one of the leading contributors to cli-
mate change, where taking action has proved especially difficult. Yes, 
the American public believes that human beings are causing climate 
change by huge margins. But it clearly hates any increase in taxes, even 
if a tax is meant to forestall climate change. According to Jon Krosnick, 
in a poll conducted in early 2009 which found that around 74 percent 
of the American public thought that global warming was taking place 
and that it was caused by human activity, majorities of 78 percent and 
72 percent, respectively, opposed federal taxes on electricity and gasoline 
to reduce consumption. But majorities of 80 to 84 percent favored tax 
breaks of various kinds to encourage renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency.59 The poll unsurprisingly reflects the public distaste for taxes and 
love of tax breaks that has been familiar in American politics since the 
late 1970s. But by sticking with that preference in this case, most citizens 
choose incremental, piecemeal changes over anything more systematic. 
They seem to believe that if we improve technology, encourage industries 
to increase efficiency, and invite people to insulate their homes, we'll be 
doing fine. Unfortunately, that belief is simply untrue.
We have failed to make progress in shifting to a new energy economy 
over the last decade because most of us make our decisions accord-
ing to the laws of the marketplace. We want cheap energy: oil, coal, and 
gas. The only effective way to change our practice across the board is to 
tax all the sources of greenhouse gas, impose a cap-and-trade system on 
those sources (as Congress debated in 2009–2010), or create a rationing 
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system that would supply each citizen with a tradeable set of credits to be 
used in purchasing fuel in a given year (as proposed by Monbiot).60 
These ideas are a tough sell to a public that hates taxes. We need an 
alternative. And luckily, there is one. Several observers have proposed 
what Steven Stoft calls the carbon “untax”—a tax whose proceeds would 
be refunded in full and equally to every citizen of the United States. This 
idea has the support of people across the political spectrum, from James 
Hansen, the leading climate scientist, to N. Gregory Mankiw, who served 
as George W. Bush's chief economist. It resembles the system in Alaska, 
whose government returns the state's portion of the proceeds from the 
sale of oil to every citizen.61 Other advocates tweak this proposal a bit by 
suggesting that a portion (perhaps a fourth) of the money raised through 
the tax be spent funding research and development of renewable tech-
nologies. Bill McKibben, a leading environmental writer, likes this pro-
posal; it also served as the basis for the bill sponsored by Senators Maria 
Cantwell (D-Washington) and Susan Collins (R-Maine) in the 2009–
2010 session.
Each of these proposals has strengths and weaknesses. But it is not 
necessary to consider them at length here. Even with the large majority 
of Democrats in the first two years of Obama's presidency, the Senate 
could not act on climate change. Republicans were virtually unanimous 
in opposition to the cap-and-trade bill, and enough Democrats resisted 
it in the name of protecting the interests of constituents (such as those 
in West Virginia, a true coal state) that the bill may never even have had 
majority support, much less the sixty votes required for passage. That 
bill was already so riddled with exceptions and special favors, so obvi-
ously a series of compromises with the demands of resistant industries, 
that it may not have been worth passing. But all that is ancient history 
by now. The “tea party” revolt, the shift in power toward “skeptical” or 
hesitant Republicans in the 2010 elections, and the enduring resistance 
of many Democrats make it clear that the necessary political action will 
not emerge from the U.S. Congress any time soon. In fact, the political 
realities are and will remain dire. Because the substantial bloc of the pub-
lic that still repudiates the science of climate change constitutes the base 
of the Republican party, that party will for many years be held captive by 
a dogmatic “skepticism,” as the 2012 Republican presidential primaries 
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demonstrated at length. Barring a stunning change in Senate rules, that 
body will continue to require a supermajority of sixty votes to pass leg-
islation, giving Republicans and resistant Democrats an effective veto 
on any serious action. There is little cause to hope that the American 
Congress will ever approve of workable solutions in the absence of a fun-
damental political realignment of the sort that is highly unlikely to take 
place anytime soon.62 The Obama administration, assessing the situation 
in Congress well, has scaled back its attempts to address climate change 
in any forceful way and has made clear its preference for fairly modest 
measures, even after Superstorm Sandy brought renewed attention to 
climate concerns in the waning days of the 2012 election campaign. Its 
plans to take action within existing law, through the President’s executive 
authority or the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency, while 
welcome, can only chip away at the problem rather than bring about the 
necessary widespread transformation.63 
 That's just the domestic political situation. Things aren't much bet-
ter internationally. As everyone knows, developing nations refuse to sign 
on to a climate change treaty without a much more sophisticated under-
standing of their dilemma, especially of their desire to continue on the 
path of economic growth and industrial development and their longing to 
join in the abundance on full display among the wealthy nations.64 Their 
hope, in short, is somehow to combine development and greenhouse-gas 
austerity. Doing so will happen only if wealthy nations help them leapfrog 
over outdated technologies and adopt the most recent, least damaging 
alternatives—and to preserve their ecosystems as well.
This demand for subsidies, of course, does not go down easy in the 
developed West. But that is only part of the problem. Most commenta-
tors point out that we cannot blame China for its intransigence on cli-
mate change, because historically the developed nations have put far 
more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than China and because the 
per capita carbon footprint in China remains far below that in the West. 
All these points are true. But it does not follow that China's resistance 
deserves sympathy. For one thing, emitting greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere in total ignorance of the consequences, as developed nations 
have done for a century or two, is quite different from emitting them now, 
when we know what those consequences are. We would not countenance 
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any nation accepting the enslavement of its citizens and justifying the 
practice by arguing that America once accepted slavery. It is simply unac-
ceptable to use past ignorance to justify present stupidity. Moreover, we 
should not use the fact that China's per capita carbon footprint remains 
small to explain why it might be resistant to action: if we do so, we 
endorse the idea that in all fairness, this footprint should become larger—
as if developing nations somehow have the right to spew huge quantities 
of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, simply because we have been 
stupid enough to do so for generations. We can sympathize with their 
longing for economic growth, but we should not submit to liberal guilt. If 
the rest of the world demands the opportunity to live through the history 
we have enjoyed, the planet will be toast in short order.
We have to translate China's demands into terms that are just both 
across nations and to the planet. And justice demands something we may 
not be able to tolerate: a radical and instant renunciation of what we can 
now see as extravagant, monstrous stupidity, our willingness to eat the 
Earth for our own benefit. The point is not to invite the Earth's nations 
into our greenhouse gas insanity, but to stop our insanity and to discover 
a way of living that is truly sustainable. We should not only make this shift 
ourselves but also enable developing nations to enter an alternative, more 
viable modernity as well.
This discussion of the international political scene, of course, takes us 
right back to the domestic context. Needless to say, the American public 
has little inkling that such a renunciation is necessary or should even be 
discussed. The politics of climate change in the United States typically 
revolves around what we must do domestically to change our practices 
and whether or how to secure international agreement. But since a work-
able solution will have to provide substantial subsidies to developing 
nations, it will also require at least a minimal generosity from American 
taxpayers on top of whatever costs we must pay to transform our own
energy practices.
It might be plausible to imagine that in a period of robust abundance, 
Americans could accept both domestic transformation and international 
generosity at once. But it's hard to imagine that sort of acceptance today. 
The lingering effects of the Great Recession make aggressive action polit-
ically impossible. With high federal debt, state governments recovering 
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from crisis, and elevated unemployment, the public appetite for renounc-
ing our dependence on fossil fuels is virtually nonexistent. The focus on 
recession or debt will drown out other priorities for many years—at least 
until the recovery has brought the country well out of the housing crisis 
and greatly reduced the unemployment rate. Never mind that the actual 
costs of the transition for an average citizen would not be very large; with 
the carbon untax, for example, such a citizen would probably come out 
ahead. Never mind that a substantial subsidy to the developing world 
wouldn't impose a large burden on the ordinary taxpayer. The problem 
here is not practical, but psychological; it arises from the difficulty of 
thinking about distant nations, and a presumably distant future, while in 
the midst of hard times. In a highly polarized political context, actions 
that are rather inexpensive can take on huge symbolic significance, for 
taking those actions requires that we accept a new and perhaps unpalat-
able view of the world and of our place in it.
For some observers, it may be quite easy to denounce the widespread 
denial of climate change as well as the overwhelming reluctance to act. 
But it just won't do to blame others. Those who are often the most pas-
sionate about climate change—relatively well-off, educated, and liter-
ate citizens—are part of the problem, too. Take the question of airplane 
travel. Let's say an exemplary citizen recycles scrupulously, drives a fuel-
efficient car, eats organic food, and votes for enlightened politicians—
but takes three plane trips a year (to see parents in California, to vaca-
tion in the Caribbean, or to see friends in New York). It's quite possible 
that just one of those plane trips will have as great a carbon footprint as 
driving that fuel-efficient car for an entire year. Everybody knows, or 
should know, that plane travel is a serious indulgence, that it cancels out 
any environmental responsibility that citizens might otherwise display.65
But everybody in the middle class or above indulges in it anyway. David 
MacKay brilliantly juxtaposes two quotations from Tony Blair. In the 
first, Blair says, “Unless we act now, not some time distant but now, these 
consequences, disastrous as they are, will be irreversible. So there is noth-
ing more serious, more urgent or more demanding of leadership.” Two 
months later, “responding to the suggestion that he should show leader-
ship by not flying to Barbados for holidays,” Blair says that this idea is “a 
bit impractical actually …”66 
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I think most people in the relevant classes can sympathize: nearly 
everyone who understands what is at stake and can afford to travel really 
can't imagine renouncing the convenience of flying. Let's not point fin-
gers at those other idiots; with few exceptions, we’re idiots, too. Blair's 
reluctance to give up his vacation in Barbados demonstrates quite clearly 
that political inaction only expresses a reluctance that all of us feel to 
transform our lives fundamentally. However much our minds may be 
persuaded of the need to act, on a gut level we just can't do it—or can't 
do it nearly as quickly and thoroughly as the occasion demands. Our 
experts have long since outlined what we could do to face the present 
challenge. Slowly and with infinite reluctance, we may be starting to take 
up the task. But do we have time to spare?
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Chapter 3
Time's Up
Many observers, long used to the slow pace of political transformation, 
might agree with everything I've said so far but insist that we need not 
worry too much: given time, our economy will recover, the superma-
jority of Americans will prevail, our political system will work, and we 
will see real action on climate change. With enough persistence, over the 
next decade or so we will help forge a genuinely effective international 
agreement. The research into new technologies will begin to see fruitful 
results, we'll create the new energy economy, and we'll be on a secure 
footing at last.
But in the case of this particular transformation, unlike most others, 
we just don't have the time to let things play out. While we proceed at 
our usual deliberative pace, climate change speeds ahead. The mismatch 
is stark and growing. If we're going to get anything done, we should do it 
now, and preferably yesterday. As Rajendra Pachauri, the scientist who 
headed the IPCC in 2007, remarked in that year, “If there's no action 
before 2012, that's too late… . What we do in the next two or three years 
will determine our future. This is the defining moment.”67 
We're not used to thinking about acting so quickly in part because we 
tend to accept the pace of political change. The international negotiations 
for a climate change treaty, building on that premise, takes for granted 
that we have some time: the proposed agreement sets the target of an 80 
percent reduction in the emission of carbon dioxide by 2050. That year is 
indeed some distance away. But if we take a good look at the most recent 
information, it's clear that we will have to make the cuts much deeper and 
sooner than we thought.
But wait a minute, many voices say; why do you keep insisting that 
everything has to happen now? Why not let the country recover economically 
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before asking for change? Why not bring everybody on board before rushing 
into action?
There are eight good reasons why time is up.
First of all, the target—cutting emissions 80 percent by 2050—was 
chosen for political reasons, not on the basis of the science. 2050 is far 
enough away to make deep cuts politically palatable. Whenever peo-
ple suggest that we have to make these cuts earlier, others resist—not 
because of the science, but because they fear the political consequences. 
Unfortunately, the change in Earth's climate doesn't particularly care 
about what is palatable to us. The goals we once set are too far away; if we 
are honest, we must acknowledge that we must act much sooner.
Second, the science itself has changed since the international negotia-
tions began. Over the past twenty years or so, scientists have been asking 
what would happen if we doubled the preindustrial level of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide—around 275 parts per million—to around 550 ppm. 
This number, chosen in part as a convenient signpost, has determined 
the shape of countless investigations of climate change as well as much 
of the discussion of potential future scenarios in the IPCC assessments. 
As a result, for many years we did not have a sure sense of how much 
change might take place at lower levels. In a rather different vein, those 
seeking international agreements initially chose 450 ppm as a target in 
part because it once seemed that with concerted effort the international 
community might be able to meet it. 
But in the last four or five years, further research suggests that these 
numbers are too high. One paper (authored by James Hansen and many 
others) published in September 2009 argues that previous models failed 
to take into account the effect of positive feedback loops. Models once 
predicted that a doubling in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmo-
sphere would lead to a temperature increase of around 3° Centigrade 
(with a range of from 2 to 4.5°). But current models that include the 
effects of positive feedback loops estimate that the same carbon diox-
ide concentration will lead to an increase of around 6° Centigrade (with 
a range of from 4 to 8°). The implication of this argument is that the 
widely known and cited estimates of the IPCC are too optimistic—and 
that in fact we have already gone beyond what the planet can tolerate. If 
Rajendra Pachauri thought we have until 2012, these researchers imply 
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that we should have acted long before even that year. They estimate that 
the boundary for carbon dioxide concentration is 350 ppm; at the time 
of that article’s publication, the concentration was 387 ppm and rising—
and was forcing an exit from the Holocene, the stable environment we 
have enjoyed over the past 10,000 years.68 Persuaded by this argument, 
Bill McKibben and many others have formed the group 350.org, which 
advocates for concerted action to meet that lower target.
Third, although the international community set 450 ppm as its target 
many years ago, the continuing rise in emissions from most developed 
nations in the intervening years, together with the huge increase from 
developing countries like China, has made that target totally unrealistic. 
In the Kyoto Protocol, most of the world's nations promised to reduce 
greenhouse emissions by about 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. But 
instead, global carbon dioxide emissions increased by 38 percent from 
1990 to 2009.69 Very few observers now believe that we will be able to 
stabilize carbon dioxide levels at that threshold. In August 2004, Stephen 
Pacala and Robert Socolow introduced the idea of “stabilization wedges.” 
In their definition, a wedge is the shape on a graph whose top (ascend-
ing) line depicts a gradual increase in carbon dioxide emissions and 
whose bottom (straight or descending) line depicts a potential decrease 
in those emissions if we adopt new practices. In short, a wedge is a chunk 
of unemitted carbon dioxide. Pacala and Socolow proposed fifteen pos-
sible wedges drawing on existing or nearly existing technologies and 
suggested that achieving seven of these wedges over the next fifty years 
would be enough to stabilize those concentrations at 500 ppm, a target 
they thought plausible.70 But in September 2010, Martin Hoffert pointed 
out that because our emissions have been rising much more quickly than 
Pacala and Socolow envisioned, we would now need to achieve eighteen 
of these wedges just to reach stabilization and twenty-five to phase out 
fossil fuels altogether.71 
Think about it: in six years, the world went from needing to achieve 
seven wedges to eighteen. We're going in the wrong direction, and going 
fast: we're adding to our challenge by nearly two wedges per year, making 
the task of reversing the effects of these emissions even more difficult.
It's true that during the recession, the usage of electricity and gas fell, 
slowing down the increase in our greenhouse gas emissions. But usage 
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fell because of hardship, not from any shift in our fundamental habits. In 
the midst of the downturn, it was easy to predict that once the recovery 
began, people would rush back to the behavior they know best. In fact, 
that is exactly what happened. Researchers found that global emissions 
of carbon dioxide increased by 5.9 percent in 2010, more than making up 
for a slight decrease in 2009, the year in which the recession had the most 
impact.72 Clearly, the recession did not slow down the steady increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Fourth, even this discussion does not face the full measure of the chal-
lenge, for the simple reason that carbon dioxide is not the only green-
house gas. George Monbiot points out that according to the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impact Research, we should aim to stabilize “green-
house gases in the atmosphere at or below the equivalent of 440 parts of 
carbon dioxide per million.” When the carbon dioxide concentration was 
around 380 ppm, “the other greenhouse gases raise[d] this to an equiva-
lent of 440 or 450.”73 But in late 2013, the global monthly mean of car-
bon dioxide approached 400 ppm, so that the overall concentration of 
greenhouse gases is now well above the equivalent of 450 ppm.74 We have 
already exceeded the upper limit for our contribution to the greenhouse 
effect we set some years ago.
Fifth, we must take another factor into account as well. As time goes 
by and we emit more carbon dioxide, the less the biosphere can absorb; 
by one estimate, it will absorb fully one-third less as much by 2030.75 As 
a result, emitting a certain quantity of carbon dioxide a decade from now 
will impose a greater burden on the biosphere than emitting it today—
and what is more, reducing our output will only keep up with the Earth’s 
capacity to absorb less. In effect, we will have to cut back our footprint an 
extra portion just to take that fact into account. 
Sixth, much as these estimates for how deep we must cut have to 
be revised, the guess as to how soon we should achieve our target must 
change as well. Monbiot’s already severe estimate—that the United 
Kingdom would have to cut its emissions 80 percent by 2030—was based 
on a guess as to when our emissions would be so great that they would 
trigger positive feedback loops and thus irreversible climate change. But 
Monbiot relies on an estimate in a paper published back in 2003.76 It's 
already clear that in the intervening years we've emitted far more than 
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scientists in 2003 would have guessed. If they thought that business as 
usual might trigger irreversible global warming around 2030, twenty-
seven years later, the reckless emission of greenhouse gases over the last 
ten years has undoubtedly moved up the date much closer to the present.
These physical facts alone are dire. We have over twice the reductions 
to achieve as we did only a few years ago and far less time in which to 
achieve them. Very soon, the present in which we live and the future in 
which we would cross the tipping point will coincide—and we'll dis-
cover we've already passed the point at which those positive feedback 
loops kick in.
Doing some arithmetic based on these facts may help clarify our situa-
tion. In 2003 it once seemed we'd meet our goals by 2030, but we've man-
aged to waste ten years or so. If we once needed to achieve seven wedges, 
we now need to achieve eighteen—plus a further increment to hit a target 
not of 500 ppm, but of 350. Since we are already above the equivalent 
of 450 ppm, if we wish not to go too far beyond that level we will have 
to try to eliminate fossil-fuel use entirely, and thus to achieve twenty-five 
wedges, as Hoffert suggests. But to do so now, after several years since his 
study have gone by, we’d most likely need to hit around thirty wedges. Yet 
we’d need to add a further increment to take into account the fact that the 
biosphere will absorb less of what we emit in the coming years. A back-
of-the envelope calculation suggests that if we acted today we would need 
to reduce our emissions by at least thirty-two wedges. Moreover, thanks 
to our profligacy in recent years, as well as our sense that we must hit a 
lower target, it's also likely we would need to achieve these cuts many 
years earlier.
Other ways of estimating the challenge confirm these figures. At the 
Copenhagen summit on climate change in 2010, a majority of nations 
endorsed a target of raising the Earth's temperatures no more than 1.5° 
Centigrade above preindustrial levels. But since we've already raised the 
average temperature by 0.8°, and the temperature will rise another 0.6° 
due to the inertia of the world's climate, 1.4 of those 1.5° are already inev-
itable, leaving us virtually without hope of reaching the target.77 Even if 
we acted today to eliminate our greenhouse gas emissions entirely, we'd 
still barely meet our goal. And there is simply no chance we can eliminate 
all those emissions so quickly.
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Let's take more than the purely physical facts into account here as 
well. It will take us a few years to pass the necessary legislation and sign 
the key international agreements, as I suggested above, and a few years 
after that to research and implement an array of new technologies, build 
the solar and wind plants, create a new energy infrastructure, convert our 
transportation system, and fund the protection of forests. If we're lucky, 
perhaps we will begin to see steep reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions in about a decade. By then, however, we will have emitted so much 
more carbon dioxide that we'll have much further to go to meet our tar-
gets. How far is impossible to say—but clearly we'd need to achieve many 
more than the thirty-two wedges I mentioned a moment ago.
From these estimates it seems that if we acted now, our change in pol-
icy would finally begin to take effect roughly ten years from now, some-
where in the early 2020s. But the severity of our situation is clear if we 
take into account the seventh reason—the fact that, as I’ve said above, 
2020 is the new 2100. As recent research indicates, we’ve already crossed 
one tipping point with the melting of the Arctic sea ice and may cross one 
or two more by the mid 2020s. Nearly all the above estimates take as their 
fundamental principle the overriding task of not crossing through those 
tipping points; once we reach them, we need not work our way through 
all those calculations but can sense our situation immediately from the 
state of those tipping points. We're now witnessing the very events we 
were trying to avoid, and all this talk of targets, all this arithmetic, how-
ever useful it may have once seemed, ultimately distracts us from what 
is right in front of us. And from the evidence of the melting sea ice, the 
exploding methane clathrates, the morphing permafrost, and the crack-
ling Amazon rainforest, the essential story is becoming increasingly clear. 
So it seems that even under the best case scenario, even if we acted today 
our efforts might take effect in the mid 2020s—just as we may be trig-
gering severe and irreversible climate change. Fortune may smile upon 
us and allow us a few years of grace to hit our target, but if so, we really 
must achieve everything in a ridiculously tiny span of time. It is far more 
likely that we will be in the position of taking action after the feedback 
loops have already begun—making ourselves poster children for defiant 
foolishness. We are more than flirting with disaster; we're inviting it. It's 
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almost impossible not to think that all is lost, that even if we act, it will be 
too late.78 
These realities undermine the premise of a major activist enterprise 
of our moment—Bill McKibben’s drive to encourage many public insti-
tutions to disinvest in fossil-fuel companies and thus help prevent the 
United States from pushing the biosphere beyond the limits of its toler-
ance. In the Rolling Stone article in which he lays out his case, McKibben 
first explains that the 2° threshold on which international negotiators 
rely is too high, but then invokes on a specific “carbon budget” derived 
from that threshold to argue we have time to make a difference through 
the strategy of divestment.79 His effort, praiseworthy as it is, relies on a 
contradiction between his knowledge that we’ve already virtually met the 
limit of what the Earth can tolerate and his description of what a certain 
kind of activism can still accomplish. 
Given all these factors, we can no longer assume that our efforts 
will bear fruit, that the civilizations of the Holocene will survive in any-
thing like their present form. An honest look at the task ahead and the 
time remaining should disabuse us of our unspoken confidence that the 
world we know will endure in something of its current form for the rest 
of our lives.
But hold on, someone might say, what if we lower our emissions after 
that target date? Wouldn't the Earth's temperatures eventually decline as well, 
getting back down to a level that would not cause extensive climate change? 
Even if we've been very slow and don't meet the target of 450 ppm, isn't there 
hope that we can eventually hit that or a lower target, and all will be well?
In this question, I hear the voice of the last optimists speaking—the 
voice of those who hope that, however stupid and cowardly we all are, 
however slow to act, however likely to botch the entire task for a few 
more years, we might still have a chance. The activists at 350.org, acting 
on something of this premise, are organizing efforts to reduce our carbon 
dioxide emissions to that lower number in the long term, hinting that if 
we can do so, we will avert the onset of serious climate change.
But it simply isn't so. The eighth reason we have so little time is that 
once we warm the planet up to a certain point, it will not cool down again 
for a very long time. A recent paper showed that “the climate change that 
takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide concentration is largely 
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irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop.” If we did manage to stop 
emitting carbon dioxide, “radiative forcing”—or what we usually call the 
greenhouse effect—would indeed decline, but that decline would be 
“largely compensated by slower loss of heat to the ocean.”80 
This finding means that even if we manage to cut our output of carbon 
dioxide, Earth’s temperatures will go up and stay up. But wait a minute: as 
I mentioned above, the rise in temperature lags behind the rise in carbon 
dioxide concentrations by many years, so that even after we stop emitting 
carbon dioxide, the temperature would rise another 0.6° Centigrade or 
so—a time lag that all the above estimates take into account. So the real-
ity is that even after we cut our greenhouse gas output, the temperature 
level would continue to rise—and then eventually level off and stay at that 
higher level. 
Unfortunately, then, the physics of the climate will not let us reverse 
the effects of our misbehavior now. If we push temperatures up, they 
are going to stay there. We have no second chance. And the first one is 
already slipping away. 
It would be nice to pause here and suggest that it is not yet absolutely 
certain that those vicious circles are under way in full force and for good. 
That hesitation might have been plausible a year or two ago. But by now, 
the dire state of the Arctic feedback loop and our sense of its conse-
quences for the entire global climate leave us little room for doubt. 
Is there no basis for hope left to us? One last consideration remains, 
one final bedrock for hope: our general humility in the face of the vast 
complexity of Earth’s dynamic systems. Only the sense that our knowl-
edge is limited, that something may be taking place and might still appear 
of which we have little inkling, stands between us and a frank acknowl-
edgment that all is lost.
Many others seem to have come to a similar conclusion. Some of 
them show their awareness of our situation by introducing an entirely 
new angle on the problem, suggesting forms of geoengineering to address 
our plight; the Arctic Methane Emergency Group I mentioned in the 
introduction is a good case in point. But almost invariably such sugges-
tions threaten to harm the planet in their own way. One idea is to inject 
aerosols into the atmosphere to dim the sun and lower the temperature. 
But doing so would ultimately cause serious ground-level pollution and 
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could help deplete the ozone layer. What about a shield placed in outer 
space to lower the amount of sunlight hitting the earth? It would need 
to be around 4.5 million square kilometers in size—and thus cost a huge 
amount of money to build and maintain (perhaps as much as 6 percent 
of the world's GNP, every year). Maybe putting white plastic sheeting 
over various deserts and reflecting the sunlight back into space would 
help. But doing so would prevent the circulation of dust, which has a vital 
role in providing iron and phosphorous to other regions and in supply-
ing nutrients to plankton. What about placing that white reflective plastic 
over a vast area of the ocean? The objections to that idea are fairly obvi-
ous: vast quantities of plastic would cut off sunlight to organisms in the 
sea, would easily be transported by wind and storm, and could affect 
coastal ecosystems if the plastic were blown ashore.81 These and other 
suggestions speak more about our current desperation than about any 
genuine attempt to address our dilemma.
Other suggestions seem quite sane. The leading climate scientist 
Wallace Broecker has concluded that there is no realistic chance we'll be 
able to replace fossil fuels with renewable sources in time. Accordingly, he 
proposes that we fix the climate by withdrawing carbon dioxide directly 
from the open air and injecting it deep into the earth. As I mentioned 
in chapter two, Carbon Engineering is putting similar ideas to work and 
is hoping to market its technology soon. But here again, there won't be 
enough of a commercial incentive to do so on a sufficient scale until there 
is a carbon tax (or untax)—until there is political action to make fossil 
fuels more expensive.82 Sound familiar? We need political action before 
we get the new technology—and in this case, the technology is in a very 
preliminary stage.
Other observers, seeing our dilemma, do not imagine we can find 
a technological fix. They turn in a different direction, encouraging 
us to adapt to the massive transformations that are coming our way. 
Bill McKibben, for example, took a big step when he entitled his book 
Eaarth: in his view, we're no longer living on the planet Earth, for thanks 
to climate change, we find ourselves on another planet, one we're not 
used to at all. Earlier writers, like Al Gore or Monbiot, who discussed our 
dilemma in 2006 and 2007, still had reason to be optimistic. McKibben, 
writing in 2010, abandons the attempt to tell us how to avoid a dire fate. 
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Instead, he prepares us for that new planet and gives us advice about 
how we might live there. This shift in itself is a signal of how far we've 
come. Unfortunately, even his advice about adaptation cannot do justice 
to what we face. In the last half of his book, he suggests that we should 
create strong small communities, produce food locally, and rely on the 
resourcefulness and creativity of towns rather than the nation as a whole. 
These suggestions are remarkably sane. But doing so would hardly enable 
us to survive the events he describes so well in the first half of the book. 
How well will local communities raise their own food in many regions, 
when rain falls less regularly, the landscape retains water less well, and the 
plants may not have the chance to mature? How will towns flourish in the 
midst of dying forests and drying streams? Where exactly will these small 
communities succeed? 
Not long ago, people who studied climate change could emphasize 
the possibility of transforming our fossil-fuel economy. A few years later, 
the tone has shifted: now they emphasize the prospect of engineering the 
Earth or offering up a localist ethic as a counterbalance. As I have sug-
gested, I do not think these suggestions provide actual solutions. But 
they do have the merit of pointing out the problem. The challenge, then, 
is to face that problem without looking away, without escaping to increas-
ingly less credible responses. A crucial shift has taken place in the last few 
years, and yet for the most part we avoid it; we hasten to move on, to 
find some pretext for optimism. There must still be comfort available to 
us, wherever it may be. But these responses fail to take into account the 
real implications of what is before us.
I do not discount the need for us to begin assessing the task of adapt-
ing to a changed Earth. Here again, the IPCC reports perform a valuable 
service. The 2007 assessment takes great care to describe the potential 
effects of various levels of warming on ecologies and societies around the 
world—and on how they might adapt. Because of our increasingly dire 
situation, many observers now treat these sections of the report more 
seriously than they did in the past. But as the focus shifts toward adapta-
tion, we should pause and think about the implications of that change 
in emphasis.
For one thing, “adaptation” is a misleadingly gentle term for the task 
before us. “Adaptation” suggests that we can adjust some of our practices, 
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rethink how our ecosystems and economies will survive, and find a “new 
normal” in which to live. But this implication is simply too optimistic. 
Unless we make severe, thorough, and uncompromising changes soon, 
temperatures will climb to a high level. The longer they remain at that 
level, as they will, the more likely they are to trigger positive feedback 
loops—and thus create a further round of warming, with a further series 
of harsh consequences for the climate. These possibilities were not incor-
porated into the projections of climate change provided in the IPCC 
report in 2007, nor were they a factor in the scenarios of adaptation 
sketched there. The reality we face, then, is somewhat tougher than we 
thought a few years ago. The most likely scenario we face is that changes 
to Earth's climate systems will accelerate and get steadily worse, step by 
lurching step, for decades—as various feedback loops kick in and impose 
devastating effects. The release of methane gas from the permafrost in the 
far North, for example, if it takes effect on a large scale, will lead to a rapid 
round of global warming, which in turn could trigger a wholesale col-
lapse of the Amazonian ecosystem, with all its consequences for weather 
in the Americas, and a general increase in carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere, which could in turn trigger feedback loops elsewhere. Once 
we pass the first tipping point, we cannot have confidence we will escape 
others and still others. What we face, in short, is perpetual adaptation—
the task of making a wholesale adjustment to our reality, then doing it 
again … then doing it yet again. It would be better if we admitted that if 
we make the necessary changes too late, we will have to adjust radically, 
and at uneven and unpredictable intervals, for as long as we can imagine.
That prospect is quite dire. But we should not therefore leap to the 
popular image of a planetary catastrophe. The future we face is not as 
simple as a full-out, planetary disaster that will simply defeat us. If that 
were the case, it would indeed make all our efforts vain, all our best strate-
gies hopeless. But climate change is not a single, devastating event, like 
a nuclear holocaust. If irreversible, devastating climate change takes 
place, in the long term it will displace many societies, change the ethos 
of our cultures profoundly, cause untold suffering to millions of people, 
and reduce the Earth's population by a major fraction. It will do so over 
generations, altering the world decade by decade, allowing us to accom-
modate certain changes and be defeated by others. As a result, it will not 
Time's Up 69
allow us to relax into any particular mode of response. It may proceed at 
an incremental pace for many years but at other times strike quickly.83 It 
will be an ongoing horror unlike any we have faced before. Planetary in 
scale, unfolding over a long span of time, it will at times give us room to 
change and at others interrupt our projects without mercy. It will allow 
us to have the illusion we are adapting successfully, then undercut our 
efforts with further ecological transformations. We cannot assume these 
events will necessarily finish us off soon, but neither should we pretend 
we can master them or survive them unscathed. Climate change, in short, 
will never quite allow us total hope or utter despair: we will be caught 
endlessly between conflicting possibilities.
In realizing that this is our most likely future, in turning from the hope 
we might ward it off to accepting the task of adapting to it, we are taking 
no small step. In doing so, we concede that our future will consist of liv-
ing in a worsening world—a world that may get incrementally, steadily 
less habitable as time goes by.
This change will be much tougher on all of us than the most likely 
consequences of severe climate change, such as storms and floods, rising 
food prices and disappearing water supplies, economic distress and wars. 
Modern life has always been premised on the notion of progress—on 
democratization, economic growth, increasing cultural interchange, and 
improvements in the lives of ordinary people. America as a nation, bor-
rowing on the promise of the Enlightenment it shares with many other 
traditions, has always looked ahead, building its identity on the promise 
of eventual liberation for its citizens and for the people of the world. For 
many generations, parents in modern societies have assumed that they 
were making better lives for their children, confident that their hard work 
and sacrifice would benefit their offspring. Even in dark times, at the 
depths of the Depression or in the midst of war, Americans have kept this 
hope alive. Participants in movements for social and economic justice 
have always cast their eyes far ahead, knowing that activism might pay off 
only decades into the future. All these hopes, in turn, have tacitly relied 
on the promise of economic growth, a promise that all advanced capital-
ist nations now rely on for their legitimacy—the hope that over time, all 
incomes would rise, and everyone would eventually flourish.
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To give up the dream of progress and accept the prospect of a perpetu-
ally worsening world would be an immense loss for all of us. Without the 
promise of better lives for everyone, few of the attitudes of modern life 
survive intact. Facing the reality of our present moment, then, requires 
much more than an assessment of how we are doing in reducing our 
greenhouse gas emissions. It requires nothing less than a wholesale reex-
amination of the progressive attitude we inherit from the Enlightenment, 
a rethinking of the most basic attitudes we take for granted about our 
relation to the future.
Looking at our present moment in this way does not force us to give 
up our fight to ward it off in the first place. Nevertheless, as people begin 
to admit more and more that we have come to the final years in our effort 
to avoid irreversible climate change, as the emphasis falls ever more on 
adaptation, the question of how to be honest about our situation with-
out giving up on the battle becomes more pressing. Al Gore once com-
mented that “an astonishing number of people go straight from denial 
to despair, without pausing on the intermediate step of saying, 'We can 
do something about this!'”84 He's absolutely right. I would only add that 
despair can be a form of denial: it, too, allows us to dismiss the problem, 
to assume we're not responsible. Since nobody can do a thing, we're 
off the hook.
But what if we have been dedicated to doing something about it—and 
nothing happens? What if we do what we can, join an activist community 
such as Repower America, the group Gore founded to agitate for political 
action, encourage the nation to shift to renewable sources by the end of 
the decade, and help individuals to take voluntary actions to reduce their 
carbon footprint—but ultimately realize the necessarily big shift will not 
take place in time? What then?
That question is what this book is about. Here we are now, fully aware 
of climate change and what it can bring, well aware of what we can do, 
but thwarted from real action. We're stuck in a holding pattern, as if we 
must simply accept our fate. It would be the height of foolishness at this 
key moment simply to give up and abandon the effort. It's devastatingly 
clear that our first task is to intensify the effort. After all, we are talking 
about the world's greatest crime, ecocide, an assault on our entire plan-
et's ecology. It far outweighs genocide, the destruction of a people, for it 
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threatens to ruin the support system for all living things, and along the 
way displace, impoverish, or destroy a major portion of the human race. 
It undercuts our hopes for the future. It alters our understanding of the 
religious, cultural, and political traditions we inherit, for the future on 
which their validity relies threatens to disappear. We simply must fight on.
But as we do so, we should begin to confront the possibility that what-
ever the results of our efforts, the future we have always taken for granted 
is in danger of disappearing. We could once rely on the notion that the 
basic ecosystems of the Earth would still be present and flourishing for 
decades and centuries into the future. We can do so no longer. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the best thinking about our cur-
rent situation almost always hesitates to acknowledge this fact. Inevitably, 
with only one or two exceptions, those who tell the truth about the 
dimensions of the challenge and the lateness of the hour lay great empha-
sis on the steps we can still take to alleviate the crisis or the best strat-
egies we might use to survive the changes in the biosphere when they 
come. Providing a note of optimism is key; thanks to that gesture, we can 
handle an honest assessment of our situation much more productively. I 
too would emphasize that not all is lost, that we can still take action—if 
we do so immediately and on a vast scale. But anyone who stops there is 
not telling the whole story. In actual fact, given the slow pace of politi-
cal change and the immense inertia of our economies, the probability we 
will do what is necessary in time is extremely low. 
To face our situation without evasion, then, we must do the appar-
ently impossible, break a very strong taboo, and begin to ponder what it 
would be like to live in a world undergoing severe climate change. None 
of us would ever seek out thoughts of this kind. Nevertheless, to block 
them out is ultimately another form of denial, another way to protect 
ourselves from the realities of climate change. Any such defense ulti-
mately contributes to our complacency, our willingness on some level 
to accept things as they are. In contrast, the sanest, most humane, most 
transformative course of action is to face our situation as fully as we can. 
Doing so will not undercut a commitment to changing our societies; 
on the contrary, it will help us understand the real stakes of the current 
fight. The goal is not only to safeguard the future of the biosphere; it is 
also to preserve our idea of the future, on which so much of our lives and 
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traditions are based. We are battling to preserve not only the ecosystems 
in which we live, but the hope for an expansive and joyous life for our-
selves and others—the very hope on which we ultimately stake nearly 
everything we do. Let us face the abyss together, then, in the coming 
chapters, knowing that in doing so, we may be catching a glimpse of our 
actual future—or perhaps learning so much from that glimpse that we 
will fight even harder to keep it at bay.
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Chapter 4
The Impossible Revolution
So far I have been arguing that climate change is real and that its irre-
versible form is virtually upon us. The moral imperative to act is over-
whelming. Yet we do not. Why are we in the United States incapable of 
acting even under this immense imperative? If we are to understand this 
crossroads in time, we must grapple with whatever in our collective hab-
its makes it so difficult for us to face this moment with genuine foresight 
and sanity. At first glance, it is not all that clear why we are so stuck, why 
we seem incapable of addressing a threat that has such enormous con-
sequences for us all. What features of this crisis have led us to such an 
impasse? What attributes of our political culture might explain our hesi-
tation? And what does our inability suggest about our overall dilemma 
and its consequences? 
The practical steps we could take to address our crisis seem rather 
simple. We just need to raise the price of fossil fuels—as well as the cost 
of generating greenhouse gases through the poor management of farm-
land and forest—so that the market reflects the physical realities in which 
we live. If we do so, we will all have a practical incentive to shift to new 
and less destructive practices. If we increase these prices in further steps 
over the ensuing years, we would change our practices even further, even-
tually reaching the point where we would not be contributing to the 
planet's warming at all. We should also fund research into developing and 
implementing new technologies so that solar, wind, tide, wave, and geo-
thermal energy can become readily available; the mechanisms for captur-
ing and storing carbon dioxide can be installed on a large scale; and our 
agricultural and forestry practices can become ecologically sustainable. 
These ideas of raising the cost of unsustainable practices and funding 
new research are fairly straightforward and by now thoroughly familiar to 
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climate change scientists, technicians, policy experts, and legislators; we 
just need to carry them out and do so soon.
To make these changes, however, is not so simple. Imagining a course 
of action is much easier than actually pursuing it. For those of us living in 
the United States, taking these key steps will require a fundamental reori-
entation of our attitudes and practices all across the nation. That change 
will have to operate on many levels if it is to work at all. It will require 
a shift in our understanding of our place in the world, a willingness to 
endorse unprecedented public policies, a revision of our industrial and 
agricultural practices, and a change in our individual daily habits. It will 
have to be ideological and legislative, technical and financial, large-scale 
and individual, all at once. To ward off the prospect of severe climate 
change requires us not only to change our thinking but also to participate 
in an everyday, detailed endeavor that will often seem utterly tedious and 
banal; at every turn, we will have to overcome our comfort with things as 
they are, our resistance to inconvenient interruptions, our preference for 
cheap living, and our ignorance of alternatives.
How best might this transformation come about? Only something 
very powerful, systemic, and persuasive could possibly succeed—some-
thing like climate change itself, except within the political domain. The 
challenge is to translate the reality of climate change into terms our cul-
ture can understand and accept. But doing so is no simple matter. Most 
policy experts take for granted that introducing any radical new princi-
ple is bound to fail, at least at first. Doing so, they argue, forces one to 
advocate for positions that are not politically viable. In their view, we 
must be more strategic, more circumspect; we must find means of subtle 
encouragement that nudge people toward more responsible behavior. An 
outright intervention would simply provoke a repudiation of the entire 
effort. After all, as Aristotle said, politics is the art of the possible; if you 
demand too much, you won't get a thing. One version of this attitude is 
voiced by Mike Hulme, who reviews the various reasons why people dis-
agree about climate change and suggests that we will make headway only 
when we can reconcile our divergent beliefs.85 
But climate change does not compromise. For us to ward off severe 
disturbances to our ecosystems, we cannot compromise either. But with-
out compromise it is virtually impossible to change democratic societies. 
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It takes several generations for social movements in the United States 
to achieve their primary goals; activists in this nation have always been 
forced to accept small gains over many years until the prize is won. So far 
the debate over climate change is following this pattern. Activists point 
out what must be done, “skeptics” refuse to act, and the nation edges for-
ward, slowly and cautiously, toward the goal.
This time around, however, the slow and steady approach will not do. 
We do not have the luxury of awaiting the reconciliation of beliefs that 
Hulme envisions. Because climate change proceeds apace, we must act 
as soon as we possibly can. Hesitating to act in this case seems foolish. 
Although all of us by now have a healthy respect for the ponderous rate at 
which political change comes in modern democracies, we also know that 
in this particular case, the problem gets worse with each passing year.
Is it possible that something is wrong with the best solutions proposed 
to this point? Are they simply too much to take? If so, what about them 
seems to go too far? As I have suggested, the basic approach is straight-
forward enough: raising the price of emitting greenhouse gases would do 
the trick, especially through the mechanism of a greenhouse tax or untax. 
(As I mentioned in chapter two, following the usage of Steven Stoft, an 
untax is a tax whose entire proceeds are distributed equally to all taxpay-
ing citizens.) But to be fair, even this relatively simple approach would 
require an important transformation in our political culture.
In the United States, we tend to place great faith in the rationality and 
efficiency of the market. We interfere, if at all, by making certain transac-
tions illegal, imposing regulations on business practices, and encourag-
ing various endeavors with tax breaks. But for the most part, we allow 
the market to set its own priorities. We regard any widespread attempt to 
shape market forces with suspicion, having decided many decades ago, 
at least by the time of the Cold War, that any collective control over the 
market constituted socialism and therefore (in a major leap) totalitarian-
ism. For us, it seems, the liberty of the market is as sacred as any other 
freedom, no matter what the consequences. But as a result, we tend to let 
many abuses fester for generations; even though we can see that the mar-
ket creates a wide array of social problems, we refuse to consider many 
ways to fix them out of the fear that intervening would look like social-
ism. Ironically, of course, through our government we have subsidized 
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the extraction of fossil fuels, interfering into the market to lower their 
cost, creating as we so often do a kind of warped socialism, stretching 
out a helping hand to the staggeringly wealthy. The first thing we need 
to do, then, is to eliminate these subsidies entirely. But that step in itself 
would simply restore the market to its own equilibrium and would fail to 
address the problem at its core.
A greenhouse gas untax cuts through this impasse. Ordinarily, the low 
cost of fossil fuels makes them the default source of energy; as long as 
these sources remain cheap, the market will forever reinforce our current 
fossil-fuel habits. By raising the price of sources of energy that contrib-
ute to climate change, an untax modifies this dynamic entirely. Because 
it incorporates the collective good into the pricing mechanism, it enables 
us to bring about a massive shift in our practices simply by following the 
laws of the market. Once fossil fuels become more expensive than renew-
able alternatives, we'll all have the incentive to power our industries, heat 
our homes, and fuel our cars with sustainable sources of energy. 
The result will be an explosion of technological innovations to create a 
new energy economy. When this untax raises the cost of agricultural and 
forestry practices that produce greenhouse gases, it will also drive wide-
spread innovations in managing the land. No doubt public investment in 
technology research will also be needed. But rather than transforming 
public behavior exclusively through law or regulation, this measure uses 
the market to counteract the harm it previously reinforced. Furthermore, 
if it truly is an untax, rather than a tax—if the federal government dis-
tributes all of the proceeds equally among the nation's taxpayers—then it 
innovates in a further way: it makes protecting the future into collective 
property, giving each taxpayer a stake in social change. The more citizens 
get attached to their share of the money, the more they will identify their 
self-interest with the good of the whole.86 
This proposal thus represents an important innovation in the 
American understanding of the market. On one level, the untax appar-
ently accepts without question the market's dominion over the Earth, 
creating that strange beast, the notion of profit-driven ecological change. 
But in fact, by using the terms of the market, this solution subordinates 
the market's workings to a common goal. It suggests that even if the mar-
ket is a set of mechanisms that usually create cheapness and efficiency, 
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the public can appropriate it for a collective purpose, turning it into a 
straightforward, low-maintenance, and effective means to create a green-
house-free economy. In effect, this strategy makes market society into 
a transformative machine that would generate incredible momentum 
toward undoing the causes of climate change. When that common goal 
finds expression within the terms of the market, individual choice can 
do the rest. The result would be neither capitalism nor socialism, strictly 
speaking, for it would rely on an alternative to both, using an aspect of 
capitalism to achieve a socially designated purpose.
This strategy accords well with other aspects of an innovative solu-
tion. The shift to sustainable energy technologies, as well as ecologi-
cally sound management of farmlands and forests, will rely heavily on 
scientific research, experimentation, and know-how. This approach thus 
hopes to use science to reconfigure the fossil-fuel-driven world it has 
created over the past two centuries. Here again the proposed measures 
would make possible a fusion of apparently opposed political traditions; 
it would blend technological innovation with environmental responsibil-
ity, making good use of engineering skills to ecological ends. Just as we 
can use the market to transform itself, we can rely on science to do the 
same—to find ways of sustaining our lives that are far less destructive 
than those it has provided so far. 
In effect, this measure ultimately proposes a Grand Compromise 
between free-market ideology and an inescapable environmental impera-
tive. It accepts the bedrock American love of economic freedom and 
uses it for a cause in which the vast majority of Americans also believe. 
The nation has used a roughly similar approach on previous occasions, 
as Social Security and Medicare demonstrate. Those measures blended 
economic individualism and public protection in ways that were ini-
tially attacked as socialist but that eventually received nearly unanimous 
public support, suggesting that hybrid solutions of this kind are possi-
ble in America.
Nevertheless, this proposal has not yet been adopted by our legisla-
tive bodies. (In 2010, the Senate rejected a bill without a vote, perhaps 
because the cap-and-trade mechanism in the bill was riddled with flaws, 
but more likely because it would have indirectly raised the price of fossil 
fuel.)87 It does not seem likely that any legislation increasing the cost of 
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fossil fuel, whether through a cap-and-trade mechanism, a tax, an untax, 
or a rationing system, will ever receive Congressional blessing—at least 
not in the foreseeable future. Those opposed to action insist either that 
climate change does not exist or that the government should not intrude 
into the market in this way. The first objection is tacitly a stand-in for the 
second; it signals the fear that if climate change happens to be true, it will 
give the government an excuse to take too much control over our lives. 
The ultimate basis for these objections is the belief that each person 
has the right to do whatever he or she pleases—as long as such action 
does not harm the interest of another. This belief is the core of “liberal” 
philosophy, that is, the strand of political philosophy that places its high-
est priority on safeguarding individual liberty. (Here our terminology has 
it exactly backwards; those who place liberty above our future are “liber-
als,” strictly speaking, while those who wish to sustain the biosphere into 
the future are in a key sense “conservatives.”)
The problem with this objection is that it falls flat, right on its face. 
When we decide to use fossil fuels, we are harming each other, as well 
as the biosphere and all future generations. If there were ever a pub-
lic imperative that passed this test better, I'd like to know what it is. All 
governments have the right to protect the viability of the biosphere 
for future generations; otherwise, it's not clear why we bother to let 
such governments exist. Our Constitution recognizes this right in its 
Preamble, which states that the purpose of government is to “promote 
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity.” Take note: its purpose is to secure liberty for us and poster-
ity, too. Since emitting greenhouse gases today will lead to more severe 
climate change, which will in turn seriously hamper the liberties of our 
descendants, the only way to safeguard the rights of posterity is to change 
our own practices today. The liberal tradition is absolutely on the side of 
changing our society, and doing so now. The trick is to find a solution to 
the problem that also respects the liberal tradition, that draws on individ-
ual decision-making, foresight, and creativity. The greenhouse gas untax 
fits the bill, for it creates the market incentives for all of us to bring about 
the changes we need.
The obstacle, then, is not present in any feature of the proposed solu-
tion, which accords well with our Constitution and our respect for the 
80 Chapter 4
free market. We can only conclude that the opposition stems from an 
objection that has no legitimacy and cannot even be spoken: the belief 
that no possible public good can justify an intrusion of this kind into indi-
vidual liberty, that in protecting freedom we should not take the interest 
even of posterity into account. Such a belief objects to the very idea of a 
greater good or a collective purpose. Ever since the “Reagan revolution,” 
many Republicans have strongly resisted the notion that the government 
is capable of solving any social problem, for by definition government 
itself is the greatest problem of all. In consequence, since that “revolu-
tion,” these Republicans—by no means all—tend to vilify progressive 
uses of government as socialist, communist, or fascist, and on occasion, 
as all three. In the new version of the free-market ideology, it seems, noth-
ing can ever be more important than the market itself.
In practical terms, then, the nation's response to climate change must 
now be debated on entirely different grounds, that of “energy indepen-
dence”—the goal of weaning America from dependency on “foreign 
oil.” But any legislation adopted on these premises will not be enough. 
Funding research into new energy technologies is essential, but this step 
will not in itself make those technologies attractive to individual consum-
ers. Giving tax breaks to help people convert to renewable energy is good, 
too, but it will be insufficient, since the vast majority of the public will 
have little incentive to give up cheap fossil fuel. Perhaps the only event 
that will truly change individual habits is a dramatic hike in the price of 
oil. In that case, the free market might do what the government cannot, 
inspiring us all to use new sources of energy as soon as we can. One pos-
sible scenario is that the government will pass legislation to generate a 
new round of technological innovation, and a global economic recov-
ery will push the price of oil so high that we'll all begin shifting to a new 
energy economy on our own. But such developments will still leave too 
many gaps: they will leave in place the hope that oil prices will decline 
again, preventing businesses from making the necessary long-term invest-
ments; they will keep alive the popular bias for cheap energy, as well as an 
immense transfer of funds to oil-producing nations; and they won't cover 
the management of farmland or forest, create a smart grid, or help reduce 
the cost of electrical cars. Moreover, they will make it very difficult for 
the United States to accept a binding target for lowering emissions in 
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international negotiations, hindering truly effective worldwide action. In 
short, this “solution” simply will not do.
The doctrinaire opposition to effective action has more than purely 
practical consequences. It will force us to adopt half-measures, to be 
sure. But it's worth contemplating why we must resort to them at all. It's 
about time we faced the consequences of the “Reagan revolution”—the 
notion that protecting the free market is more important than any other 
consideration. If that dogma is true, then creating a business-friendly 
environment trumps preserving the Earth. Capitalism matters more 
than the biosphere. No doubt capitalism might have difficulty flourish-
ing if the biosphere begins to suffer; any sane businessperson should 
be able to admit to that fact. But free-market dogmatists will not do so, 
because they will not concede that the biosphere is in danger in the first 
place. Their resistance to action is more subtle: in their view, capitalism is 
more real than the biosphere. The conditions for business are real, as are 
taxes and government funding, but in their view scientific assessments 
of climate change are still so speculative and so dependent on unproven 
models that they do not yet describe reality. Assessments of the business 
environment, of course, also depend on models and estimates, but at least 
they refer to modes of behavior that we understand. In this view, climate 
change, if it exists, arises from physical processes we still don't fully com-
prehend. Adam Smith is good as gold, but the IPCC is still a bit fishy. 
There is no need to change until the science is more solid—but even 
then, how could it ever be as solid as the myth of Adam Smith?88 
This description of market fundamentalism might sound a bit 
extreme. But in fact the entire public sphere accepts the principle that no 
political measure can be justified unless it is consistent with the laws of 
the market. (The only exceptions allowed these days are national secu-
rity, a handful of moral norms—such as those that forbid selling people, 
body parts, or sex—and a few government programs too popular to 
touch.) We've long since gotten used to obeying this principle: it seems 
we can't truly face any significant public problem (from elevated high-
school dropout rates, drug abuse, and worker safety to disaster relief and 
the protection of endangered species) without considering its impact on 
the economy and whether it would be cost-efficient to address it. Our 
ultimate reality is the economy; any other factor that matters to us must 
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make its peace with that principle or be eliminated altogether. In the 
United States, at least, human beings must abide by the rules of the mar-
ket, not vice versa. Here, we all live within the free-market bubble; noth-
ing makes it inside that doesn't submit to the logic of the market.
The consequences of living in this bubble are stark. Quickly now, 
answer this. What's harder for you to imagine: the end of free-market 
capitalism, or the end of nature? By now, imagining a devastated bio-
sphere comes fairly easily to us all. Imagining life after the end of the mar-
ket? That's almost impossible. For all of us in this society, the market is 
more real than nature.89 
But is this the core problem? After all, the greenhouse untax trans-
lates a shared priority into monetary terms, working with the rules of the 
market to achieve a common purpose. It respects the rule that no public 
good in this nation can be accepted until it speaks in the language of cost 
incentives. But evidently, this gesture is not enough. The untax relies on 
the principle that the market must serve something outside itself, must ulti-
mately not endanger the biosphere and thus our future. In doing so, it says 
that nature is more real than the market. It declares its loyalty to the Earth, 
not to economic growth. In attempting to dislodge our dependence on 
cheap energy, it tries to bring about systemic, radical change to our entire 
frame of mind. In doing so, it violates a basic taboo; it bursts the bubble.
In practical terms, the greenhouse untax (or its alternative versions) 
is a fairly innocuous proposal. It would raise the cost of energy, leading 
to a host of further changes, but it otherwise respects our traditions and 
habits in every way. Nevertheless, it represents an immense symbolic shift. 
If the “Reagan revolution” sought to limit the government's right to inter-
vene into the market, this shift constitutes an ecological revolution, one 
that limits the market's right to intervene into nature. Addressing climate 
change, it seems, requires nothing less than a radical transformation—
one akin to the industrial revolution, the sexual revolution, the Reagan 
revolution, or all three, for it calls for a transformation in specific aspects 
of our understanding of government, our physical infrastructure, and our 
daily life all at once. Its effects are so widespread, in fact, that it may be 
the most consequential revolution of them all.
Why does such a simple measure have such big consequences? In 
the past, American movements for social change have taken two paths: 
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at times they have inspired Constitutional amendments, Supreme Court 
decisions, new legal protections, and other revisions in our basic under-
standing of individual rights, and at other moments they have led to the 
creation of public agencies to oversee and enforce protections for work-
ers, previous targets of discrimination, or aspects of the environment. 
Although passing Social Security and Medicare required fighting back 
against charges of socialism, even those battles pale in comparison to 
what is required today. Seldom have we attempted to change our society 
by intervening so directly into the market itself, by changing the price of 
goods necessary to all categories of economic activity for the sake of a 
collective purpose. The last time we did anything on this order of magni-
tude, we removed an entire category of goods from the market—namely, 
human beings—and it took a Civil War to do so. In this country, when-
ever injustice is woven into the fabric of our economy, change is very dif-
ficult indeed, and the current case is no different.
One sign of how much this revolution will require of us may be found 
in what it shares with “deep ecology,” which argued around three decades 
ago that because the Earth is not here to serve human purposes, we need 
to repudiate modest protections for the environment and change our 
societies far more radically.90 Deep ecology has never become a main-
stream movement; it has been regarded, and has regarded itself, as a mar-
ginal if fierce presence. But today, climate change is making its central 
point more clearly than ever: by now, it's crystal clear that we cannot use 
the Earth in whatever way we see fit, for if we do so, we endanger our own 
future. We are a part of the Earth, rather than the other way around. 
But this insight in itself is not enough. Deep ecology uses mislead-
ing terms; by using the term “deep,” it implies that depth of awareness 
on these matters is its own reward, that seeing past gradualist measures 
is sufficient. That view distracts us from a much more crucial contrast, 
embedded in nineteenth-century radical traditions, between reform and 
revolution. At its heart, by opposing reformist measures, deep ecology is 
revolutionary ecology. In that case, merely thinking through a critique of 
modern society is only the first step. Much more crucial is the task of fig-
uring out how to change modern society so that it will no longer destroy 
the biosphere. Climate change forces us to convert this particular strand 
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of ecological thinking into a political force that can advocate for actual 
legislation and practical, real-world solutions.
And how, exactly, might we do so? So far, the major activist strategies 
have not worked. Popularizing climate change science only goes so far, 
since a good share of the public is dogmatically committed to a “skepti-
cal” stance. A more overt attempt to educate the public would only be 
perceived as condescending or worse. Direct political action on climate 
change has tended to follow the two tracks familiar within American 
activist traditions: either it uses the tactics of reformist pressure poli-
tics, which ultimately relies on fundraising and lobbying Congress, or of 
decentralized, community-centered activism. But both of these efforts 
have failed and will continue to fail. Lobbying Congress has gradually 
built support for action, but not enough to get a strong bill through a 
Democratic House, much less a Democratic Senate. Many activists, hav-
ing given up on federal leadership, have put their energy into organizing 
local efforts; such efforts have led to good results, especially in city, state, 
and regional compacts to reduce emissions. But ultimately none of these 
local efforts is enough; without concerted, tough federal action, we will 
simply not reduce our emissions as greatly as we must.
What political strategy is available to us that we have not tried? 
Perhaps it is worth mentioning in passing that the moral case for violent 
intervention is strong. If we can justify a nationalist revolt for liberty, 
as our ancestors did, or a war to defeat fascism, we can easily defend an 
intervention to save the life of the entire biosphere, whose decline repre-
sents a threat on a far greater scale than any crisis in the past. The murder 
of tens of millions of people during World War II pales in comparison to 
the potential harm to more than seven billion people on the planet in the 
coming decades.91 
Yet even discussing the possibility of resorting to violence seems to go 
too far; by now, in developed countries the mere hint of violent revolu-
tion is enough to delegitimize any movement for change. As a result, in 
the postwar era, the United States has evolved a gentler alternative to vio-
lent social change, one that fits the gradualist pace of American politics: 
the massive, nonviolent rally in Washington to make specific demands 
for action. Perhaps the key event in this regard is the civil rights march 
in August, 1963, when Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his famous “I have 
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a dream” speech. That rally has served as the template for virtually every 
later rally in the nation's capital, each of which has implicitly invoked the 
civil rights movement as the model of its own seriousness.
But because such rallies are symbolic—because they express certain 
demands without forcing immediate action—they hit their mark only 
if the government is willing to listen, only if pressure reaches an official 
audience that accepts the legitimacy of popular demands. When officials 
believe that they have already responded to those demands or that the 
new moral claims are illegitimate, the mass rally does not make a great 
deal of difference; the crowd will assemble and disband, the press will give 
it passing attention, and the life of the nation will go on, relatively undis-
turbed. In that case, the rally ultimately constitutes a feel-good occasion, 
a day for collective self-expression that has no real consequence. This 
much, at least, is true of rallies concerning ecology and climate change; 
the various rallies, protest marches, and other events in recent years have 
not budged Congressional sentiment a single inch.
What about the strategies tried by the Occupy Wall Street demon-
strations beginning in the autumn of 2011? Would the more aggressive 
attempt not just to demonstrate but to occupy public space have a greater 
impact? For better or worse, however, that protest movement, while 
addressing real concerns, did not provide a list of demands to which 
those in power might respond. The movement succeeded in putting cer-
tain ideas into the overall political debate and changing the dynamic in 
the nation's capital and elsewhere, but it did not have a powerful, imme-
diate impact. 
Would it be possible for activism to pursue a more courageous, cre-
ative tactic to break out of this impasse? Many nations have undergone 
nonviolent revolutions over the past several decades when vast num-
bers of ordinary citizens took over public space, demanded a change in 
government, and succeeded. The actions of immense, persistent, disci-
plined crowds in the Philippines and Indonesia, Berlin and the Ukraine, 
Tunisia and Egypt—and elsewhere in the Arab Spring—are excellent 
cases in point, even if the transformations they helped bring about have 
not necessarily endured. Could such an event take place in the United 
States, though for a different purpose? Could an immense rally in the 
public spaces of the nation's capital—a rally that begins on the premise 
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that it will not cease until its specific demands regarding climate change are 
met—transform our political idiom, crack open our encrusted collective 
discourse, and force a decision of some kind on climate change, whatever 
it might be?
The answer, I think, is no. Activists have not attempted to organize a 
protest on this basis, or even considered it, for several reasons. For one 
thing, doing so does not respect the principle that political demands in 
this country must be moderate, respectful, and measured—that even if 
voices for change may not be heard at first, they will be listened to eventu-
ally. A massive crowd that demands change before it disbands implies that 
the duly elected government is so neglectful of the collective interest that 
it cannot be trusted to act on that interest in its own good time. That crowd, 
in short, would attempt to usurp the popular legitimacy of the govern-
ment itself. Such a tactic cuts deeply against the American grain; at least 
over the past century, we have accepted the notion that a constitutionally 
legitimate government is legitimate in other ways as well, that in the end 
it will serve the common good. To suggest otherwise would come across 
as the height of arrogance, for it would seem to attack democracy itself. 
As a result, no one who believes in the urgency of action contemplates 
a tough, uncompromising rally of this kind; we all in practice accept 
the authority of this government, come what may—even if its policies 
endorse market activities that are destroying the Earth. 
But the consequences of that loyalty are stark. In effect, we put the 
viability of our political system above the viability of the biosphere; our 
political systems are more real to us than the Earth itself. In effect, we live in 
a political, as well as an economic, bubble. If climate change increasingly 
reveals that our policies do not make sense, we still accept the authority 
of this government and continue to pursue a moderate kind of activism, 
as if the biosphere can wait while our officials dither.
As a nation, then, we have two overpowering reasons why we have not 
acted. First, we do not wish to burst the free-market bubble, our belief 
that the Earth is here to sustain economic growth. Giving up this belief is 
very difficult for a good portion of the American public. But even those 
who give it up accept the habits of moderate protest because they do not 
wish to burst the political bubble, the nearly unanimous belief that this 
government will in time represent the best interests of us all. Even if the 
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climate transforms before our very eyes, we will hesitate to act, because 
for virtually all of us, our ultimate homeland, the domain that counts as 
real for us, is not the Earth, but the political and social traditions in which 
we live. No natural events are strong enough by themselves to dislodge 
our unthinking loyalties.
Why can climate change not get us to budge out of these fidelities? 
What about the ecological revolution of our time simply does not com-
pute? The answer can only be that it goes against the nation's traditions 
so directly that it can hardly be understood in familiar terms. As a truly 
ecological revolution, it creates a number of unprecedented challenges.
For one thing, every previous revolution in the classic sense (such 
as the Puritan Revolution, the American Revolution, or the French 
Revolution) has promised some degree of liberation—from a monar-
chy or aristocracy, a foreign government, or a system of exploitation or 
enslavement. In all these cases, people fought hoping that victory would 
give them much greater liberty and happiness. An ecological revolution 
promises no such reward. It seeks the liberation of the Earth's ecosys-
tems, and ultimately of human beings as well, from climate change. But 
it undoubtedly goes against the stream of modern culture. It requires 
us to renounce what we thought we had gained from those previous suc-
cesses. It tells us that we do not have certain rights—that we live within 
an intricate web of mutual relations that are not subject to our control. 
Rather than promising us a wonderful expansion of our lives, it offers 
us something altogether more subtle: it tells us that if we give up a cer-
tain kind of abundance, or a certain way of securing it, we will safeguard 
what we thought we could take for granted, our opportunity to have a 
livable future.
Similar reflections apply to a social change that, unlike violent revo-
lution, follows the rules of American political culture—a change that 
takes place through compromise, over many generations. For most of 
the history of this nation, the great movements for emancipation have 
taken place within the context of economic growth, industrialization, 
increasing population, and a greatly expanding use of natural resources. 
Expanding individual rights is difficult—it has taken generations and is 
still ongoing—yet it is somewhat easier when economic growth holds 
out the promise that if relatively privileged groups recognize the rights 
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of others, their own future happiness will not be harmed. Furthermore, 
this expansion of rights is only one element within the wider effect of 
industrialization itself, which liberated people from the endless drudgery 
of preindustrial labor. Released in this way, people had time for educa-
tion and leisure activities, money for a vast range of consumer items, and 
an opportunity to extend to their fellow citizens a chance for happiness 
like their own. 
An ecological movement does not follow these rules: it forces us to 
consider whether economic growth, which inevitably involves a greater 
use of natural resources, is even viable in the long term, and if so, what 
it might look like;92 it demands that we reconstruct our entire industrial 
infrastructure and potentially deindustrialize many of our practices; it 
forces us to give up our assumption that we can continue to “develop” 
previously undisturbed natural spaces; and as a result, it asks us to relin-
quish, or at least consider relinquishing, the idea that our collective abun-
dance will forever increase. To demand change without the promise of 
greater plenty would require making an appeal on pure principle. Few 
previous attempts of this kind have succeeded; as I mentioned in the 
introduction, the movement to abolish slavery was fought on the same 
basis, came up against the realities of an entire economic system, and did 
not succeed until the nation endured a Civil War. Needless to say, that is 
not a good precedent. Even worse, such an appeal would go further than 
merely doing without the help of the trends in production, population, 
and settlement that, broadly speaking, enabled previous movements to 
gain general acceptance; it would potentially argue against them. An eco-
logical movement worth its salt asks for more, and seems to offer less, 
than any previous social cause—even if its ultimate purpose is to safe-
guard the happiness of human beings. Here again, the demands of the 
Earth and of our own better selves conflict with our traditions.
The revolution of our time cuts against the grain in these ways in 
part because it does not have what most people would recognize as an 
immediate human constituency. Every previous revolution had a discern-
ible protagonist, a group of people who would truly benefit from social 
change. This time, the immediate constituency is the Earth itself, all its 
ecosystems, and the human race as a whole. But it turns out that getting 
the concerns of that constituency recognized within our political system 
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is no easy task. Those parties have no direct political representatives; no 
one speaks for them other than those who volunteer to do so. But the 
public treats those volunteers with suspicion: who are they to represent 
the natural world or to speak for the human race? Is their knowledge of 
climate change thorough and sound? Is their demand to put the viabil-
ity of the biosphere above immediate human satisfaction acceptable? Yet 
without such representation, we would hardly be able to take the environ-
mental consequences of our actions into account. No one gives ecosys-
tems the vote, nor can the dying coral reefs or melting permafrost make 
political demands. Of course, inhabitants of islands that are about to be 
submerged can raise their voices. But they are so few, and their lands so 
distant, that people in the developed world act as if they do not exist.
The result is an impasse that marks out as clearly as possible the limi-
tations of our political institutions. They take for granted that all matters 
that pertain to human affairs must arise from within the human commu-
nity and can be resolved within that domain. But it turns out that some
matters, at least, are relevant to all American citizens, even if none of us 
is seeking relief from an oppression that immediately afflicts us. Taking 
action to prevent severe climate change is indeed in the interest of us all. 
But to make the natural world feature in our calculation of our own inter-
est is unusual, and on this scale unprecedented: our institutions simply 
do not know how to respond.
This impasse may also stem from the fact that this potential revolu-
tion necessarily sustains an unusual relation to the future. Social move-
ments have typically fought to create a better future; the revolution of our 
time, however, fights to prevent the arrival of a devastating one. Previous 
revolutions could attempt to shatter tradition, cut off the relationship to 
the past, and invent an entirely new world; the French Revolution even 
created a new calendar, attempting to start time over again. Since the 
Enlightenment, modern societies have taken this link between revolution 
and radicalism for granted. But our time is different. The quintessential 
aim of radicalism—the utopian hope for a transformed future—now 
requires that we first attempt to conserve as much of the Earth's environ-
ment as possible before trying to reconstruct our societies in any other 
way. Today, radicalism must first be conservative: even if its ultimate aim is 
to open up an entirely new era, it must first make possible a sustainable, 
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ecologically responsible continuity over many generations, a continu-
ity without which it could not even fight for further social and political 
transformation. This conservatism, of course, also requires radical change 
to our energy economies, but in the name of making it possible for the 
biosphere, and thus our societies themselves, to survive.
Because the focus of this movement is to sustain the biosphere, it dif-
fers sharply from prior revolutions in yet another way. Climate change 
waits for no one: if we do not transform our practices today, we will 
feel the heat in years to come. Never before has there been a deadline
for revolution, a claim on us to bring about social change before it's too 
late. No doubt previous revolutionaries seized opportunities that would 
never again arise, certain that it was impossible to endure oppression for 
another moment. In that sense, they too felt a supreme urgency. But that 
urgency arose from within the historical situation itself, from the inter-
play of social and political forces. Now the imperative emerges from the 
purely physical consequences of actions that a short time ago we may 
not have considered politically significant. Suddenly, material reality 
obtrudes into our history, making felt an absolutely urgent demand that 
we cannot ignore.
There is no mistake about it: we must act, and we must act now. Some 
might argue that the urgency of the challenge will at last motivate us all to 
participate in a movement that will transform the world in which we live. 
But any sense that acknowledging the potentially catastrophic dimen-
sions of what we face will in itself help create an ecological revolution is 
almost certain to fail.93 The contrary possibility is much more likely to 
come true. The revolution we must bring about goes against our tradi-
tions again and again. It is endlessly inconvenient: it has no constituency, 
promises no liberation for us, and imposes its own timeline. It intrudes 
into our history implacably, utterly indifferent to the normal political cal-
culations. It demands that we change our material practices immediately, 
whatever our apparent interests at the moment might be.
Because the obstacles to action are formidable, indeed overwhelm-
ing, the odds are very strong that we as a nation will not act in time. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, the current political realities in 
Washington make it almost impossible for our government to take the 
necessary steps in the coming few years—during the crucial interval 
The Impossible Revolution 91
when we must act. In this situation, what should sane and responsible 
citizens do?
Should we simply give up and go with the flow? Should we accept 
an intolerable reality because it is so difficult to fight against it, and 
more strangely, because even a victory would come too late? Not at all. 
Looking back at the era of slavery, how tolerant are we of a hypotheti-
cal slaveholder who argued that because liberating his slaves wouldn't 
change the system overall, there would be no point in doing so? Or look-
ing back at Nazi Germany, would we accept the plea of a citizen who 
claimed she cooperated with the policy of extermination because it was 
not in her power to buck the system? Do we accept excuses like this? No, 
we don't. The American refusal of the Nuremberg defense during the war 
trials shortly after World War II says it all: evil action, even when commit-
ted under orders, is not acceptable. 
Our thoughts in this regard say a lot about what we value. We affirm 
the necessity to act justly even if doing so requires us to risk our lives. 
We also affirm that we must do so even if there are no guarantees that 
our action will lead to the results we desire. The same is especially true 
in a situation of dire extremity, when the future of civilization seems to 
be at stake, when nobody knows whether the future for which we sacri-
fice ourselves will even come to pass. Judging by our response in these 
examples, it's clear that for us, just action is never about calculating the 
consequences, but about doing the right thing, just because it is right.
If that is the case, we don't really follow Aristotle at all. For us, politics 
is really the art of the impossible. If we do not wish to use the equiva-
lent of the Nuremberg defense, we have to admit that even if a revolution 
against the current system seems to be impossible, we must fight for it any-
way. We must act, and we must act now. We owe the Earth and future gen-
erations far too much to pursue only reasonable actions, only strategies 
that have a high probability of success. Instead of complying with con-
ventional wisdom, we must transform it, reconceiving as well of familiar 
understandings of self-interest. The crisis of our time is unprecedented; our 
response must be so too. We must have the courage to break our society's 
taboos, to crack open the conventions of our political life, to expose the 
fundamental illegitimacy of any government that belittles the future of 
the biosphere. If this demand requires us to gather in vast crowds to hold 
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our nations hostage, thereby defying the complacent assumptions of 
modern democracies, so be it: only through this or any similarly force-
ful gesture will we at last place the biosphere above our belief in familiar 
political traditions. Even if we fail miserably, even if the conventions of 
public debate are too rigid to accept our intervention, we should not hold 
back. We will never again face a crisis in which more is at stake; we have 
no excuse but to salvage at least the possibility of future action. We have 
no choice but to redefine what is politically feasible—even if it is too late.94
For us, only the impossible is worthwhile.
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Chapter 5
The Stolen Future
Because our economy and political traditions are more real to us than the 
biosphere itself, the ecological revolution we need is not likely to take 
place until climate change itself becomes much more persuasive, until 
the biosphere tells us in unmistakable terms that it will truly decimate 
us if we don't change. At that point we will finally understand what it 
requires of us and will modify our societies in ways still possible for us. 
The fact that a damaged biosphere will eventually coerce us into action 
tells us that we face a basic choice: either we carry out an ecological revo-
lution today in a manner that conserves what we know best—or climate 
change will devastate our society later on and force us to adapt to condi-
tions we did not choose. Here again, our situation is unprecedented: the 
necessary ecological revolution, however inconvenient, is the product of 
a forced choice, a decision to prevent a later, much more intrusive and 
chaotic event.
If we do act too late, it won't be for the first time. Many observers 
would point out that in this respect, the ecological crisis of our day paral-
lels many others we have already experienced. Hunters on the American 
high plains decimated millions of buffalo and nearly eradicated the spe-
cies without much of a public outcry; only a few small herds remained 
after the great slaughter. Developed nations injected DDT into the food 
chain long enough for that molecule to drive some species to near extinc-
tion before Rachel Carson's call to action finally led to a ban on the prod-
uct in the United States. In the 1970s, trawlers on the high seas wiped 
out a substantial share of desirable fish populations by the time nations 
finally took action. We could add almost indefinitely to this list, each item 
of which would demonstrate very clearly that in countless cases, we act 
after the damage has been done.
This time around, however, acting too late will be even worse, thanks 
to yet another strange aspect of our present dilemma. Because the carbon 
dioxide we emit today will endure in the atmosphere for over a century, 
and our actions today will have consequences over generations, a failure 
to act will perpetually undermine and possibly erase any future action to 
address climate change. Modern history is rife with revolutions that led 
to counter-revolutions, movements to restore the prior state of things. 
Today, our own inaction would constitute a perpetual counter-revolution, 
a heavy hand destroying the inventiveness of future generations. It's as if 
the minutemen of the future would endlessly be defeated by King George 
III, no matter how resourcefully they fought on.
If that is so, we are simultaneously harming the future of the biosphere 
and deliberately stealing from future humanity's ability to respond effectively 
to that fact. Our emissions are not only harming the biosphere; they are 
destroying the future history of humanity and the biosphere both. Carbon 
dioxide, it turns out, is not only a molecule that can persist well into the 
future, contributing to global warming for generations; it is also a histori-
cal pollutant, fogging up the future with past events, smothering poten-
tial brilliance with the stupidity of earlier generations. It's as if our own 
moment, by some strange wrinkle in time, will come after the generation 
that follows us. The more carbon dioxide we emit, the more contempt we 
show for the agency of our own descendants. In giving birth to them and 
raising them, we may to some degree be showing them love and care, but 
at the same time we hand down to them an inheritance of future disaster, 
a legacy of the ashes to come.
Our situation is thus utterly bizarre. We have no real clue how to act 
in time, yet our inaction will severely restrict the benefit of action when it 
finally does take place. The revolution is not only going to come too late; 
when it comes, it will be defeated in advance. Thanks to us, it will be far less 
effective than it should be, even when it does come. We are the thieves of 
the future. 
Faced with this haunting realization, we might be inclined to pause 
and listen to a viewpoint steeped in a cynical acceptance of human folly 
and ecological destruction. Some people might remark, for example, that 
our present inaction is nothing to lament. In their view, if we act against 
our own long-term self-interest we will bear the consequences, as we so 
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often have in the past. Nothing in human affairs guarantees wisdom or 
foresight; our failure to act in the present case is no exception. What is 
there to regret? After all, they might go on to argue, the value we give to 
the natural world is not intrinsic within it; it speaks of what we as human 
beings enjoy and love. Nature itself has no consciousness of harm; it will 
not protest if we destroy it. In wounding nature, we only wound what we 
project onto it and no more—unless we harm ourselves, in which case 
we will ultimately learn our lesson and apply it as well as we can. There is 
no need for anyone to try to speak for the biosphere; what happens to it 
matters only insofar as it bears on humankind in a manner evident to all.
This attitude cannot withstand a quick reality check. Do we really 
believe that the world's ecosystems exist only for us—simply because we 
possess a certain kind of consciousness? If so, we value the power to know 
above the power to exist. Yet in one account of our formation as human 
beings, our ability to know results from God's creating us in his image, in 
which case we are responsible for preserving his creation. In another, that 
ability came about through our evolution within specific ecosystems, in 
competition with other species and in response to many environmental 
pressures; it links us directly to thousands of other forms of life. In either 
version, we owe whatever ability we have to something outside ourselves.
Moreover, our ability to “know” is limited; we have mastered very 
little about our own existence, much less about the lives of other crea-
tures, and even less about their possible forms of consciousness. Rather 
than making us the sole arbiter of value, this ability speaks of a fallible 
echo of divine powers or emerges from a particular mode of evolutionary 
adaptation. Human consciousness is remarkable, to be sure, but it is not 
a feature that gives us unlimited sovereignty to do what we wish with the 
biosphere. Few of us, I dare say, would accept existence merely as forms 
of consciousness without the pleasures of embodied life. We would not 
wish to sacrifice our existence as natural beings and become purely men-
tal entities. But in that case, we are natural creatures among the rest, and 
our wish to live well reflects the basic drive of all life to do the same. If 
we respect these dimensions of human existence, we must respect other 
forms of life as well and do what we can not to destroy them.
Nevertheless, this objection does have one great merit: it makes 
explicit the profound anthropocentrism on which all our institutions are 
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based. That attitude, as I have argued, is quite visible in our economic 
systems, which take for granted that ecosystems are “natural resources” 
for human beings to use. It is inherent in our political traditions as well, 
which find it difficult to take a perspective other than the human into 
account. In fact, it speaks for nearly every dimension of modern, indus-
trial society, which everywhere takes human sovereignty for granted.
Climate change refutes that attitude, and it refutes it for good. Because 
we regard nature merely as the backdrop for human activities and con-
tinue to live as we please, we threaten the conditions of life as we know it 
and thus undermine modern society itself. We are in the process of dem-
onstrating, once and for all, that without a flourishing biosphere, human 
life on its own cannot flourish in the least.
But if that is so, climate change tells us that much more is amiss than 
climate change alone. It is only one consequence of a broad array of 
anthropocentric activities, each of which threatens the biosphere. From 
an ecological perspective, we have already intruded into countless land-
scapes to make space for our own activities, spewed pollutants into innu-
merable ecosystems on land and sea, and driven a vast number of spe-
cies to extinction. In the last three or four decades, we have begun to take 
steps to curb these practices, but we have far to go.
All these problems, including climate change, arise from the enor-
mous increase of productive power that came with advanced industrial-
ization. Drawing on the energy provided by fossil fuels, industry could 
produce goods more cheaply and abundantly than ever before and gen-
erate chemical fertilizers that allowed modern agriculture to be much 
more productive. Together, the industry and agriculture powered in this 
fashion sustained a much greater population. That population, with its 
highly developed way of life, now expects a similar standard of living in 
the future, as do in some measure the people living in the developing 
world. Although advanced societies are getting better at producing goods 
and services with less energy each passing year, providing an advanced 
standard of living for all the world's people would still require using far 
more resources than are available on this planet. There is not even the 
shadow of a chance that the developed way of life under existing energy 
technology can be shared with all or even most of the world's people. 
98 Chapter 5
Nevertheless, in these and many other ways, we continue to treat the bio-
sphere as if it is an inexhaustible resource for human beings.
How much would we change this situation if we managed to con-
vert to entirely renewable sources of energy? It's worth trying another 
thought experiment: suppose that we did decide to do whatever we could 
to change our energy economy as soon as possible. What would follow? 
David MacKay's book on what it would take to energize the island of 
Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) without emitting any greenhouse 
gases provides an excellent starting point. Late in his book, MacKay pro-
vides several different ways to achieve that goal, leaving the choice to the 
reader. One scenario relies heavily on nuclear power; others use clean 
coal; still others avoid both of those sources and rely heavily on wind 
power. When he puts a representative plan on the map of the island, the 
real implications of such a shift become clear. Major swaths of the coun-
tryside are converted into biofuel or wood-generating systems; eleven 
nuclear power plants spring up around the nation; several wave and tide 
farms appear off the coasts; waste incinerators appear all over the map 
near populated areas; wind farms arise in likely locations around the 
island's periphery; large quantities of energy from solar power, derived 
from installations located in the Sahara Desert, arrive through long-dis-
tance power lines; and a few clean coal mines appear as well.95 
MacKay's exemplary work applies indirectly to any other densely 
populated nation or region, including a good portion of the United 
States. If we starkly reduce our use of fossil fuels, we will have to intrude 
into our environment in other ways. We'll need to install wind turbines 
wherever there is enough wind to justify the expense, put in thousands of 
square miles of solar panels in sun-friendly locations, gather the energy of 
wave and tide wherever feasible, harvest every bit of the energy of plants 
and trees we can on a sustainable basis, and much more. In short, we'll 
need to exploit the Earth in every way we can imagine except by emitting 
the exhaust from fossil fuels into the atmosphere. Ironically, taking our 
lesson to heart and trying to ward off climate change would force us to 
shift our exploitation of the Earth's systems from one mode to another, 
causing us to increase our imprint on the visible surface of the land and 
sea by a good margin.
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This thought experiment suggests that our energy-dependent large 
populations require so much energy we cannot supply them without a 
huge imprint on the planet of some kind. We now borrow from the pre-
vious history of life by burning fossilized creatures—in the form of oil, 
coal, or gas. We mine uranium, refine it, and use its radiative energy in 
nuclear power stations, but that process leaves behind nuclear waste, 
whose half-life is on the scale of thousands of years. It seems we must 
either colonize the planet's past or its future. If we wish to avoid these 
options, we could set up millions of energy farms on land and sea to 
extract the energy of sun, wind, and wave, of grasslands and forests. But 
doing so will inevitably intrude into all those ecosystems in ways we do 
not yet fully understand. How much of the deserts of the Southwest do 
we wish to cover in solar panels if we respect the ecosystems there? What 
happens to the Earth's dynamic flows if we harvest a good share of the 
movement of wind and tide for our benefit? In effect, we would end up 
colonizing the Earth's present in a style that would be novel even for us. 
One innovation might be an exception to this pattern: we could try 
to capture and store carbon dioxide underground. In that case, we would 
appropriate relatively hidden and unused parts of the Earth, though we'd 
have to make sure that the stored gas would not escape someday far into 
the future and do its damage then. Outside this single instance, it seems 
that our sheer numbers make it necessary to colonize the Earth, and time 
itself, for our own benefit.
The simple fact is that if we look at the present situation from a non-
anthropocentric viewpoint, there are too many of us. If we wished to 
avoid sucking up the resources of the planet on this scale, we would have 
to reduce our population by a serious fraction—perhaps to preindustrial 
levels. The single greatest legacy of the era of unlimited growth is very close 
to home: it is us. No doubt the rate of population increase in industrial-
ized nations has greatly declined over the past few decades. But that fact 
does not cancel out the reality that the process of modernization since 
the mid-eighteenth century has made possible a staggering increase 
in human lives. We have by now far surpassed what William R. Catton, 
Jr., described several generations ago as the planet's “carrying capacity,” 
the number of people that the Earth’s ecosystems could credibly sup-
port.96 The fact that modern agriculture can feed the billions only by 
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using immense quantities of fossil fuel, overusing the available water, and 
befouling the groundwater and seas with the effluent of nitrogen fertil-
izers tells us that under sustainable methods it would be much more dif-
ficult to keep us all alive. Like climate change, we ourselves are symptoms 
of an immense excess that has been going on for generations.
If that is so, then we, too, live in a future created by a particular past. 
We did not choose to exist in these numbers; we are in our own bodies 
the heirs of decisions not our own. Furthermore, the very fact of our pres-
ence in these numbers is a huge constraint on our action today. Much as 
we are stealing the future from our descendants, our own present actions 
are seriously undercut by the actions of our ancestors.
But it hardly works to suggest that in retrospect, we would repu-
diate their decisions—for if we did so, we'd be choosing not to exist. 
We're caught in a tragic contradiction between our own love of life and 
an awareness of what that life costs the biosphere. We are the agents 
of a new future and a danger to it at the same time. This contradiction 
appears as well in our relation to the modern, industrial era: we are grate-
ful for past revolutions, happy to have been liberated in more ways than 
we can remember, amazed at the abundance of knowledge and enjoy-
ment that have been made available to us. Whatever we may say, we are 
inevitably the products of the modern world. But we also know that this 
world is killing the biosphere and cannot continue. The modern way of 
life is our life, our own breath and blood, yet if we stick with it, we will 
destroy the Earth.
Insofar as our dilemma comes from our sheer numbers, we cannot 
help but realize that our future, too, has been stolen from us. We already 
overtax the Earth, whatever we do. Even now, the revolution is far past its 
time. From an ecological perspective, that event should have taken place 
long ago—simultaneous with the adoption of large quantities of fos-
sil fuels to power the modern economy. In liberating us from an ancient 
scarcity, the coming of cheap fossil fuels also set into motion the ecologi-
cal destruction to which we must now respond. Our task is thus in part 
to bring about a transformation that is long overdue. Yet in doing so we 
cannot denounce our ancestors; they could not have known the ultimate 
consequences of their actions. They stole the future from us without 
meaning to do so in the least. We are immersed in an immense historical 
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irony, whereby the actions of our ancestors, meant to liberate us, have 
without their intention also cursed us.
It is no wonder, then, that we find it so difficult to face the current 
crisis. Inheritors of a vast abundance, and in our vast numbers an instance 
of that abundance, we cannot easily undo the legacy of generations. In 
the previous chapter I listed a series of reasons why the ecological revolu-
tion of our time has gone missing. Here I can add a further reason to that 
list: in the end, that revolution asks us to undo certain consequences of 
a demographic explosion that has lasted for several centuries. It demands 
that we catch up with an event that should have happened long ago—and 
that, thanks to our ignorance, could not happen at its proper time. We 
were born too late and are emerging from our stupidity later yet. We are 
only beginning to grasp our situation now, at this far edge of time, awak-
ening as it were after our own end.
Where are we, then, in this strange moment on this planet, which is 
not quite, or not yet, our real home? As I argued in the previous chapter, 
this hour cries out for a revolution—but one that promises us no famil-
iar liberation, no release. We must act, yet we will not; we must reply to 
something greater than we are, yet we can barely hear its voice. Now, 
when we work within our political traditions, they thwart our actions, 
rather than enabling them. In doing what we must, we discover that we 
are also asked to give what we do not have. The measures we could take 
to forestall the coming horror are relatively simple, their purpose clear, 
yet enacting them seems impossibly difficult. 
Yet as I have been suggesting in this chapter, if we did so, we would 
discover that despite our best efforts, we would still be using the planet 
for our own purposes. Even as we attempt to forestall the coming crisis, 
we must recognize that we ourselves, in our great numbers and exces-
sive demands, are already a crisis too great for the planet to bear. We are 
lost where we are found, ignorant in our knowledge, poor in our wealth, 
inheriting a blessing that curses us. Here at the crossroads, we are already 
beyond them, already inhabiting a future we did not choose. Stealing the 
future from our descendants, we also discover that in some degree ours is 
missing as well. In retrospect, we might conclude that the whole history 
of the modern world is shadowed by another future that is not to be—
one promised by an ecological revolution that, whenever it takes place, 
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will come too late. We are the heirs, in short, of a tragic contradiction, 
an impasse no one chose. The challenge of our time is not only to fight 
against this impasse, to bring about that necessary, impossible revolution; 
it is also to discover how to live in a world with a disappearing future. To 
this last, devastating challenge, we now turn.
Notes
95.  For the five energy plans, see MacKay, Sustainable Energy, 203–213; for the 
map illustrating one plan, see 215.
96.  William R. Catton, Jr., Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).
Chapter 6
The Ruins to Come
If we face the reality of climate change honestly, taking into account how 
urgent a task lies before us and how dim is any hope we will act in time, 
we must acknowledge that a great shadow darkens our present moment. 
The biosphere changes apace; the land dries, the ice cap melts, the forests 
burn; those who lead our public institutions debate, stutter, and go silent; 
the prospect on which we rely throughout our daily activities erodes 
and falters; and the hope that inspires our political lives flickers and goes 
dark. We have always taken for granted that a livable future lies before us, 
that whatever happens to us now, tomorrow is another day. But we can 
no longer be so sure.
Human societies have always had a strong image of the future. 
Traditional societies have assumed that the future will be much like the 
present—that the tribe, kingdom, or nation will continue to replicate 
itself, generation by generation, sustaining the link to the gods, the legacy 
of the ancestors, and the fundamental human ways in perpetuity. Modern 
societies, in contrast, have held forth the image of the general liberation 
of the human race, so that at some point in the future no oppression or 
poverty, no ignorance or violence would afflict the Earth.
These images of the future, however, have relied on the even more 
basic assumption, never previously called into question, that the planet's 
ecosystems would remain intact and flourishing forever. The seemingly 
indestructible continuity of the living systems that surround us has made 
all our imaginings possible. But what happens if that continuity is in 
question—when we begin to realize that the Earth's ecosystems are vul-
nerable to destruction or decay?
Our first task in confronting this question is simply to absorb the 
significance of putting that continuity in doubt. How do our most basic 
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assumptions change when we begin to imagine the future differently? 
What, for example, takes place when we take the scenarios of general cli-
mate change, social dislocation, and perpetual adaptation seriously?
When scientists imagine what the world might look like in a century 
if we continue with business as usual or alter our energy economies a few 
years from now (and thus too late), providing details about changes to 
familiar landscapes and the consequences for the places we know best, 
they ultimately depict for us the ruins of our own culture. The best sci-
ence available to us requires us to imagine an America with damaged 
coastlines, decaying forests, and drying soils, with countless trees, plants, 
and animals under severe distress—and to envision parts of coastal cities 
standing in the water of elevated seas, as well as the cities of the heartland 
crouching beneath the dust storms rising from parched fields. 
These images capture for us the ruins of our own future. If we con-
tinue to live in the way we do today, we will eventually find ourselves in 
strange, almost unrecognizable places. Our own lives will change as well: 
because they will be at once something like what we know today and very 
different, with major elements missing and other elements adapted to 
new conditions, they too will be in ruins.
To think of ruins in this way provokes a new emotion. We are all famil-
iar with images of ruins—of human structures, built long ago, that have 
survived the disappearance of the cultures that created them, have fallen 
into partial decay, and remain in the landscape as reminders of a distant 
era and as symbols of what time will inevitably do to all human enter-
prise. In the presence of the ruin, whatever it may be—from the Roman 
Colosseum to an abandoned farm down the road—one contemplates 
not merely one's own mortality but the mortality of cultures or historical 
eras; one senses a great gap between the intensity with which we pursue 
our goals and the indifferent flow of time.
But now, we contemplate the prospect of future ruins, conceiving of 
a cultural decline that has not yet taken place. Indeed, the thought of 
these ruins is so fascinating to us that we have long enjoyed depicting 
them fictionally in science fiction stories and movies. (Think Planet of the 
Apes or Waterworld.) More recently, however, those fictional scenarios 
have given way to sober forecasts of what will take place if we continue 
to live as we do. Reading the IPCC reports, we can find utterly serious, 
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detailed analyses of what is likely to happen if greenhouse gas emissions 
rise to a certain level. We no longer need science fiction to help us imag-
ine future ruins: a generation of scientists is now analyzing our prospects 
while attempting to remove every trace of fiction from its scrupulous esti-
mates. We can now absorb professional assessments of how dry central 
Africa and eastern Australia will become, how much the water levels in 
the Great Lakes will recede, how much of Bangladesh or Florida will be 
submerged, how much of the grain of northern China or the American 
Midwest will die under the greater heat of the sun. As we begin to think 
of adapting to these and other possibilities, what was once science fic-
tion has become the reality of our world, the ruins in which we must pre-
pare to live. 
Those ruins are not terribly picturesque. Contemplating the remains 
of Mayan temples, we might take pleasure in the surviving structures of a 
distant culture. Contemplating the ruins of our own cities and landscapes 
is entirely different, if only because we still live in them. While we take in 
a fictional scenario, we might enjoy putting ourselves in a distant future 
to look back at the present with wonder or regret. But in reality, we take 
the ongoing viability of our lives for granted. To think about our future 
ruins, then, is ultimately to confront the fact that the world in which we 
now live is about to transform into something else—something we may 
not wish to live through at all. Those future ruins, in short, bear upon our 
present, casting a shadow over who we are.
Those future ruins are strange in another respect. In them, the idea of 
ruins will extend from buildings to landscapes, from landscapes to con-
tinents and seas, and then to the Earth itself. Today we can easily imag-
ine that an observer a century hence, viewing a pine forest in Colorado, 
will see a good share of its trees browned and dying, others already fallen 
and in decay. Such an observer, having experienced part of the previous 
century and having learned about the rest, will see in that landscape the 
ruins of a forest. To think in this way of an ecosystem in ruins also pro-
vokes a new emotion. Where a visitor to the Colosseum might ponder 
the decline and fall of Rome, and thus the mortality even of the mightiest 
empires, this observer of the pines will contemplate something quite dif-
ferent. The inevitable mortality of nature? Not exactly: those pines stood 
there for millennia and presumably could have stood much longer. The 
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end of a civilization? Not quite: that civilization will no doubt be endur-
ing in some form nearby, most likely in the observer herself. What, then, 
will these ruins speak of? The power of fossil-fuel civilization to put that 
forest into irreversible decline. 
It might work, then, to say that the forest speaks of the ruins of a civi-
lization. In that scene, then, a cultural disaster will be made visible in a 
wounded ecosystem. But even that unusual feature does not fully capture 
the strangeness of our future ruins. Normally when we think of ruins, we 
do not imagine that the people who built them still live on in them; those 
sites are abandoned and empty. No Caesars visit the Colosseum today 
to witness gladiatorial contests; somewhere along the way, the inhabit-
ants of Rome gave up such spectacles and failed to maintain that ancient 
structure. No soldiers now patrol along Hadrian's Wall; it lost its origi-
nal function, fell into disuse, and some of its stones were plundered for 
other purposes. A certain cultural continuity was lost, but the physical 
object remained. In contrast, we must imagine ourselves or our descen-
dants actually living in the ruins of the cities we built—or perhaps in 
the less difficult regions nearby. In some sense, then, those future ruins 
will be the opposite of the picturesque ruins of the past: we will outlive 
the environments we have destroyed. The buildings we use will still serve 
important cultural functions, we will still live in their vicinity, and yet 
we face the prospect that eventually our use of them will no longer be 
tenable. We would like to stay in our cities; we would hope to maintain 
our traditions—yet our way of life will erode nevertheless. Strangely, that 
way of life, thanks to the ecological consequences of its very “success,” 
will end up interrupting itself, making itself unlivable and obsolete. After 
we realize as much, however, we or those who follow us will still live on, 
scrounging in the shadows of those ruins for habitation and sustenance. 
We will be part of the ruins, eking out a damaged way of life.
No doubt others in the past have lived through something like this 
experience. When enemies took over a city, burned it, and destroyed its 
sacred places, those who lived there know they witnessed the passing of 
their way of life. But they never doubted that the lives at least of their ene-
mies would go on. When civilizations exhausted their surrounding envi-
ronments, outliving the resources available to them—whether in ancient 
Mesopotamia or the Yucatan—people certainly lamented the passing 
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of their civilizations, but they could still assume that they might survive 
elsewhere and that they or their progeny could build anew.97 The passing 
of a civilization, however enormous an event, is never definitive; every-
body knows that something else will happen, another round of history 
will begin. And all these changes are paltry in comparison to the endur-
ance of the natural environment that human beings take for granted. 
Rome falls, the Holocene endures, and thus Rome can be built again.
Not anymore. If anything, Rome still flourishes, only more success-
fully than ever. No previous generations have experienced anything 
approaching the abundance of modern life. Modern, industrial civiliza-
tion is being replicated around the world, “developing” nations seek to 
join the club of wealthy countries, and the reckless consumption of the 
Earth goes on unchecked. Yet that fossil-fuel abundance is threatening 
the Holocene, the complex, relatively stable state of the Earth we have 
enjoyed over the last 10,000 years. Now, Rome flourishes so extrava-
gantly that the Holocene will fall—and as a result, so too will Rome. We 
cannot be confident that other societies will flourish in place of our own; 
what will befall us will happen in some other way to all the world's cul-
tures. Nor can we assume we will build anew. We may not yet know how 
to build anything that will endure on this transformed Earth; finding a 
way to do so will be a perpetual challenge. At least in one respect, the 
eclipse of our future will be definitive: it admits of no escape, for it will 
apply to the human species as a whole.
A defeat on this scale may still place us in a dilemma that others have 
faced. Other societies, after all, have been faced with even bleaker pros-
pects, barred from sustaining their former traditions on their own terms. 
Consider the aboriginal Tasmanians. After they were colonized on their 
native island, decimated by disease and violence, and imprisoned by their 
European masters on a small portion of their former land, they found 
themselves so spiritually destroyed that they merely waited for death 
and within a few years disappeared entirely.98 A less devastating version 
of this defeat happened in the recent past, not long after the fall of the 
Berlin wall. When capitalism swept over the Soviet Union, shattering the 
remnants of communism's promises, the life expectancy among men dra-
matically declined, as if the loss of that society's foundations gave them 
little reason to go on.99 Neither society was especially heartened that 
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another culture would endure, for the world that mattered to them, the 
world that supplied them with their core system of beliefs and concerns, 
had vanished. 
Our dilemma is a little like theirs: eventually, when we realize that no 
one can escape the future we have created, we too will have to doubt our 
core system of beliefs. But this time, no one will have defeated us; we will 
not be imprisoned, nor will we be the losers of the Cold War. We will 
have defeated ourselves. That event will at once distress us, since we will 
indeed be stuck on an Earth we never hoped to see, but it will also give 
us some hope, since as the agents of our own undoing, we would still pre-
sumably have the chance to do something about it. At once perpetrators 
and victims, we'll endure a crisis, to be sure, but we will still be confident 
we can face the crisis on our own terms, find means of adaptation, or dis-
cover some style of living on.
But too much confidence in this respect will be illusory. Until this 
point in our histories, we could take for granted that if we foresaw a dan-
ger to our collective lives, we could take action and ward it off. If we did
something, we would see results. But if our societies fail to act soon and 
those positive feedback loops kick in, we will enter a truly bizarre condi-
tion. At that moment, if it has not already taken place, we will discover 
that the future we dread will arrive no matter what we do in the present. In 
that strange hour, the future will become at once inevitable and alien; it 
will bring about devastating events even if we attempt to prevent them. 
Where we could once shape the future in some fashion, in that 
moment we will discover that the future has become estranged: that
future, as well, will be in ruins. Of course, our actions even in that 
moment will continue to have an effect: they might prevent an even more 
devastating future from taking place or might save various aspects of the 
planet for later generations. But they will be too little and too late to pre-
vent a wrenching change for all the world's cultures.
The possibility that we might cross those tipping points without 
knowing it makes our situation uncanny. If we do make that transition, it 
will take place silently, without notice—as if we are on board a ship that 
has been struck and will eventually sink even though we heard nothing of 
that blow and the band plays on. In a case like that, the events determin-
ing the future will have arrived already, while we carried on, oblivious. 
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Although our cultures will already be stricken, we will continue to par-
ticipate in them as if they still thrive. Several recent movies imagine that 
ghosts are dead people who have not yet learned that they are dead; they 
haunt the living because they are ignorant of their true condition.100 In a 
similar fashion, the world's societies, unaware of their actual state, may 
soon become phantoms, enduring in a posthumous condition.
But this depiction of ghostly cultures may still not do justice to our 
dilemma. For the most part, we tend to place these ruins in the future, 
whether we are enjoying fictional tales or pondering scientific assess-
ments. We mostly assume that the major cultural dislocations caused 
by climate change are yet to come. But in fact those changes are already 
taking place. Some observers suggest that the dryer, hotter conditions in 
the Darfur region of the Sudan helped create the conditions for conflict 
and crimes against humanity there.101 Alaskan towns built on permafrost 
are tilting, their foundations cracking.102 Countless farmers around the 
world, including in the United States, are discovering that the seasonal 
rhythms on which they once relied are being suspended.
We are already living in a ruined future, already enduring changes in 
the biosphere for which we are not prepared. But why are we not ready? 
Why should the arrival of this future surprise us? Evidently, even though 
we are highly entertained with the thought of strange futures, project-
ing them endlessly in our fictions, we do not ultimately expect them to 
arrive: when they do, they seem premature, catching us by surprise. The 
very category of the future, it seems, floats in the distance; even if we 
are oriented to it as the basis of our present actions, we keep it on the 
other side of a conceptual wall, safeguarding the present from its arrival. 
The same is true of the scientific study of what climate change might do: 
while we may absorb what researchers tell us, their findings often remain 
mere information to us, not a vivid reality in our ordinary lives. Even if 
we know that climate change is happening and may devastate our homes, 
we might not truly acknowledge this fact to ourselves. The arrival of that 
future deprives us of the security and pleasure we take in contemplating 
it in the distance, throwing the conceptual map of our lives into disarray. 
When it arrives, it short-circuits what we thought we understood. Never 
having lived through such a change before, we cannot know what it will 
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be like to experience it. We are inevitably unprepared for this event; it can 
only take place when we are unaware.
Our tendency to keep the ruined future at a distance forces us into 
a contradiction: if its arrival has not taken place, then evidently we still 
have time (to argue about it in Congress, to negotiate new treaties, to pre-
pare to alter our technologies), as if it is still years away; if it has occurred, 
then it's too late, and we need do nothing. Either way, we believe we 
don't really have to do a thing. Perhaps here again we live in the ruins 
of the future: modern culture has long since prided itself on its capacity 
to control its conditions, to plan for contingencies, to predict trends, to 
provide for long-term safety and security. The future, you could say, was 
its specialty. But this time around, those who manage the future are in 
over their heads. The future has been their specialty, just not this future. 
This version, it seems, is by definition too much to handle: we caused it, 
yet it eludes us, primarily because it contradicts our basic assumptions. 
We've been making life much better, not worse; the thought of a devas-
tated future profoundly conflicts with everything we've been trying to 
do. If the future is in ruins, so also is our expertise in the future. But then 
the most basic premises of modern culture are in ruins as well.
At first glance, our way of enduring the prospect of these future ruins 
may share much with how we respond to our own mortality. We cannot 
know when our deaths may arrive; we might know that they will take 
place eventually without taking that prospect seriously; we might even 
have contracted a terminal disease without suspecting a thing. But does 
it follow that pondering the ruins is something like contemplating our 
own deaths? Are these meditations on dire events to come in some ways 
the same? In an older religious tradition, believers once meditated on the 
memento mori, a reminder of death such as a skull, to teach themselves 
that they would die, that all their passionate attachments and fierce long-
ings would pass, that everything melts away, so as to set their sights on 
eternity instead. More recently, philosophers such as Martin Heidegger 
argued that the most authentic mode of being for us is being-toward-
death, the direct encounter with our mortality.103 
But this analogy ultimately fails. Climate change is absolutely vaster 
than any individual's passing—even one's own. It is of another order of 
business entirely. We all know that individuals will die in the ordinary 
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course of things. But for a species to die is another matter altogether. An 
individual's death arises from the same process as its birth, its participa-
tion in reproduction, its maintaining a certain adaptive behavior within 
a particular ecological niche. Similarly, in the context of the biosphere's 
dynamic life, the passing of a species arises from the same process as its 
emergence, its flourishing, and its participation in the relationships of 
symbiosis or competition. Its extinction fits within the pattern of a won-
derfully complex but coherent interaction. What we face, however, is not 
extinction of this kind, but the murder of species, ecosystems, oceans—
purely as a result of the biologically unnecessary indulgence of our spe-
cies. This is not death, nor even extinction, but a destructive intervention 
into the web of life. 
Climate change, in short, does far more than mortality could ever do: 
it harms the lifeworld that sustains our species, and in consequence dam-
ages the societies in which our deaths have meaning, the cultural context 
for our own aspirations and achievements. It imposes an extra level of 
difficulty on each species, each society, each life—one that none previ-
ously had to bear. As a result, all will face something more than mortality, 
something altogether unanticipated and more strange.
This bizarre future differs from mortality in yet another way. Two 
centuries ago, in one passage of his elegy to John Keats, Adonais, Percy 
Bysshe Shelley wrote that when nature revives in the spring and the dead 
do not return, we are reminded that the circle of the year differs sharply 
from the shape of an individual human life. Spring cannot bring back the 
dead; ultimately, then, it cannot console us but instead revives our grief. 
He concludes this portion of the poem with these lines: “As long as skies 
are blue, and fields are green / Evening must usher night, night urge the 
morrow, / Month follow month with woe, and year wake year to sor-
row.”104 For the speaker of these words, human beings pass while nature 
endures. Today, however, we face virtually the opposite emotion. Under 
climate change, you, or I, or a friend may live on beyond the death of a 
local forest, the silencing of a nearby stream, or the browning of a neigh-
boring green. The years will return, no doubt, and night will still urge the 
morrow, but whether nature will revive is another question. Where we 
once thought we would die and nature endure, we may instead survive 
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after the passing of an ecosystem we know. Our response to the land-
scapes surrounding us alters irreversibly. 
In that case, our relationship to many other aspects of experience 
changes as well. Even in a nation as industrialized as the United States, 
the movement of the seasons serves as the basis of the ritual year, anchor-
ing Easter and Christmas, Passover and Yom Kippur, Independence Day 
and Thanksgiving; as the seasons drift to new regions of the calendar, 
plants blossom or decay at other times, and the natural world becomes 
more confused, the significance of these ritual events changes too, speak-
ing less of the deep turning of the world and more of sheer convention. 
Our association of youth with spring, of age with fall, begins to falter if 
spring comes too soon, if fall extends into winter; our metaphors start 
to melt away, even though youth and age remain to us. Our lives are cut 
adrift from the seasons, our span of time knocked askew from nature's 
rhythms, our mythic associations made threadbare. 
We may in consequence find ourselves grieving more for the vulner-
ability of the biosphere than for our own. That emotion might lead us 
also to grieve for our excessive invulnerability, our capacity in these lat-
ter, hi-tech days to defeat disease, master the body's ills, and generally 
ward off aging and death—and for that matter to protect ourselves from 
cold or heat, reduce hunger and thirst, shrink every distance, and master 
further reaches of the unknown. We may end up wishing for a return of 
greater vulnerability, a more open acceptance of weakness and mortality, 
for only with that return might we release other forms of life from the 
devastating effects of our dominance.
Such thoughts, however, will ultimately demonstrate that our own 
mortality fades in comparison to something altogether more harrow-
ing—the possible mortality of our societies, the natural systems we know, 
and to some extent the biosphere itself. In our world, the temporal coher-
ence of a future into which our individual lives vanish—the coherence, 
in short, of mortality itself—is falling into decay. What once served as an 
instance of the ultimate contemplation is now dwarfed by a much more 
difficult thought, the prospect that our very metaphor of what endures 
and what is timeless has itself fallen into ruin. 
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Chapter 7
The Broken Present
Many of us contemplating these possibilities might answer quite simply, 
“Why should I care? The events you describe, if they take place at all, will 
change human life on Earth after I am gone. Besides, the problem is so 
vast, and the actions we must take are so difficult, that I can make very 
little difference on my own. I'll just live out my life in the best way I can 
and let history take its course.”
There is a kind of sanity in this response: in many circumstances of 
life, repression may be a fine thing indeed. But is it truly possible to set 
aside the reality of what might take place to us all in the future? Can we 
simply divorce our present actions from their consequences?
If, as I suggested in the previous chapter, every human society has cul-
tivated a strong image of the future, it has done so because such an image 
is necessary to justify its activities in the present. Some kind of future, 
some orientation to a goal or destination, is intrinsic to all of our inten-
tional activity as individuals and as members of groups. Whether or not 
we care in a deep or heartfelt way about what will take place to our soci-
ety, or for that matter about the human race or the Earth itself, some kind 
of investment in the future is implicit in our situation as human beings. 
Even if we repudiate the significance of that future for us on a conscious 
level, the fact that we are purpose-driven beings implies that our actions 
will betray us, endlessly demonstrating that in fact we do care, that we are 
everywhere and always invested in creating a livable future.
So there is no way for us to evade some difficult questions. If that
kind of future is in store for us, what happens to the goals we have set 
for ourselves and that we seek through our various efforts? Everything 
we do in our ordinary lives is based on the assumption that we will have 
a future—that our houses will remain standing, that we will continue 
The Broken Present 115
to have a home in the nations in which we live, that the skills we have 
acquired will be useful in some fashion, that we will be able to participate 
in the cultural activities we care about, and that we will have some chance 
to achieve our goals. Our businesses run on credit, borrowing their very 
capital from the financial resources of the future; our governments staff 
and equip standing armies to defend against attacks that may come to 
pass; and we insure our properties, bodies, and lives against harm that 
may befall us. Many of our daily activities are directly oriented toward 
ensuring that the future will be livable. Sustaining our loving and erotic 
relationships, cultivating our family ties and our friendships, raising chil-
dren, giving or getting an education, giving or getting preventative and 
acute medical care, and building and maintaining the physical structures 
in which we live and work: all these, and countless further activities, 
reveal how greatly we wish to sustain the lives we already know, to hand 
them down to further generations, and to maintain something like our 
current level of abundance and happiness. Our orientation to the future, 
in short, provides the very pith and substance of our present.
Individual lives take for granted that they are shaped by narratives 
with a past, present, and future—that they are oriented to satisfactions, 
achievements, or realizations that will reward lifelong commitments. 
Only through such narratives can we live our lives ethically, for only 
through them can we establish a context for intentional action, whatever 
it may be, in relation to everyone and everything that matters to us.105
Such narratives also shape the collective life of families, communities, 
and nations, as well as political groups, commercial enterprises, and reli-
gious faiths. Without such narratives, it is hard to imagine that modern, 
democratic societies could legitimate themselves at all, for from the start 
they are founded on the principles of liberation and progress. This orien-
tation is so deeply embedded in our activities that even an outright nihil-
ist who repudiates all notions of a collective good nevertheless assumes 
he will be able to sustain that identity and share that perspective in the 
future. Merely speaking of that viewpoint to others takes for granted the 
timeline of persuasion, the long-term contexts of argument and debate.
At times, of course, people sacrifice too much of their present lives 
for the sake of the future: they too eagerly practice the well-known art 
of deferred gratification, working so hard in the present that they almost 
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forget what all the effort is for. We often tell such people that they should 
stop living for the future and enjoy the present. No doubt we are giving 
them good advice. But we should not assume that it is truly possible to 
live only for the present. Even the most dedicated contrarian, one who 
rejects a job and ignores her friends, will still turn off the water after tak-
ing a shower, knowing it would be nice not to flood the bathroom. Our 
practical actions constantly speak of our knowledge that the next hour 
and next day will come, even if at times and for specific purposes we 
might not wish to emphasize that fact.
But what happens when, in reviewing the narratives of our lives, look-
ing ahead to the futures we hope to have, we realize that climate change 
will damage our world in ways that will directly and permanently affect 
us? What happens to our orientation to the future when its livability is 
cast into doubt and begins to dissolve? What if the place we choose for 
our abode becomes unlivable, the profession for which we have been 
trained is no longer needed, or the income we hoped would support us 
threatens to disappear? What if we realize that the life we wanted to lead 
is ecologically outrageous, that the children we've been raising have no 
chance to live as well as we have, and that the political causes for which 
we've been fighting may never succeed? 
The answer, I think, is clear: all our practical activities, our human 
relationships, our professions and goals, are harmed in their very sub-
stance. The value of our ordinary activities begins to fray, and the entire 
framework of our lives becomes suspect. Climate change does not just 
melt the ice caps and glaciers; it melts the narrative in which we still par-
ticipate, the purpose of the present day. In this sense, too, we are already 
living in the ruins of the future.106 
Climate change devastates the future and the present alike. But that is 
not all. Most of us hope to transmit to new generations something of the 
values, achievements, and joys we inherited from our forebears. When 
our future is cast into doubt, so also is the transmission of that past. In 
much the same way, the memory of our own pasts, which we may still 
regard as strongly continuous with our present, shifts more emphatically 
into the past tense, as if it now speaks clearly of something that is gone. 
At certain moments, perhaps, we might almost sense that our very pres-
ent should be rendered in the past tense—as if, like those on board the 
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ship I mentioned above, we live in a society that is already dead with-
out knowing it.
This bizarre possibility extends well beyond the framework of our 
own lives. We live in cultures that have long and storied histories, that 
have produced and been shaped by the deeds of monarchs and rebels, 
the achievements of statesmen and engineers, the thoughts of theolo-
gians and philosophers, the works of poets, playwrights, and intellectu-
als, and the discoveries of scientists. But without a future, these heritages, 
while still crucial and precious, subtly change, as if they endure after 
their foundations have disappeared. Suddenly, all these legacies belong 
to a planetary era that is passing away, for they were built on the security 
of ecological foundations that have collapsed. When the future goes, so 
do the present and the past. The entire framework of human time tilts, 
decays, disappears.
Does our situation leave us without hope? On one level, it does: we 
can no longer hope that the civilization we inherited will thrive or that 
future political changes will give all human beings a chance to partici-
pate in the abundance we have known. If that hope came true, the Earth 
would perish very quickly. As Robert Jensen says, hope of that kind is 
lazy, and the traditions it relies on are dead.107 As long as we stick within 
the framework of what we have known, we will no longer envision great 
things, only the prevention of the worst. We will imagine no utopia, only 
the best dystopia we can get.
But if we change our perspective and abandon the premises of fossil-
fuel culture, another kind of hope may be given to us: we could hope for 
a post-carbon culture that could thrive even on a greatly wounded Earth. 
That kind of hope, however, is far more than the bare emotion, for it 
can arise only out of the activity of reinventing who we are and becom-
ing uncharacteristically honest about the difficulty we face. Yet even that 
hope cannot come without its shadow: as I argued earlier, converting 
to renewable energy sources for everyone on this overpopulated planet 
would still do great harm. The hope we now have, it seems, will always be 
mixed with a certain dread. Rebecca Solnit, writing about the challenges 
that will always face political activism, calls this “hope in the dark.” In our 
moment, that darkness is darker yet.108 In our broken present, however, 
this may be the best we can do.
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I have been suggesting that an awareness of our future ruins harms 
the very substance of our present activities. Does it follow that we should 
simply give up, abandon all our efforts, renounce the world, and live in 
a kind of catatonic despair? Why not just stop all our labors and lie pas-
sively on the sofa? That would hardly be a solution; before long, the guy 
on the sofa would wonder how to get food to eat, how to keep the roof 
over his head, and how to satisfy other basic physical needs. If he truly
gave up taking care of himself, eventually his friends would have to do so 
for him. He'd become a pain to everybody he knew. However great our 
awareness of what may come, the basic imperatives of life demand that 
we carry on. In fact, the more we deny those imperatives, the more we 
tacitly acknowledge them: you can't deliberately ignore something unless 
you already know it is there. Even the guy on the sofa has to acknowledge 
that life goes on.
Would it work, then, to embrace our everyday lives with a vengeance, 
as if to escape our knowledge in doing so? Why not respond to our 
dilemma by saying, “I'll just keep working until the waters rise up and 
carry me away”? But if a person makes this declaration, she would show 
that she values activity for its own sake, not for any purpose it might 
serve. She might hope to prove that she will not submit, that she can con-
quer any despair. While such a choice reveals a certain courage, it too is 
ultimately desperate, for rather than truly responding to the conditions 
around her and adjusting her life accordingly, she would attempt to value 
what she knows is futile. Although ignoring climate change might seem 
to protect her from it, the uselessness of her efforts would necessarily 
strike her from time to time, especially when she relaxes from her heroic 
strain, and since she had not created a viable response to it other than 
sheer stubborn effort, it would hit her with special force. Pure stubborn-
ness is no better a response than passive despair.
The difficulty of our situation only becomes clear if we realize that the 
future is in ruins and that life goes on. As a result, even if we are aware 
that the blow has been struck, even if we live in knowledge instead of 
ignorance, we find ourselves having to live on as if nothing has changed: 
that knowledge, it seems, does not alter the basic challenges of everyday 
life, the ordinary tasks of doing our work, taking care of our loved ones, 
and planning for the future. The contradiction is stark, inconquerable. 
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Our orientation to the future inevitably remains, but for us it is directed 
toward what is no longer entirely there. We are caught between two 
imperatives: we must lead our lives, but we must also recognize that our 
life narratives are no longer credible. Neither renunciation nor stubborn-
ness, neither reckless grief nor furious assertion, can finally erase the 
eerie quality of persisting within a narrative whose conclusion is slowly 
being erased. No plausible course of action is open to us. The ruined 
future forces us to endure in a broken present.
Is it even possible to live in full awareness of this contradiction? Can 
we at once perform our ordinary activities and be conscious that the nar-
rative they imply may be in ruins? Our first option is to do everything 
we can to prevent entering this contradiction at all: the prospect of life 
in these terms should be enough to motivate our unreserved participa-
tion in a movement to change our societies and to change them now. 
But as I have been suggesting, the time available for action is so short it 
has virtually disappeared. We may have little choice, then, but to live in 
a mode that might seem impossible for us, to endure a life that will go 
on, even though it has been damaged fundamentally. We who are alive at 
this strange moment may end up having to reckon with its strangeness by 
enduring in this impossibility. If the Earth passes the turning point and 
we still endure, we will discover that the ruins of the future have thrown 
us off the track of our personal narratives and disjoined us from who we 
think we are. In that moment, if we are sane and aware, we will be off-
kilter, out of balance.
The ruins of the future inevitably undo any coherent way to live. If 
events force us to construct new strategies for surviving in an altered 
world, we will also have to face this more intimate challenge: how 
to endure this incoherence, how to live on in the ruins of the lives we 
thought we would lead, in the ruins of who we thought we might be. All 
our basic emotions will be up for grabs, for none will remain unchanged: 
desire and grief, joy and sorrow, hope and despair. Living in the physical 
ruins of the Earth will be tough. But doing so will also symbolize living in 
the ruins of another sort, the broken language of the heart.
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Chapter 8
A Slow and Endless Horror
So far I have been suggesting that our situation of facing the conse-
quences of climate change for our future is unprecedented. We've never 
before contemplated the possibility that the life we know might be altered 
beyond recognition in quite this way. But it's worth pausing to consider 
whether this relation to the future is really all that new. Are we in fact 
experiencing as strange a moment as all that? Aren't people in modern 
cultures used to facing these kinds of uncertainties as a matter of course 
by now? What is really new in our current situation?
We are, after all, the heirs of a long history of devastation. Over the 
past several centuries our societies have engendered and endured sys-
temic, irreversible transformation in its various forms, including those 
in which expansion and liberation evolved into devastation and geno-
cide. For half a millennium we have had to accept the possibility that the 
invasive power of modern economic and political regimes could destroy 
entire traditions, cultures, and peoples. This history is so long, difficult, 
and bloody—and so convenient to ignore—that it may be useful to 
review it for a moment. 
The European encounter with the New World led to an era of coloni-
zation on nearly every continent, a pattern that in turn frequently deci-
mated native populations and drew upon the murderous enslavement of 
Africans to provide labor for the new world. The scientific and industrial 
revolutions, in their turn, made possible the creation of modern industrial 
capitalism, which superseded traditional trades and handicrafts, forced 
a long demographic shift from the countryside to the city, and subordi-
nated national economies to global trade and financial networks, forever 
altering the preindustrial way of life. At times, that process had brutal 
effects. The British application of a particular theory of the free market in 
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countries across its far-flung empire led to the Irish famine of the 1840s, 
the devastating famines in India in the late 1800s, and ultimately to what 
Mike Davis has called the “making of the Third World.”109 Eventually, the 
bureaucratic power of the modern state, coupled with military and impe-
rial ambitions, nationalism, or racism, created the concentration camps 
in South Africa during the Boer War, the little-known genocide of the 
Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia (then South West Africa) under 
German control in 1904 through 1907, and the Armenian genocide of 
1915–1923.110 
This history has only intensified over the decades since. World War I 
shattered the complacency of Europe and destroyed a generation of young 
men; a decade or so after the war ended, the Depression began; that long 
ordeal ended with World War II, which in turn introduced the nuclear 
bomb and the Holocaust. The changed geopolitical conditions after the 
war led to the foundation of the state of Israel and the displacement of the 
Palestinian people; it also opened the way for the independence of India, 
which came to pass with the Partition of India and Pakistan, an event 
accompanied with the slaughter of around one million people. Shortly 
thereafter began the Cold War, the arms race between the superpowers, 
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in limited ways contin-
ues to this day. Over this period, the legacy of the Enlightenment took 
on a darker hue; the example of the American and French Revolutions, 
which had initially opened the way for nations around the world to inter-
vene in their traditions and reinvent themselves, inspired the Russian and 
Chinese Revolutions, whose leaders eventually sought such systemic, 
wholesale change that they plunged their nations into famine or worse 
(under Stalin in the 1930s and Mao in 1958–1962). In the wake of the 
Holocaust, which inspired the world to vow that it would “never again” 
tolerate the attempt to destroy a people, we instead witnessed genocide 
and the massive destruction of human life in Burundi, Cambodia, the 
former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Rwanda, Darfur, and elsewhere, as well 
as the murder of roughly five million people, still ongoing, in Congo. In 
the early years of the present century, 9/11 brought to the fore interna-
tional, stateless terrorism and its counterpart, the “war on terror”; these 
developments, along with events in Rwanda and Congo, suggest that in 
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the coming decades this history of violence will continue outside of state 
control, becoming an endemic feature in failed states around the world.
Throughout the past several centuries, then, human beings have never 
been assured that the life they know will endure; on the contrary, the 
prospect of global violence, the attempted decimation of whole peoples, 
and in recent decades, the destruction of the entire human race have 
loomed large as distinct possibilities. We have been living with disas-
ter for a long time. By now we may have become used to the possibil-
ity that the entire lifeworld in which we live is terribly fragile and that 
humanity itself may disappear. In response, however, we have attempted 
to beat back the forces of destruction in the hope we can put the worst 
behind us and enter an era of peace. In the United States, for example, 
we have tended to assume that the emancipation of the slaves put the 
most egregious forms of oppression safely in the past. The international 
community, having founded the United Nations, warded off a nuclear 
war, survived the Cold War, and prevented the outbreak of many other 
conflicts, may also believe that it has finally marked out the boundary of 
disaster's kingdom. 
How well does climate change fit within this history? In her remark-
able Earthseed series, composed of the novels Parable of the Sower and 
Parable of the Talents, Octavia Butler depicts a future United States 
wracked by the consequences of climate change, speculating that in a 
society torn by violence, insecurity, poverty, and lawlessness, slavery will 
return. The form of slavery she envisions is more sexual and economic 
than racial, based in the exploitation of individuals rather than a vis-
ible category of persons. Nevertheless, her work suggests that if things 
go awry, the forms of injustice we Americans think we have surpassed 
will return. 
While we have not often contemplated these possibilities in the 
debate about climate change, her suggestion has the ring of truth. If a cri-
sis is deep enough and lasts long enough, all bets will be off; the guaran-
tees of the Constitution will not protect the poor from the rich or the 
weak from the strong. After all, they have never done so completely, and 
even now the battle to guarantee civil rights for all continues. Butler's 
novels remind us that we have not eradicated inequality and exploitation 
from our society; the endurance of class privilege and deep poverty, as 
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well as the resegregation of public education and the neglect of inner-city 
communities, tell us that we have used the fact of our previous abolition 
of slavery and other open abuses to justify tolerating a host of social ills 
today. The persistence of these profound inequalities creates the condi-
tions for harsher practices to return. This point extends to the interna-
tional context as well. If we consider the inevitability that under the pres-
sure of climate change millions of people will attempt to migrate across 
national boundaries, that societies will clash over resources, and that 
various states, weakened by perpetual crisis, may not be able to prevent 
conflict, we must admit that conditions will be ripe for the return or pro-
liferation of many forms of injustice.
In that case, climate change may create the conditions for reversing the 
guarantees established by democratic societies and the modest achieve-
ments of the United Nations. Going forward into the ruined future, 
we may instead recede into a version of the past. The major difference 
is that this time, we would not be able to escape from that past so eas-
ily through establishing individual rights or creating economic growth. 
That future will have discredited such possibilities, showing that they 
could not deliver on what they promised, for the societies that protected 
individual rights will have been the same that created planetary distress. 
Moreover, because we will retain the memory of less woeful days, we may 
experience such injustice with greater pain than did our ancestors, many 
of whom had no memory, and no notion, of human rights. Used to being 
treated fairly, we will resent the opposite fiercely. The return to certain 
abuses will not merely take us back to the past; it will cancel what we 
thought were permanent guarantees and thus traumatize us intimately. 
We may then learn that the notions of liberty and individual rights are 
only fictions, resting within a network of exploitative social relations we 
never fully attempted to dismantle.
Inspired by reflections like these, we may wish to denounce those who 
keep alive the structures of inequality. But climate change undercuts such 
an attempt at moral clarity. A look at the international consequences of 
climate change tells us this much. On one level, the fact that the world's 
industrial nations have emitted and will eventually emit far more green-
house gases than other nations is already a sign that we live in a world 
shaped by yet another form of oppression, a greenhouse gas imperialism. 
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We who live in the developed world are clearly perpetrators of a great 
violence. Yet it is not as if we will escape the consequences of our actions. 
We are immersed in a society that continues to emit greenhouse gases at 
a ridiculous pace, and most of us will also live long enough to endure the 
consequences of those emissions. We, too, will endure great difficulties; 
our societies will be wrenched as well. As a result, we will become our 
own victims. Some of today's wealthy may assume that their money will 
enable them to survive relatively unscathed through a dystopian future. 
But no individual should be complacent; economic disarray and interne-
cine violence have a way of shattering any smug arrangements, destroy-
ing businesses and households, and leaving individuals stranded in the 
midst of chaos. The return of injustice and violence potentially extends 
to all of us; we cannot be sure we are not enslaving ourselves, creating a 
prison that neither we nor others can escape. 
If we take these scenarios just one step further, we can place the 
potential consequences of climate change within the history of collec-
tive destruction. In a previous chapter I mentioned that climate change 
most likely created the conditions for the brutal violence in Darfur.111
In itself, of course, climate change does not actually take human lives; it 
creates the miserable matrix for that violence. By destroying ecosystems, 
depriving people of their livelihoods, and forcing them to migrate, cli-
mate change vastly increases the opportunity for conflict. The events of 
Darfur illustrate that fact well. Once climate change increases in its sever-
ity, further violence of this kind is nearly inevitable—and not only in 
areas far removed from the developed nations. Because the modern state 
often takes unintelligent, corrupt, and oppressive forms, because several 
versions of violent stateless entities (insurgent armies, separatist organi-
zations, or jihadist movements) have emerged and are likely to arise in 
many regions of the world, because absolutist ideologies of various kinds 
still have armed adherents, and because ethnic rivalry and prejudice 
thrive as well, all the ingredients for international conflict, civil war, and 
systemic murder remain in place. Now that we're adding climate change 
to the mix, those ingredients are more combustible than ever before.
The prospect of this future violence takes shape against the back-
ground of our greater awareness of its costs. In recent decades, many 
interpreters have become increasingly conscious of the psychological 
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consequences of surviving war, genocide, sexual violence, domestic 
abuse, and other horrific events. As they have argued, trauma is devastat-
ing because its severity breaks into consciousness before the mind can 
adequately prepare itself—or, more precisely, in a way for which it could 
never prepare itself; as a result, the mind bears the wounds of events it 
cannot absorb or understand. Because traumatic experiences in some 
sense never fully take place for their victims, they can never move on, 
never entirely live after those events.112 In the era of the Vietnam war and 
after, we in the United States have called this “post-traumatic stress dis-
order,” and in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we recognize 
that this syndrome continues to afflict soldiers and civilians alike. 
But if we take the possibility of severe, global climate change seriously, 
and thus acknowledge the near inevitability of the genocides to come, 
what happens then? Can we be traumatized by events that have not yet 
taken place? If trauma is characterized by an inability to absorb experi-
ence into the ordinary realities of life, could envisioning the horrors of 
the future have a similar effect? For a modern Cassandra, such a trauma 
would be possible: she would behold events to come with an intensity 
that would devastate her. Perhaps a modern version of a biblical prophet 
would endure the same. But it is instructive that such figures, announc-
ing what they see, are never believed; those who hear their warnings 
melt away, unmoved. That indifference makes clear that for the rest of us, 
anticipatory trauma does not seem possible. After all, if we are imagining 
trauma, we are not truly living it, nor is it shattering our minds in a way 
for which we are not prepared. Perhaps future events can never be as real 
to us as past or present ones. In that case, climate change simply cannot 
be as vivid for us as the horrors of a certain past.
What, then, is the status of a violence to come? An awareness of the 
immense consequences of our ordinary acts today for the lives of our-
selves and others will shadow those acts, giving them a haunting depth. 
A truthful look at our current practices—especially at the exceptionally 
high rate with which we burn fossil fuels in the United States—should 
give us pause. Are we perpetrating a kind of genocide ourselves, just one 
that will take place later? Are we participants in a systemic violence that 
will work itself out only over the coming decades? Part of the answer 
must be no; as I suggested above, climate change is not itself genocidal, 
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for it provides no more than the matrix for conflict. But since it does that 
much—and can therefore generate a perpetual series of horrific events—
it is actually much larger than any single genocide. It is at once less and 
more than the violence in Darfur.
In fact, since we cannot know precisely what form of climate change 
our present use of energy will create in the future, the specific implications 
of our acts remain out of reach. The problem here is not an experience 
that is too vivid, so shattering we simply cannot absorb it, but one that 
is too removed, too difficult to capture. Climate change works on tape 
delay: someone acts in a harmful manner, and the results might emerge 
soon, perhaps decades later. It also works in the aggregate; any single act 
can contribute to an overall disorientation of the climate, which in turn 
causes a series of further physical processes to kick in. Climate change 
is caused by a systemic violence that is cut off from any direct tie to its 
consequences. 
As a result, our actions as participants in a fossil-fuel economy are 
accompanied, not by trauma, but by its photographic negative, as it were, 
its equally devastating counterpart—a violence we can infer but not 
actually see. Our actions thus take on an unknowable extra dimension, 
an imprecise but palpable edge, for they are inevitably shadowed by the 
horror to come. For trauma in its original sense, events are too vivid and 
specific for the mind to handle; in contrast, for the anticipatory trauma of 
our time, the mind conceives of a real violence that is not yet vivid or spe-
cific enough. If trauma is the result of an experience that is too intense, 
too heavy, we live an experience that is too light. But in this way, we too 
participate in events we cannot absorb, a horror we cannot assimilate.
These reflections may clarify the place of climate change within the 
history of enslavement, war, and genocide. But what about its effect on 
a world now used to the prospect of global nuclear war? That threat, 
far more encompassing even than genocide, threatened to destroy the 
entire human reality in a moment, almost without warning, wiping out 
everything we cherish in a single blow. Without a doubt, it endangered 
our individual and collective lives on a fundamental level. The fact that 
a head of state in the United States or the Soviet Union, and to a lesser 
degree in other nations, could in a single gesture threaten the viability of 
the human race was unprecedented. In the nuclear era, the existence of 
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humanity as a whole ceased to be guaranteed; it was no longer as defini-
tive a reality as nature itself.113 No longer could we be confident that a 
divine force was protecting us or that our cultural values might in some 
way prevent our annihilation. Indeed, for a time it seemed possible that 
the contest over those values might lead to our annihilation. The things 
we held sacred and the things that threatened our reality were potentially 
one and the same.
But in contrast to climate change, nuclear annihilation, however hor-
rifying, seems almost comforting. We imagined that event as an interrup-
tion of our everyday lives. What made it truly terrible was the prospect 
that it would suddenly destroy billions of lives that would otherwise con-
tinue and possibly flourish. As a result, for virtually everyone the threat 
of nuclear war inspired an immense desire that ordinary life itself would 
endure. The absolutely horrifying thought of the world's end autho-
rized an absolute affirmation of the familiar. That emotion was typical 
not only of anti-nuclear activists but of heads of state as well: the doc-
trine of mutually assured destruction, propagated by the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara, drew on this emotion, claiming that the 
Soviets would not destroy us if they knew we would destroy them in turn, 
and vice versa. The idea was that our affection for the lives we led and 
our hope for the future would make it impossible to push the button. The 
prospect of total destruction could paradoxically lead ordinary citizens as 
well as heads of state back to their primary loyalty to the familiar world, 
perhaps even intensifying that loyalty in a manner not known to any prior 
generation. If anything, the nuclear era inspired us to regard ordinary life 
as fragile and so to value it all the more. The threat could somehow give 
the everyday a stunning intensity.
Climate change, however, is another matter. As I suggested in the 
introduction, this time around, the prospect of future ruins arises from 
our way of life, rather than threatening to interrupt it. Virtually every-
thing we do in advanced industrial societies is powered by the burning 
of fossil fuels in a process that directly contributes to global warming. 
The implications of this threat are thus truly unprecedented. If we wish 
to ward off a globally traumatic event, our task is not simply to avoid a 
certain course of action, to refrain from hitting the button. We face the 
much more difficult challenge of undoing and transforming a fundamental 
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aspect of our societies on a massive scale. This time, we are the threat, 
and if we wish to preserve anything like the lives we lead today, we must 
change those lives as soon as we can.
As a result, this threat has a very different impact on our attitude 
toward everyday life. Under the pressure of climate change, the everyday 
is at once precious and a threat: it is split at its core. Where the nuclear 
led us to affirm ordinary life virtually without reserve, climate change 
forces us to imagine how it can be transformed so it will no longer under-
mine itself. This affection for our way of life paradoxically does opposite 
things: it at once motivates us to sustain and to change it, to cherish and 
transform what we know. Our way of life speaks at once of what we wish 
to protect from trauma—and of the trauma it will create. In that case, we 
are even today both perpetrators and victims, slowly destroying our lives 
and surviving that destruction at the same time. Thus even the relative 
clarity of trauma dissolves into a contradictory, paradoxical state that 
blends the imposition and endurance of disaster.
The moral clarity of the threat and the necessity of responding to it 
are different this time as well. If severe climate change takes place, it will 
not happen in a single, annihilating event. An all-out nuclear war truly 
would have decimated the conditions for human life; even if a few vic-
tims struggled on briefly, in the end no one would have survived. Climate 
change, however, has its impact over decades and centuries. In contrast to 
the single event, its pace seems incredibly slow—so slow that we might 
decide simply to ignore it. If it seems slow, it is also sure; if we ignore 
it, it will destroy what we take for granted. It is thus a truly insidious 
threat, almost creepy in its persistent force. But it is also less absolute in 
its potential devastation; because it is comparatively slow in human terms 
(though not on the evolutionary time scale), we can well imagine that it 
would never truly annihilate us, never actually bring our world to an end; 
on the contrary, given its pace, we might guess that a good share of the 
human race would survive it, though with lives quite different from what 
we know today. 
This contrast between nuclear war and climate change may explain 
why we do not yet take the latter very seriously. In the nuclear era, we got 
used to an all-or-nothing scenario. Either the world would end, truly and 
for good, or it would go on without a hindrance. Climate change doesn't 
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give us either ending to the story. It doesn't destroy us outright, nor does 
it let us live on as we are. It combines devastation and survival. It doesn't 
give us apocalypse, nor does it give us the satisfaction of having avoided 
the world's end. It is something altogether different, as if it is at once sin-
ister and benign. It's as if climate change tells us that the world ends, yet it 
goes on—or that it ends, gradually, as it goes on. It gives us that unprec-
edented experience: a slow and endless horror.
This dimension of climate change compounds its already paradoxi-
cal effect on everyday life. Because the consequences of climate change 
are neither immediate nor absolute, we can surmise, if we wish, that it 
imposes far less of a moral imperative on us than the nuclear threat did. 
Our society so far hardly wishes to embark on the necessary effort to 
comply with that imperative, for it is still thwarted by those who protest 
against taking action, and the rest of us have not yet demanded a revo-
lutionary transformation strongly enough. We delay and hesitate while 
crucial decades go by. Such recalcitrance would have been impossible in 
the nuclear era: nobody seriously attempted to deny that the bombing 
of Hiroshima had taken place or that the Soviet Union existed. Today, 
however, in the United States, negating reality has become the profession 
of many and the hobby of millions, and a general indifference or passivity 
characterizes many more. 
In consequence, for Americans reality is split once again: the physi-
cal fact of climate change has not yet achieved the status of a social or 
political fact. At the moment, we Americans live in a society that fails to 
acknowledge the crisis of the biosphere. The climate tells us one thing, 
our politics another. In consequence, we endure a state of radical disso-
ciation. For us in the United States, things are truly confusing: not only 
is the world ending as it goes on, we also hear that it is not ending at all. 
Because we cannot defeat that false message, we sense that our everyday 
lives devastate our own future—and present—while also being asked 
to pretend they are doing nothing of the sort. The contrast between our 
knowledge of the consequences of our actions and a collective, deaden-
ing indifference continues to grow, making the incoherence of our expe-
rience even worse.
Here again, in retrospect the nuclear doesn't look so bad. The nuclear 
threat almost seemed to take care of itself: the doctrine of mutually 
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assured destruction captured the situation well, making it plausible that 
no one would ever push the button. Furthermore, once technicians 
installed various fail-safe devices to forestall accidental nuclear war, we 
could assume that massive annihilation would take place only if a per-
son actually chose to authorize it for some purpose. That notion of human 
control gave us hope that the moment of destruction would never arrive. 
We could believe that this choice came with a certain moral clarity, a 
deliberate decision to destroy or preserve the world. 
With climate change, however, we can have no such illusion. If any-
one is in control of this threat, all of us are. But it would be foolish to 
imagine we actually are in control. The physical complexity of climate 
change dramatically undermines the moral clarity we might bring to bear 
on preventing it. The limits of our knowledge, the immense difficulty 
of communicating what we do know to all the world's citizens, and the 
huge challenge of altering our material practices in midstream make it 
very likely that many of the world's people, including ourselves, might 
help bring about severe climate change without knowing it and without 
intending to do so. The physical processes at stake will work themselves 
out even if we do not fully grasp them or if we deny that they exist at all. 
That possibility points to another instructive contrast to the nuclear 
threat. In the height of the nuclear era, observers sometimes rated the 
degree of danger by estimating how many minutes remained before 
“midnight”—before the dread hour of nuclear conflagration. Today, the 
same metaphor would work well—up to a point. But this time around, 
it's quite conceivable we could live past midnight and not notice a thing. 
As I suggested earlier, the dread hour of triggering a series of positive 
feedback loops could arrive while no one lifted a finger. What then? We 
have no common language for describing what the world looks like when 
it survives such a moment. Our nuclear fictions, of course, constantly 
imagined not the nuclear event itself but a post-nuclear landscape—as 
if it were even remotely possible that something like human life could 
go on for very long after that event. Those fairy tales have little relevance 
to our situation today. Now we must confront the possibility that all of 
us will live in a world that seems unchanged after it has been fundamen-
tally harmed. 
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How do we describe that world? We could use the metaphor of the 
ship already struck by the iceberg and about to sink, as I did in the previ-
ous chapter. But even that notion only goes so far. That ship might keep 
going for a few more decades, sinking very slowly into the depths while 
the years pass. We simply do not know how to understand a world that 
lives after the disastrous moment has passed and finally becomes aware of 
its situation—but too late.
One type of story provides an inventive response to this situation. 
The back-to-the-future scenario, especially in the Terminator movies, 
imagines that in a disastrous future we might come back to this present 
and avoid doing anything to cause that future. This scenario does at least 
imagine a life after the disastrous event. But it does so in order to convey 
the urgency of acting now—as if all of us in the present have been sent 
back from that future to make sure it doesn't happen. This type of story 
is perfect for the era of climate change: indeed, nearly all of the warnings 
that scientists give us about the effects of our fossil-fuel economy could 
be told in that way. But what happens if we discover that the event has 
already taken place—and we have no machine to help us go back in time 
and make things right?
Our inability to know when that moment will take place or if it has 
already happened, as well as our relative lack of control over whether it 
will happen, stems in part from the radical limits in our knowledge of cli-
mate change. In the nuclear era, everyone knew well enough what push-
ing the button would lead to. But with climate change, things are utterly 
different. If scientists had not begun to calibrate the levels of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere in the mid-twentieth century, and if they had not 
become attentive a couple decades later to the possible consequences of 
introducing greenhouse gases in novel quantities into the atmosphere, 
none of us would have had more than a vague sense of what was tak-
ing place. Without the ongoing work of hundreds of scientists around 
the world, we wouldn't have a ballpark estimate of our situation even 
today. Yet despite that effort, nobody knows how climate change works 
in all its permutations. One reason for this contrast may be that human 
beings created nuclear bombs, could test them, witness their results, 
and contemplate their possible use. Nobody planned and implemented 
climate change.
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But we could plan and implement a planetary response to climate 
change. Some observers are fond of saying that if America once embarked 
on the Manhattan Project to create the nuclear bomb, why couldn't it do 
the same to create a new energy economy? One problem with this com-
parison is that today the United States, or more likely the international 
community, would need to create several equivalents of that project, 
invent a range of new technologies, and implement them on a wide scale. 
We need a Manhattan, a Brooklyn, a Queens, a Bronx, and a Staten Island 
Project, just to get started. But the further irony is that the goal of that 
earlier project was to create a devastating weapon; the goal this time—
and a far more difficult one—is to prevent destruction. Of course, in that 
era American government officials argued that they needed a weapon to 
prevent the Nazis, and then the Soviets, from destroying the nation. They 
hoped to use destruction to ward off destruction. This time around, we 
have no convenient weapon we could use to blow up climate change.
This demand for a different kind of national—or more likely, interna-
tional—project will require us to alter our relation to the technological 
breakthroughs of the modern era. In the Manhattan Project and thereaf-
ter, the United States hoped to secure its dominance by taking the logic 
of destruction to its limit and becoming the supreme master of annihila-
tion. Although the development of a nuclear weapon was certainly new, 
it nevertheless operated within the general flow of history, toward the 
ever-greater capacity to destroy. It arose as well from within that broader 
historical dynamic, the creation of many technological innovations—the 
production of the automobile and the airplane, radio and television, dig-
ital systems and the Internet—which took for granted another version 
of the power to destroy, to use the Earth's resources without reserve for 
human benefit. Climate change will not allow us to go with this flow, for 
it demands that we make technological breakthroughs that will roll back 
the pattern of destruction. It demands that we contest the entire momen-
tum of the modern era, indeed the celebration of the “modern” itself. 
On many different counts, then, climate change represents a major 
shift from a danger that has become quite familiar to us. In retrospect, 
the nuclear era seems positively saturated with moral clarity—with a 
clear and present threat, the prospect of an instantaneous and absolute 
end, a public that readily agreed that such a threat existed, a specific 
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technological project that could be completed to respond to that threat, 
and a presumably sane and rational figure who could be relied upon not to 
choose annihilation. Climate change undercuts these certainties at every 
turn. It gives us a scenario loaded with paradoxes and contradictions, one 
that seems to complicate the necessary urgency several times over.
If this quick, cursory look at our place within the history of the mod-
ern world teaches us much, it tells us at least that the terrors of the past 
few centuries, along with their apparent moral certitudes, have not pre-
pared us for the present moment. Climate change ushers us into a truly 
new era. Living with climate change throws us out of our familiar narra-
tives: it tells us that we have not surpassed the violence of the past and 
that the apparent guarantees under which we live may be illusions. As we 
live in the shadow of future devastation, the bitter taste of what may even-
tually transpire invades our daily lives, giving us the uncanny sense that 
our ordinary actions are accompanied by the trauma to come. Climate 
change also cracks open the tale of the willed, instantaneous death of 
nuclear annihilation, for it constitutes an event that finishes off one way 
of life while letting us live on in a disaster that takes generations, if not 
centuries, to unfold. It is as grave a threat to the Earth and its people as 
any before it, yet it is less understood, less amenable to our control, and 
more difficult to prevent. As this prospect weighs on us, it splits our real-
ity to the core, forcing us to live at once with and against our ordinary 
lives, to cherish what we must also change. Our challenge today is to bear 
up under all these difficulties nevertheless, to do what must be done, and 
in defiance of the long odds, to sustain as habitable a planet as we can for 
ourselves and for those to follow. 
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Chapter 9
Infinite Responsibility
If what I have been suggesting is true, our present failure to do what is 
necessary to ward off severe climate change constitutes a grave threat not 
only to Earth's living systems but also to fundamental aspects of our ordi-
nary lives. As I have argued, it endangers the future that shapes the narra-
tives by which we live, undermining the significance of everything we do. 
The reality of that threat calls upon us to value the lives we know and to 
see them as destructive at the same time, as a result splitting our response 
to ordinary experience. 
The ethical implications of our inaction are equally divided. Our fail-
ure will ultimately steal the future from those who follow us, depriving 
them of a full opportunity to address the problems that will afflict them. 
But our ineptitude, in turn, arises in part from the decisions of our ances-
tors; over several recent generations, they expanded the world economy 
exponentially and produced us in staggering profusion, greatly limiting 
the options available to us. 
Heirs of a discredited past, haunted by a disappearing future, we 
meet our present moment in dismay. Yet we cannot simply surrender to 
despair, for the demands of ordinary life perpetually call us to orient our-
selves to a future, even if it is disappearing. We are thus caught beyond 
reprieve between the demand to act and a great difficulty in doing so, 
shackled and stumbling at the crossroads of history. 
If we truly experienced in full the haunted, broken qualities of the 
present, we would yearn for an emotional and spiritual resource through 
which we could gain consolation. Yet our situation already undermines 
nearly every version of comfort and hope familiar to us. As long as we 
work hard to provide for a better future, as long as we depend upon hope 
that the world we know will endure, and as long as we grieve in a mode 
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that still promises eventual recovery, we are caught within an emotional 
dynamic whose foundations are disappearing. 
We thus find ourselves in a situation where we cannot help but seek 
some other basis for ethical action, another resource for endurance. 
Once we recognize that the future is in ruins and our present is shattered, 
the task of encountering the human significance of climate change is not 
yet complete, for we must still discover some foundation on which we can 
build, a foundation that can stand no matter what may come. Finding 
that foundation is the task of this chapter.
The first step in doing so is simply for us to accept the present hor-
ror in full. Doing so is surprisingly rare. One would think that our highly 
contradictory, almost impossible position would inspire consternation or 
outrage. Instead, we have in general responded in a very different tone. 
Nearly everyone endures this crisis in distraction, mild dismay, ambiva-
lent passivity, indifference—or in a sort of baffled indignation. This very 
absence of a passionate response from the great majority of us is striking. 
What could possibly explain our reluctance to acknowledge the night-
mare qualities of our ethical dilemma—or what is worse, our tendency to 
accept it in a mode of quiet desperation?
The answer may well lie within the history I outlined in the previ-
ous chapter. We've been living with disaster so long that we're used to 
it. For generations now we have accepted the shattering of tradition, the 
decimation of native peoples, enslavement, economic displacement and 
exploitation, genocide, and the threat of nuclear annihilation as inevita-
ble aspects of our world. Such violence is so interwoven into the very fab-
ric of modern culture that we cannot imagine a world after it has ceased. 
In consequence, we do not truly attempt to move beyond what we know. 
We seem to have surrendered ourselves to the prospect not only of our 
mortality, but of the potential destruction of our societies, our ecosy-
tems, and the biosphere itself. Although we protest against these pros-
pects, in the end we consider any concerted attempt to overcome them 
as delusional.
We might at times suggest that we disapprove of this violence, but 
at every turn we take it for granted, accept its results, and flourish on 
the wealth it produces. We often treat those who protest as moralizing 
annoyances, as partisans of a simplistic and ultimately failed viewpoint. 
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We incorporate their denunciations of contemporary society into our 
own thinking without giving up our love of what we possess, ending up 
in a partly ambivalent, partly celebratory mood, uneasily aware of what 
our history has cost but not finally regretful. When we do acknowledge 
some dimension of that cost, we usually turn it into the pretext for par-
tial, narrowly construed resentment, a demand that our particular group 
be invited more openly to the party and given a greater share of wealth 
and respect—as if that broader world, despite the systemic violence on 
which it is based, remains legitimate. In short, although we know that the 
world in which we participate emerges from a history of devastation, we 
ultimately accept its violence because of its benefit to ourselves.
Our response to genocide, however, suggests that on occasion cer-
tain events do give us pause. Shocked and appalled by the Holocaust, we 
vowed never to let murder on that scale happen again. But we have not 
yet made good on this vow. Although we created the United Nations to 
help adjudicate conflict, that body places too great a trust on the pow-
ers of the modern state to intervene into its affairs and accordingly to 
this day often allows nations to commit grievous violence against their 
own citizens. Neither the destruction of a third of the world's Jews nor 
the long series of genocides in the last four decades has inspired us to act 
with sufficient resolve. Although we decry the consequences of state vio-
lence, we have not dared to shift our loyalty to any alternative that would 
be powerful enough to curb it.114 
Our inability to realize the goals stated in that vow may arise from an 
even greater inability to understand violence on that scale. Yet such incal-
culable violence should not disable our resolve but make it incalculably 
strong in its turn, elevating mourning into an even more powerful emo-
tion that demands resolution. Our failure in this regard in the six decades 
since the Holocaust suggests either that we did not mourn those deaths 
or, more likely, that we have learned to dissociate mourning and action, 
emotion and institution.
The response to genocide thus exposes a fundamental impasse in our 
culture: a vast gap between our vows and our actions, our confidence we 
can build new institutions and our ability to do so. We have so far not 
passed from intention to fulfillment, from horror to resolution. The fail-
ure to act in one regard exposes a much broader, long-standing failure 
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to recognize and address the destructive consequences of moderniza-
tion for the world's people. Our response to the Holocaust foregrounds 
what is true virtually across the board: however great our private grief, 
we live within a public sphere that on ultimate matters remains largely 
disabled and bankrupt, that operates from within a legacy of uneasy, 
haunted denial.
This legacy is intensified even further in the era of climate change. If 
we cannot grieve for those destroyed by genocide, we are even less likely 
to grieve for those we have not yet lost. Yet the potential violence to 
come, as I have suggested, dwarfs the destruction of any genocide, indeed 
of many more genocides than we have yet seen. Our present moment is 
thus characterized with a dissociation more striking than ever before—a 
strange compound of horror and complacency, resolution and indiffer-
ence. It is as if in our halting way we wish to explore the ultimate reaches 
of disorientation and self-estrangement.
As I suggested a moment ago, our inability may stem from a continued 
fidelity to the very thing genocide already discredited: the unchallenged 
rule of the modern state. The United Nations has not yet found a way to 
supersede the claims of its member nations to govern their internal affairs 
without interference. This collective failure to curb the powers of the state 
is especially harmful today as negotiations over an international treaty to 
address the causes of climate change frequently run aground on competi-
tive assertions of state interest. Such assertions arise from developed and 
developing nations alike, even from the world's wealthiest nation that can 
best afford to be generous. Recently many commentators have blamed 
international inaction on the resistance of nations such as China or India. 
But we should not forget that in response to the Kyoto accords, in July 
1997, the United States Senate voted 95-0 not to agree to any protocol 
that did not apply as well to developing nations or that would harm the 
American economy.115 States clearly assume that their priorities are more 
important than any potential threat to the biosphere, just as their inter-
ests are more crucial than protecting human beings from mass slaughter. 
The rule of the state, it seems, can brook no interference, except from lim-
its the state freely accepts on its own terms.
Our tolerance for the power of the state finds its equal, in the American 
political sphere, in our respect for the abstract liberty of the individual. 
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As I suggested in an earlier chapter, the harsh resistance to a carbon tax 
or untax expresses the wish to protect individual liberty even from the 
overriding demand to transmit a living biosphere to posterity. The fierce 
defense of liberty defined in this way—a liberty free of obligations to 
others or responsibility to the future—ultimately protects irresponsibil-
ity and a refusal of obligation, much as the tolerance of state power in the 
abstract authorizes a potential abuse of power. The international inability 
to respond to genocide is echoed in our general endorsement of the right 
to drive SUVs, build excessively large homes, apply nitrogen-based fer-
tilizers to crops, or engage in mountaintop removal coal-mining. Taken 
seriously, the perpetual complaint about environmental regulation voices 
a demand that one have the right to use or abuse the Earth's resources as one 
pleases, or more directly, the right to destroy. Such an insistence, I would 
suggest, applies in one domain what the murderous abuse of state power 
enacts in another.
This insistence on the rights of states or individuals makes clear what 
is at stake in the habits of indifference and self-estrangement. We refuse 
to mourn the violence of modern history primarily because we are its 
beneficiaries—because it exemplifies, on a much broader scale, the 
right to destroy that we claim for ourselves. We ultimately do not wish 
to take responsibility for the violence that sustains us because our belief 
in a certain liberty requires us to value that liberty more than responsi-
bility itself. Although we may deplore the exploitation that pervades the 
world economy, we do not finally lament it, for we do not allow it to crack 
open the notion of individual liberty or the reality of our relative eco-
nomic privilege.
The most direct way to overcome this flawed legacy is to renounce 
the notion of an abstract, purely formal liberty—a right in the end to 
destroy—and affirm instead our place in a web of relationships with fam-
ily, friends, neighbors, and partners at the workplace, with fellow citizens 
in our locality, state, region, and nation, with the living beings who share 
our habitats, with those who make the goods we use or who consume 
what we produce, with those who share our humanity, with the dead and 
the unborn, and with the Earth's dynamic, living systems. An abstract lib-
erty is as nothing compared to our power to respond and be responded 
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to in turn—that is, our power to be responsible for others, to others, to 
all others, and indeed to the very domain in which all others can flourish.
The interpretation of the world as a scene of countless relationships, 
familiar in archaic cultures but gradually marginalized in recent centuries, 
provides the ground for a much more coherent approach to the chal-
lenges of our time. Our ambivalent acceptance of the legacy of violence, 
for example, stems in part from our inability to conceive of strangers as 
related to ourselves. Marooned in the past or future, in another country, 
in a reality we consider too far removed from our own, they do not have 
enough substance in our minds to merit serious attention. They exist 
within that vast abstraction, our world, which in its incalculable complex-
ity cannot move us. When a great evil such as the Holocaust takes place, 
we may experience astonishment, horror, and pain, responding with 
enough interest, perhaps, to learn something of its history. But without 
recognizing its implication for our ordinary lives, its power to arise from 
within institutions familiar to us, we enact only an empty grief, a formal 
attentiveness without consequence. We could instead allow our relation-
ship to strangers to have a practical effect on our lives or on the practices 
of which we are a part; if we did so, we would actually complete the pro-
cess of grief by identifying the cause of the horror and dealing with it 
directly. The point, in short, would be to consider ourselves responsible 
for the event and its possible reappearance and to act accordingly. 
The same applies to our situation in the era of climate change: we 
must not simply mourn the victims of the future, nor merely compre-
hend the problem and its potential solutions, but above all consider our-
selves responsible for whatever damage will take place—responsible, in 
short, to coming generations—and thus by definition to respond. Only if 
we regard ourselves as participants in a web of mutual obligation will we 
have the motivation necessary to overcome indifference and shatter our 
unthinking, psychotic belief in our right to destroy. Others have given to 
us and made our lives possible; let us give to others in return.
To live our moment fully, to feel the horror without reserve, is to be 
given fierce motive for ethical action. If we were truly to accept our place 
within a web of relationships and thus attempt to respond, what would 
follow? Let's imagine that we were to face what Al Gore calls our choice, 
decide wisely, and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions, use more 
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energy-efficient techniques, minimize the environmental harm from our 
management of forests and farmland, create market-driven incentives for 
everyone to take these steps, fund a wide array of new technology proj-
ects and implement them as soon as possible, and reach international 
agreements that would enable nations around the world to undertake 
similar efforts of their own.116 As I have suggested, to do so would require 
that we act in a truly revolutionary manner—that we would defy the 
assumptions and habits of generations for the sake of a common end. 
By acting in that decisive way, however, we would also do much more. 
We would demonstrate that we are free in a sense scarcely ever men-
tioned by the pretended partisans of liberty—that we are not merely 
puppets of our cultural traditions but are still capable of making the right 
choice despite all odds. For much of this book, I have outlined a series of 
tough obstacles in our path, including the short timeline for action, the 
difficult technical challenges, the limits of our political institutions, our 
addiction to economic growth, the self-interested calculus of state inter-
est, and the belief in a false version of freedom. But it does not follow that 
these factors ultimately determine what we will do; we are still capable of 
surpassing what we have so far achieved.
But acting in this way would ultimately go much further than showing 
our power to alter our common history. If we truly enacted the necessary 
ecological revolution, we would finally bring about what our forebears 
barely envisioned and scarcely ever attempted. In doing so we would also 
address the systemic violence and excess of modern culture, that vast leg-
acy of exploitation and devastation that still defines our time. Choosing 
justice would not only enable us to transform our historical circumstance; 
it would also take responsibility for that history. It would say that in our 
freedom, we are capable of making that history our own, placing it to our 
charge, and judging it in the clear light of its consequences. Most crucially 
of all, it would show that we can make reparation, do justice to those we 
have harmed and would otherwise still harm, and fight against the moti-
vating force of this history. By taking up this task, we need not admit to 
an inherited guilt; we are not automatically accountable for the actions 
of our forebears, any more than those who follow us will be accountable 
for ours. Our act would thus be free in yet another sense, for it would be 
freely chosen rather than demanded; it would suggest that we are capable 
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of shouldering a burden that should never have fallen to us, but that in 
taking up that burden we can at last pass beyond enduring the weight of 
our history and move to a new phase, into a world we have not merely 
inherited, but made.
But that is not all. Because this ecological revolution would salvage 
something of the future of the biosphere, as well as of all human societ-
ies, it would demonstrate our capacity to assume responsibility for the 
encompassing ecological context of humanity's future as well. Insofar 
as not acting would deprive people in the future of a full opportunity to 
respond to climate change, as I argued earlier, an ecological revolution 
would do precisely the opposite: it would protect the very possibility that 
in the future we or others could act on humanity's behalf. 
Acting in this way would, in short, go far toward restoring some 
dimension of the stolen future and thus mending in some degree our 
own broken present. It would salvage something from the ruins, piecing 
together a remnant of the human despite the shattering effects of climate 
change I have been describing over the last four chapters.
In doing so, however, we would take on a task breathtaking in its scope 
and significance, for we would necessarily assume the ethical burden of 
generations not our own—the weight of a violent history, on the one 
hand, and of the potentially devastated generations to come. But even 
this is not all. Between these two domains, of course, lies our present, 
which in its almost insurmountable momentum, its ambivalent indiffer-
ence to the violence it still causes, and its refusal to accept genuine trans-
formation imposes still another burden on us—one that we can instantly 
recognize as our own. In our free choice to save the biosphere from fur-
ther destruction, in our attempt to salvage something from the ruins of 
our shared history, we must ultimately assume responsibility for addressing 
the violence enacted throughout the entire sweep of modern history, from the 
past through the present and into the future, and thus for many centu-
ries of human endeavor.117 Strangely enough, to act justly we would in 
our single generation bear the weight of that entire development, discharg-
ing an immense debt on behalf of the dead, the living, and the unborn. 
Although we did not choose this moment, we might still freely choose to 
accept its challenge, to make at last a full reckoning with modernity itself.
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Yet even this description does not capture the full dimensions of our 
moment. We would hardly grasp the implications of this choice if we 
did not extend our view further into the past. With Jared Diamond, for 
example, we should trace the chronicle of civilizations that pushed their 
environments beyond the breaking point and eventually collapsed—or 
those that through foresight avoided that fate.118 A decisive moment has 
occurred on many previous occasions to civilizations around the world; 
our version of that moment is unique only because it encompasses the 
fate of the biosphere itself.
We could extend this view even further back. Contemplating the 
whole sweep of human evolutionary history, we could attribute its disas-
trous effects to an inherent fault in the species. After all, the story might 
go, over the millennia we have wiped out most of the large mammals, 
destroyed many ecosystems, learned how to exploit nearly every living 
thing for our benefit, multiplied our numbers seemingly without limit, 
and now are about to torch the climate itself. If we continue with our 
ways, consuming the biosphere to our heart's content, we will make sur-
vival for a good portion of living things difficult if not impossible. 
Such stories could justify utter despair; if we have depleted the plan-
et's resources so systematically for millennia and have pushed the logic 
of civilization beyond natural limits time and time again, there can surely 
be no hope we will depart from this pattern today. But such a despair 
would hardly take into account how often we have acted wisely, or—
as Diamond’s examples of the New Guinea highlands, Tikopia Island, 
and Tokugawa-era Japan indicate—how often we have lived within our 
means.119 Nor would it recognize that we are neither simply a biological 
species nor directly determined by our long history; we are also capable of 
recognizing our status as animals whose actions threaten the other forms 
of life on this planet and therefore are capable as well of surpassing our 
selfishness for the sake of all life. Evolutionary and historical knowledge 
should count for something; the awareness of that long legacy, unique to 
our era, necessarily alters what it means to be human, transforming our 
relationship to the conditions of our existence. It is surpassingly strange 
that we as a species, arising from within the complex web of living forms, 
would ultimately prove capable of damaging that web itself. But if that 
is so, we have exceeded purely evolutionary determinations and become 
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unnatural in a precise sense. Facing that legacy, our challenge is to step 
outside biological determinations in a further and opposite sense, to 
accept responsibility for addressing the ecological violence endemic throughout 
our history as a species, to make reparation as greatly as we can to the web 
of life from which we evolved and in which we live. 
Taking responsibility for that history may not be the first course of 
action that many observers would consider. Contemplating this long 
history of ecological destruction, some might simply wish that human 
beings would cease to exist: only that prospect, they might argue, could 
protect the further flourishing of life. But this profoundly misanthropic 
wish, which could never come true in any case, denies that we, too, are 
part of the life whose future we wish to protect; eradicating ourselves, if 
only in thought, is to partake in a version of ecological destruction and 
genocide multiplied many times over. It is to imagine the kind of devasta-
tion that our ethical action is aiming to prevent. 
The point is not to destroy humanity, but to undo what Stephen Jay 
Gould called our “cosmic arrogance,” the anthropocentric attitude that 
imagined we were the pinnacle of evolution, its ultimate goal.120 The best 
strategy in defeating that arrogance is not to negate human history but 
paradoxically to affirm it and transform it as a result—to make our pres-
ence on the Earth into a presence for the Earth, as an agent charged 
with protecting all its forms of life. Choosing to do justice to the life of 
which we are a part, we would freely accept a task that no other species 
has attempted to perform: to deny our impulse to thrive and reproduce 
without limit. By taking this unnatural step, we would finally become the 
stewards of that realm to which we owe our existence and which, thanks 
to us, can no longer flourish of itself. Paradoxically, by fully assuming our 
unnatural status as stewards, we would at last do justice to the biosphere, 
making the thriving of all life an ethical, not merely biological, good. If we 
set out to do so, we might set as our goal the challenge of becoming genu-
inely indigenous again, of truly inhabiting the ecosystems where we live 
with intelligence, modesty, and foresight, and thus prove ourselves capa-
ble at last of joining that long counter-tradition, also evident throughout 
our history as a species, of human generosity to the ecosystems of which 
we are a part.
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Considering the full dimensions of this decision, then, teaches us that 
enacting an ecological revolution is a world-historical act, immense in its 
implications, for through it we would accept responsibility for the eco-
logical costs of human evolutionary and cultural history across the past, 
present, and future, and as a result would ultimately accept our role as 
stewards of the biosphere itself. But such a massive act is not a further 
example of cosmic arrogance. On the contrary, that act has these dimen-
sions only because any act we commit today will ramify backwards and 
forwards across our whole history; in its physical consequences for the 
biosphere our decision will reveal the overall significance of that history 
for better or for worse, showing that human beings are in the end agents 
of reparation or disaster. The enormous, overbearing import of our cur-
rent moment arises not from our ambition but from our position at the 
crucial moment of the Earth's climate history. We are at the crossroads, 
and we simply must choose.
But this act may seem far too immense in another sense. How can we 
turn against the longstanding historical patterns that have produced our 
current ease and convenience? Why would we relinquish the unprec-
edented abundance that meshes so well with our wishes? No doubt 
doing so will be very difficult. But we need not act out of purely altru-
istic motives. We now know that business as usual will condemn us to 
a miserable fate, dissolving the future that anchors the narratives of our 
lives. To retain the value of our own present actions, to maintain the pos-
sibility that we can live intentionally, we must intervene. Acting wisely, in 
short, is in our own self-interest. This fact should give us some comfort. 
It is not so difficult, after all, to set aside immediate whim in the name of 
long-term self-interest; we learn to do so as soon as we go to school in 
childhood and in various ways continue to do so throughout adulthood. 
Delaying some portion of gratification is a necessary part of modern life. 
A smart decision would simply take such prudence one more crucial step, 
extending it to the fate of the biosphere itself. Acting responsibly does not 
require us to become exemplars of stunning virtue, moral heroes of some 
kind; it only demands that we step up our prudential thinking, applying it 
to a part of our experience that once seemed exempt from such concerns. 
Because acting in this way serves our interests, the fact that it would 
also conserve a future for others seems less of a burden than a bonus. In 
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this case, the usual contrast between selfishness and altruism disappears. 
As it turns out, if we take our own interest seriously, we will fight to pre-
serve a future for a whole range of others as well. Protecting ourselves, 
we would also save the prospects for Earth's living systems. Our single 
decision, then, would operate on several levels, saving the future for our-
selves, humanity, and the biosphere, all at once.
One way to imagine the full dimensions of the present choice is to 
incorporate into our present activity the possible experience of those to 
come, ultimately making them into the guardians of our own future as 
well. We would see the present through their eyes, judging it as we imag-
ine they will judge it. We might even fancifully imagine ourselves to be 
the emissaries of the ruined future, its embodiment in the present. We 
might see ourselves as people out of time, terribly inconvenient to our 
contemporaries—ambassadors charged with interrupting our moment 
with bad news, cracking open today's complacencies with a dire mes-
sage from coming generations. We would warn our compatriots of the 
disaster to come.
If we saw ourselves in this light, some might suggest that we would 
be the secular counterparts of the biblical prophets, who warned their 
hearers of what would follow in the absence of repentance. But we would 
also have to extend that scenario to contemplate the failure of our warn-
ings. In the biblical world, when prophecy failed, the hope for apocalypse 
followed; the redemption that did not come to pass in history could 
only take place through a divine decision to bring history to an end, 
pass judgment on the living and the dead, separate the elect from the 
damned, and create a new heaven and earth. (Apocalypse in the biblical 
sense does not refer to a cataclysmic, final event, but to a final redemptive
event, one that liberates the redeemed from the horrors of history. The 
book of Revelation, or of Apocalypse, is after all full of good news for true 
believers.) 
In our time, however, we face the possibility that redemption will not 
come in any form, neither from within history nor from its end, leaving 
us without divine guarantees, without a judgment day that could impose 
a moral significance on all time. In that case, we endure in a post-bibli-
cal landscape, abandoned to a history that provides no ultimate justice, 
no final consolation. Our willingness to serve as emissaries of the future 
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would make us nothing like the biblical prophets; we would instead sim-
ply serve as messengers from our own future selves, spokespeople for 
those whom we will otherwise have damned. We would merely be fal-
lible citizens who wish to do the least harm to those who will follow.121 
Yet even the prospect of acting in that way is now disappearing. 
Although the case for action is extremely compelling, indeed definitive, 
our society is now taking the opposite course. As I have argued above, the 
odds of our taking the necessary action in time are slender indeed and are 
virtually gone. We are thus in the position of outlining the overall impli-
cations of the right choice primarily to grasp its opposite. Understanding 
responsibility at this late hour may be most useful in helping us compre-
hend the full force of a radical irresponsibility.
What might that irresponsibility look like? Today, although the 
effects of climate change are already quite visible around the world, we 
still hesitate to act. It thus seems very likely that those effects will get our 
serious attention only when they are more widespread, continuous, and 
severe—only when they are significantly worse. In short, it seems we will 
act only when the consequences of climate change have become much 
harsher than today. 
A concerted effort in a decade or two, of course, would come far too 
late; it would not counteract the climate patterns that will have already 
set in. As a result, in the years after we do act, people will soon notice 
that their efforts will seem to have accomplished nothing. They will 
ask, “Why are all the eco-friendly measures not working? Why are we 
not seeing the results we hoped for?” The usual relation between action 
and result will be suspended, raising tough questions about the value of 
addressing the problem at all. Only then, perhaps, will we finally experi-
ence the nightmare of enduring in a world that is much more difficult to 
inhabit, whatever we do.
At that point, we might be tempted to abandon ethical action alto-
gether. Because we will be living in wounded ecosystems, shrinking 
economies, and distressed societies, we might well cast aside the attempt 
to live responsibly, choosing instead to hunker down and weather it out 
on our own terms. For many, only the promise that ethical action might 
alleviate further suffering later on, by ourselves or others, could sustain 
a choice for ecologically responsible living. But because by then we will 
Infinite Responsibility 149
already be enduring the partial collapse of the civilization we know, 
surviving social conflicts, natural disasters, and food shortages that are 
unprecedented for us, we may not even have the luxury of worrying 
about our future fate. We may discover that we are living in the ruins of 
ethical action itself. Our position might be akin to that of a person who 
has endured an amputation but must nevertheless save someone from 
drowning, or a person who has had a lung removed but still must help 
carry the wounded. In such a situation, acting to help others might be 
possible, but it is far more difficult and may not occur much at all.122 
It is thus all the more astonishing that we will not act today, when 
doing so might actually prevent that nightmare scenario from coming to 
pass. The possibility that we might act freely to save the Earth, however, 
helps clarify that a failure to act is also a choice: a choice to destroy. The 
ecological revolution is missing today, and will be missing tomorrow, not 
because it is impossible for us to carry it out but because we will not; it 
speaks of our decision to remain relatively indifferent to the destructive 
aspects of modern culture, to sustain that destruction well into the future, 
and thus to remain caught by the habits of our common history. This 
decision, too, we should regard as freely given, as an instance of moral 
assertion—this time, however, for inertia, ineptitude, and ultimately for 
disaster. It would freely allow our traditions and the bounds of circum-
stance to define us without limit, to saturate us through and through, and 
to make us exemplars of what could well be judged as idiocy, mendac-
ity, and moral cowardice. If we made this choice in full awareness of its 
consequences, we would do so with a certain negative dignity, perhaps, 
as if we were intent on displaying willful blindness and self-destruction, 
in embracing intoxication, excess, conflict, and death. But it is far more 
likely that we will make this decision without noticing it, without truly 
asserting ourselves at all, lapsing into self-destruction as if it came over us 
in our sleep. 
So far, at least, we may go if we adhere to that slight possibility that 
acting now will enable us to salvage a bit of the stolen future. But if we 
are honest about the lateness of the hour, we must acknowledge that we 
may well have already decided for calamity without consciously choos-
ing a thing. That numbed decision for disaster grows stronger every day; 
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irreversible climate change draws nigh; the world we dread is upon us, for 
it will be almost impossible for us to ward it off now.
What does responsibility look like in the midst of this surrender, as 
our ecosystems and societies undergo a slow and irreversible collapse? 
How can we remain responsible in the midst of this general indiffer-
ence, as the benefits of action are continually superseded, cancelled, or 
ignored? In these circumstances, the case for responsibility becomes 
even more difficult; the paradoxes of climate change hit home with ter-
rible force. If we try to sustain an ecological ethics today we would face 
the stunningly difficult, if not impossible, prospect of deciding to preserve 
a future even after it has been largely destroyed. Even further, we would find 
ourselves living forward into the very disaster we are fighting to prevent. If we 
take such action, the momentum of history would still carry us directly 
into the fate we did not and do not choose. In our moment, history not 
only fails to reply to such efforts; it directly contradicts such efforts, as if to 
mock us for believing in the purpose of action at all. In effect, we would 
attempt to sustain responsibility amidst its ruins, to remain just when the 
frameworks in which justice is effective have dissolved.
To sustain an intentional sense of human life in this context takes a 
supreme moral effort, a belief in human freedom that can defy nearly 
all odds, a sense of integrity that insists on justice even where it retreats 
beyond virtually every horizon of possibility. All the overtones of free 
responsibility I outlined above would be tested to the breaking point, for 
in our new setting we would be asked to take up a responsibility seemingly 
without purpose. 
The difficulty of that moment would come home to us in other ways 
as well. Once severe climate change kicks in for good, the Earth's temper-
atures will not return to their former levels, nor will the climate restore 
itself; on the human time scale, the loss will be permanent. Moreover, the 
harsher the climate, the greater harm it will do to the communities and 
people we know, and the more we will grieve for the climate's impact on 
our lives as well as on the Earth itself. But our grief will have few effec-
tive outlets, little space for meaningful resolution. Instead of embarking 
on a process of mourning that will absorb what we have experienced and 
renew us, we will find that there is nothing beyond this loss to move on to. 
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Many observers have written about the experience of environmen-
tal grief, of mourning for ruined ecosystems. In ordinary circumstances, 
grief enables us to accept the loss, to acknowledge a new absence within 
the reality in which we must live, and to face the future having integrated 
that past into our lives. Through this process of recovery, in some sense 
we recover our sense of reality, regaining a future through absorbing 
that loss.123 
But grief in the era of climate change can no longer operate in this 
way. Grieving for those we have lost, we will move forward into more loss, 
into a generalized experience of even greater mourning. In effect, because 
we will face those losses and absorb further devastation without end, we 
will never fully recover from them. The process of mourning, which will 
become inevitable for virtually everyone, will lead to little healing at all. 
Furthermore, if we acknowledge the prospect that we are not likely to act 
in time, our emotional situation today transforms as well. Facing a stolen 
future, mindful of the immense social crises to blossom around the world, 
already enduring the traumas to come, we have little choice but to mourn 
forward, to mourn into the very disaster we grieve. Even the specific emo-
tional future promised by the process of grieving disappears, replaced by 
nothing that grief can overcome. Already today, and to a greater degree in 
the years to come, we will have to take on a kind of second-order process 
of grieving for the future and for grief itself, for the very possibility of inte-
grating such losses into our lives and surviving.
Because of that fact, we cannot rely on grief, or indeed on any other 
emotional process, to carry us through this moment. However devastat-
ing the crisis for longing, hope, grief, and despair, however harrowing our 
emotional lives may be at this moment, we cannot salvage them on any 
familiar terms; we simply must find another basis on which to build any 
prospect of ethical integrity. 
The same difficulty confronts us if we contemplate our responsibil-
ity to the generations to come. In our era, as the future is disappearing, 
any ethics that grounds itself in a future good is in danger of shattering 
beyond repair. Abandoned to history, living without guarantees, we may 
soon discover that the basis of our efforts to safeguard the biosphere for 
ourselves and others to come will fail. A purely secular description of 
our moment may falter as much as a purely religious one; both dissolve 
152 Chapter 9
when we attempt to do justice in the midst of the ruins. Once irrevers-
ible, severe climate change arrives, once the domain of indifferent events 
sweep away nearly every positive consequence that might arise from our 
actions, what could possibly inspire us to be just? 
Our only choice in that case would be to abandon all reference to 
the future—a future for ourselves, for others, or for the biosphere itself. 
Although I argued earlier in this book that nearly every action we take is 
grounded on our orientation to the future, under the unrelenting pres-
sure of severe climate change we would have to construct an ethics that 
has no such orientation, that takes its inspiration from a radically dif-
ferent resource. We would have to adopt an ethics that would no lon-
ger have for its ultimate basis a belief that just action would necessarily 
lead to an eventual good for ourselves or others or a material benefit that 
might actually arrive. Adopting such an ethics, we would enact justice 
for another purpose entirely—one realized in the act itself. We would 
respond to others without calculating whether our action would pay off 
in the long run, without measuring our action according to the demands 
of a realistic common sense, accepting the possibility that our actions 
may have no results that would ever be visible to us or to others. In effect, 
we would accept a responsibility that would be infinite in still another 
sense—one that would bear upon us beyond all pragmatic, finite consid-
erations, aiming for a good that is valuable in itself—a good visible, per-
haps, only in our intention, in our sense of a justice without which the 
value of all action disappears.124 
An ethics of this kind—an ethics in extremis—can endure nearly any 
circumstance. In the midst of disaster, where pragmatic action may fail 
us, where grief itself must run aground, when all the familiar scenarios 
of daily life and of human emotion decay, we can still enact justice for its 
own sake. If we act on these terms, we accept a world without redemp-
tion, whether religious or secular; giving up any appeal for a transcen-
dental solution, by the same token we release ourselves from a purely 
material history, discovering instead our ability to do justice beyond all 
calculation. From a certain point of view, it might seem that this mode of 
justice would enact a caring that could not heal, a politics that could not 
liberate, a hope that could not come to pass. Yet in fact, if we take action 
whose benefits we cannot know, giving ourselves to what may never 
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come to pass, we discover a integrity in the very act of doing justice and 
show respect for a sanity that may endure even in the ruins.
It might seem that anyone who could adopt such a practice would 
truly have exceeded the limits of self-interest and become something 
other than human. But acting in that manner, while exceptional, is not 
outside ordinary human experience. Today if someone we love contracts 
a terminal illness, we do not abandon that person; on the contrary, we 
care and love that person to the bitter end. Love's purpose is the person, 
not the future. Does it follow that love is somehow religious, that it aims 
for transcendental ends? Not at all: love ignores transcendence, too, real-
izing nothing but itself, and as a result constitutes a form of action that 
aims beyond the religious or the secular, one that beyond all others real-
izes itself through its own acts. However strange it may sound, then, it 
follows that those who practice an apparently impossible ethics enact a 
version of this love on another scale.
But even these reflections do not bring us face to face with the most 
difficult challenge of all. If we found ourselves in the midst of disaster, 
how would we take responsibility for that disaster itself? Since it would 
have arrived thanks to human activity as well as human indifference 
about the harm our activity has been doing to the biosphere, we would 
have to take the final and unbearable step of accepting the burden of that 
failure itself.
Some might do almost anything to avoid taking this step. After all, 
they might say, we have done all we could to save the environment, reduc-
ing the harm we do in our own lives and fighting for years to bring about 
the necessary actions. No doubt for certain people such a protest could 
ring true. Nevertheless, none of us can claim innocence; all of us in devel-
oped societies are implicated in the harm wrought by modern industrial 
culture. Our very knowledge of climate change depends on the techno-
logical infrastructure available to contemporary scientists as they do their 
research; our very ability to converse about it, to organize activism against 
it, relies on modern publishing, communication technology, and forms 
of mobility. We couldn’t even participate in a movement to save the Earth 
without inhabiting the structures we fight against. No doubt it is entirely 
understandable that we who endure a horror created by human beings 
might be tempted to sink into resentment and anger against others. Such 
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a gesture might be bitterly pleasurable and even be partly accurate, but it 
would enable us to evade the fact that we benefited from and participated 
in the practices that brought about such devastation. 
We would thus do far better to take this failure as our own, to wear 
the mantle of defeat, to take responsibility for the collective decision not 
to do the right thing—in short, to accept untold loss as a consequence 
of our own collective history. Such a step might seem almost impossible 
to contemplate, so directly does it name our futility and humiliation. Yet 
by taking that step, we would achieve a certain integrity in our power to 
assume the full measure of our defeat, to name as our own what would 
then be visible as the true contours of human being: its ultimate inhu-
manity. In that bleakest moment, we would accept responsibility even for 
the fact that our attempts at responsibility fail, taking to our charge what 
would then be revealed as the nullity of our entire history.125 
Here is the ultimate, most unbearable level of responsibility: the task 
of owning disaster, putting it to our charge, taking its burden on ourselves 
as human beings. At first such a step might seem to take us to the fur-
thest, most bitter reach of self-contempt and humiliation; here at last, it 
might appear, we truly give up, collapse, dissolve into ruin ourselves. But 
such is not the case. Here, at last, we would move beyond our horror at 
our inhumanity as well as our grief for the passing of the societies and 
ecosystems we knew. By taking responsibility for a vast failure, we would 
in that same gesture accept absolute loss without nostalgia and without 
condemnation. Giving up the temptation to dismiss humanity as a mere 
evolutionary anomaly or to cling to some faint idealization of our kind, 
we would accept humanity in all its inhumanity and thus find ourselves 
in a space of radical openness, capable of affirming the entire process 
that brought us into being. Marooned on the junk heap of history, facing 
no prospect of redemption, we might attain a great serenity, broken and 
destroyed though we may be.
So it seems that the baffled, broken life I described in the past four 
chapters can ultimately lead to something more, to a basis for a renewed 
integrity even in the midst of the ruins. That basis is not a new hope, but 
the capacity to affirm and endure the worst. To find our way beyond 
the trauma of our time, to push beyond a scenario of endless grief, we 
can abandon anything that might heal us and instead embrace trauma 
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and grief themselves without reserve—and discover that by doing so they 
subtly change: through embracing trauma more fully we can accept the 
broken world without being haunted and distressed by it; and through 
submitting fully to grief, even a grief for grief itself, we might find how 
to relinquish our attachment to recovery, accepting instead a serenity in 
destitution. By owning disaster in these and other ways, we might relin-
quish that fidelity to a sense of our innocence and that belief in the valid-
ity of our culture which made the shattering of both so painful. Through 
that process, we may at last lay hold of a new foundation—one so radical 
that on its basis we may endure whatever may come. On the other side 
of a mutilated happiness we might discover vaster possibilities, including 
a capacity for affirmation without limit and a power to love without the 
hope of return.
In discovering that we may persist in doing justice even in the ruins, 
we can find the basis for an ethical optimism that can survive even in 
the midst of utter defeat. We need not fear, now or later, that political 
or climatological realities will cancel our capacity to follow through on 
our responsibility to others and to the forms of life that have sustained 
us. By working through the series of potential ethical challenges to the 
bitter end, by imagining the worst that may befall—and finding that we 
can survive even that horror with integrity—we discover an indestruc-
tible ethical agency we may never have known we possessed, discerning 
hints of possibility that lie unremarked within the impossible challenges 
of our era, sources of strength that will remain to us even if the future 
disappears. Through that same encounter with the worst, we learn how 
to dwell with the full range, however painful, of emotions that arise in 
response to the dilemmas of our time, at last overcoming the dissociation 
habitual to our culture. 
Bringing these discoveries with us back from this hypothetical future 
to our own moment, when we cannot yet be certain that all action is 
futile or that the future has utterly disappeared, we may realize that we 
can make good even now on the agency we have gained through this 
foray into the future and as a result can face our present difficulties with 
a surprising authority. Moreover, by returning to the present in this way, 
we expand the significance of that future ethical decision outward, to 
include our own present as well. But by assuming responsibility today
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for the disaster that may come, we necessarily accept the demand to 
renounce any further participation in the practices that are leading to 
catastrophe and to make reparation, as far as is possible, for the harm we 
have done. No doubt our ability to do either is severely constrained; for 
most of us, simply living our lives does far more harm than we wish, and 
the task of reparation requires far more of us than we will ever achieve. 
We who are the inheritors of a disastrous history were never meant to 
carry that entire history on our backs; it is only understandable that as we 
try to do so, we may stagger under the load. We will have to develop new 
reserves of humility, new levels of resilience, new styles of dark comedy 
to endure. The task we accept seems well-nigh impossible. Yet by taking it 
as our own we become the agents, and not merely the heirs, of our shared 
history—even if, as agents, we necessarily have in our hands a truly hor-
rific power to destroy as well as save. In accepting this task, we finally 
acknowledge what would be true in any case, that at this juncture, as in 
no other, ours is an infinite responsibility.
What does that power mean for us today in our ordinary lives, as we 
inevitably face a wide array of decisions about our everyday practices? 
We cannot do better than to take the most transformative, constructive 
steps available to us. Because our task is to reduce those practices that do 
the greatest physical harm to the biosphere, the ultimate measure of our 
willingness to do justice is not purity of heart or intensity of spirit but the 
practical, measurable effect of our actions. Yet to bring about those con-
crete results requires a real ethical commitment. As a result, we find our-
selves today in what might seem to be a paradox: we accept an incalcu-
lable responsibility best when we calculate with great rigor exactly what 
we can do to make the most difference in our ordinary practices—and 
carry through on that calculation as well as we can. In short, we must cul-
tivate nothing other than a pragmatism of infinite responsibility, one that is 
endlessly resourceful in discovering and implementing the most sophisti-
cated ideas for salvaging a future. To that task I now turn.
Infinite Responsibility 157
Notes
114.  For a harrowing discussion of a recent failure to halt genocide, see Roméo 
Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of 
Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004). 
115.  Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status, 105th Congress (1997–1998), 
S. Res 98, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:S.RES.98:.
116.  Al Gore, Our Choice: A Plan to Solve the Climate Crisis (Emmaus, 
Pennsylvania: Rodale, 2009).
117.  For classic discussions of infinite responsibility, see Emmanuel Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), especially 220–247, and 
Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), especially 131–162. For 
a recent meditation on similar themes as they bear on our current ethical 
and political dilemmas, see Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of 
Commitment, Politics of Resistance (New York: Verso, 2007). 
118.  Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: 
Penguin, 2006).
119.  Diamond, Collapse, 277–308.
120.  Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (New 
York: Norton, 1977), 14; see also 38, 62.
121.  For further reflections on biblical religion and its relevance for our response 
to climate change, see chapter twelve.
122.  In the midst of disaster, people can demonstrate an amazing capacity for 
generosity; see Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary 
Communities that Arise in Disaster (New York: Penguin, 2009). But if climate 
change becomes truly severe, it will constitute an ongoing, endless disaster, 
in contrast to the specific, local events Solnit describes, stretching the human 
capacity for generosity much further.
123.  For discussions of grieving for environmental devastation and loss, see 
Phyllis Whindle, “The Ecology of Grief,” in Ecopsychology: Restoring the 
Earth, Healing the Mind, edited by Thomas Roszak, Mary Gomes, and Allen 
Kanner (New York: Sierra Club Books, 1995), 136–149; Kristine Kevorkian, 
“Environmental Grief,” Ecology Global Network, February 15, 2012, http://
www.ecology.com/2012/02/15/environmental-grief/; and Marie Eaton, 
“Environmental Trauma and Grief,” Curriculum for the Bioregion Initiative, 
Science Education Resource Center at Carleton College, August 2012, http://
serc.carleton.edu/bioregion/sustain_contemp_lc/essays/67207.html.
158 Chapter 9
124.  For related arguments in recent critical theory, see Jacques Derrida, The Gift 
of Death, second edition, and Literature in Secret, translated by David Wills 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 82–116; the essays by Slavoj 
Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard collected in The Neighbor: Three 
Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); 
and Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding. Such discussions emphasize the 
demand to love others beyond all thought of merit or return, but they do 
not consider the unprecedented ethical challenges posed by climate change, 
including that of enacting justice even without a future. On the need to 
extend Derrida’s thinking in response to climate change, see Tom Cohen, 
“Anecographics: Climate Change and ‘Late’ Deconstruction,” in Impasses of 
the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, volume 2, edited by Henry 
Sussman (MPublishing, University of Michigan Library; Open Humanities 
Press, 2012), http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/10803281.0001.001/1:3/--
impasses-of-the-post-global-theory-in-the-era-of-climate?rgn=div1;view=fu
lltext.
125.  Compare the account of how the subject can assume responsibility for state 
of things, thereby converting substance into subject, in Slavoj Žižek, The 
Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989), 217, and how, by working 
through the fundamental fantasy that sustains one’s being, “the subject 
accepts the void of his [sic] nonexistence,” Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The 
Absent Centre of Political Ontology (New York: Verso, 1999), 281.
Chapter 10
Making Reparation: Offset Your Life
If, as I have just suggested, owning disaster is also to own the demand for 
reparation, even where reparation is impossible, then our way of surviv-
ing the slow horror of our time does not relieve us of the task of practic-
ing justice in everyday life. On the contrary, given the enormity of the 
disaster we now take to our own account, the task becomes enormous as 
well. All our pragmatic actions in consequence thus become small indica-
tions of a reparation we will never and can never complete, a task as incal-
culable as the disaster it is meant to repair.
But if we commit ourselves to doing justice in our daily lives, we 
immediately face a series of skeptical responses from ourselves or others. 
What can we do as individuals in the face of such an enormous crisis? 
Individual action can do very little in comparison to concerted national 
and international measures to address the key causes of climate change. 
But this is not in fact an objection to a renewed ethics; it is rather a 
description of our first, overriding, and most pressing task: fighting hard 
for an ecological revolution. All other actions we might take pale in com-
parison. When our political institutions pose obstacles to the necessary 
transformation, we should become more creative, change tactics, and try 
new angles on the problem. If we fail again, we should persist with still 
further efforts. Nothing should ever intimidate us. 
But it does not follow that we need do nothing to change our behavior 
in our own lives. If we are to do justice no matter what comes, we must 
commit ourselves to making a difference however we can. Doing so may 
be difficult if it’s clear that we are still caught within a society that refuses 
to alter its ways. Yet we cannot use that fact as an excuse. As I asked 
above, how tolerant are we toward a slaveholder who refused to liberate 
his “property” on the excuse that his doing so would not by itself liberate 
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all slaves? How well do we accept the plea of a woman living in Nazi 
Germany that she cooperated with the system of extermination because 
she did not have the power on her own to bring it to an end? If we are not 
likely to let such people off the hook, we must believe that people should 
do justice whatever the odds, even in the face of impoverishment, pun-
ishment, or death. Since living in an environmentally responsible fash-
ion would provoke no such threat against us today, we have even fewer 
excuses; our criteria in those other cases make our judgment about our 
current behavior quite clear.
We may hesitate to go further than we already do because we are not 
convinced it is necessary or all that helpful to do so. We might conclude, 
for example, that statistically speaking, our personal actions will have 
only a miniscule effect on the overall situation. But even if such action 
may be statistically insignificant, it is still necessary. Our ordinary moral 
compass tells us as much. If one of us kills someone we hate, statistically 
speaking we would have reduced the human population by an almost 
infinitesimal amount. Similarly, if we break into someone's home to steal 
an object we coveted, we do virtually nothing to harm the gross national 
product. Yet we refuse to commit such actions for good reason. The same 
applies to environmental ethics: it's silly to imagine that driving a gas-
guzzling vehicle is acceptable simply because that machine is only one of 
millions on the road. If we're destroying the biosphere, we're destroying 
it—and statistics is no excuse.
Other factors may enter into our thinking as well. Even if collective 
efforts to change our societies are weak or tardy, individual action can 
still make at least a minimal difference. For one thing, it will help realize, 
if only on a small scale, some aspect of the society we are demanding. 
For another, it will relieve us of a certain kind of hypocrisy, helping us 
close the gap between what we demand and how we actually live. Finally, 
if enough of us act, and encourage others to do so, together we may build 
momentum for a much more widespread transformation.
Such considerations may already motivate us to do a great deal. 
Already millions have learned that we should use renewable energy in 
place of fossil fuels, rely on energy-efficient forms of transportation, save 
energy in our households, consume less, reuse and recycle as much as we 
can, buy local and organic food, and compost our waste. Over the past 
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four decades or so, these practices have gradually become a familiar part 
of developed societies, at least in many locations, and now sound like 
basic common sense for many of us.
But because even now the greenhouse gas footprint of the average 
American citizen remains sharply higher than that of people elsewhere 
in the world, in this nation we have far to go. Moreover, as I suggested in 
chapter five, even if humanity as a whole shifts to renewable energy soon, 
our imprint on the Earth's surface will still be enormous in part because 
of the immensity of the global human population. 
To address these challenges, we must go significantly further than 
we already have. We may be forced to examine aspects of our habits or 
assumptions that we do not want to think about at all, to tackle serious 
difficulties not only in the public sphere but in our own lives as well. If 
we are to see our own moment through the eyes of the future, we may 
have to endure changes to our intimate lives that we can hardly bear, to 
do what seems at first impossible. Our dilemma forces us toward radical 
thinking and action on every level—political and cultural, social and eth-
ical, collective and personal. It demands that we cut to the root in every 
domain, including in our own individual lives.
In the end, we have no serious reason to hesitate applying a prag-
matic environmental ethics to our own lives. Refusing to do so cannot 
withstand close scrutiny. Living by such an ethics will be no easy matter; 
we will inevitably meet resistance from that part of us still caught in the 
familiar habits of our culture. As a result, we might be tempted to alter 
our practices only when it is most convenient to do so, when it intrudes 
least into our lives. We might attempt to combine ease and responsibility, 
blending our current habits with new ways, as if changing our lives a little 
bit will be enough. Most dangerously, we might bargain with the future, 
giving up practices that do relatively little harm so that we can keep those 
that do much more. Renouncing the disastrous habits of our culture can 
be surprisingly difficult. The toughest and most essential task is to over-
come this resistance, especially with regard to those truly destructive 
practices on which we most depend. On this score we should compro-
mise as little as possible. 
Accordingly, in this chapter I will focus on one example of damag-
ing activity—travelling by air—to examine how great a harm it causes, 
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why we might resist abandoning it, and what steps we could best take 
within the actual limits of our lives. Thinking through this single example 
may provide us with a template for how we can confront other destruc-
tive practices. Since air travel eventually will lead to the question about 
whether to rely on carbon offsets to compensate for our flights, we might 
also take up whether those offsets could work more broadly, whether 
they might be a useful strategy in response to all the harm we do. In short, 
this chapter will attempt to outline one practical approach to the chief 
ethical challenges of our time.
In most discussions of how we might shift to a new energy econ-
omy, the topic eventually turns to air travel. In nearly every other area 
of greenhouse gas usage, we can imagine a transition to alternative ener-
gies and can begin to make reasonable steps in that direction. But not 
with air travel. As David MacKay points out, “planes are already almost 
as energy-efficient as they could possibly be.”126 Yet flying by plane has 
an enormous, negative impact on the atmosphere. George Monbiot, in a 
representative and remarkably clear discussion of the subject, citing the 
research of the (British) Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
writes that “the carbon emissions per passenger mile 'for a fully loaded 
cruising airliner are comparable to a passenger car carrying three or four 
people.'” So far so good. But as Monbiot goes on to point out, “while the 
mean distance travelled by car in the United Kingdom is 9,200 miles per 
year, in a plane we can beat that in one day.” Planes are such an efficient 
form of travel—they enable us to cover such huge distances so quickly—
we forget how much energy is required to move us so far. If the carbon 
footprint of a given air mile doesn't seem so great, taking the full distance 
into account expands that footprint very quickly.
But this isn't the half of it. The impact of travelling in airplanes, 
Monbiot continues, “is not confined to the carbon they produce.” 
Airplanes emit many different particles that have varying effects. The 
IPCC thus estimates that the overall impact “is a warming effect 2.7 times 
that of the carbon dioxide alone,” due primarily to the mixing of vapor 
from jet engines with the air in the troposphere, creating the vapor trails 
we can see from far below. “This means that subsonic aircraft, if all their 
seats are full, cause roughly the same total warming per passenger mile 
as cars.”127 
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Bringing this analysis home to our own lives can be quite sober-
ing. Let's say you drive a fuel-efficient car, recycle, and live responsi-
bly—except each year you take a single cross-country round-trip flight. 
According to a representative carbon footprint calculator—the one at 
terrapass.com—driving a car that gets forty miles per gallon 12,000 miles 
a year pumps an estimated 5,869 pounds of carbon dioxide—just under 
three tons—into the atmosphere. In comparison, a round-trip flight from 
Boston to San Francisco, with one stop along the way each direction, 
emits 2,553 pounds of carbon dioxide per passenger. But if you multiply 
that number by 2.7 to reflect the full impact of that flight on global warm-
ing, it has a net effect of around 6,893 pounds—a half-ton more than the 
carbon footprint of driving that car the entire year.128 
So would it be better to take short-haul propeller flights? The latter, it 
turns out, are inefficient because they require planes to spend a greater 
percentage of the fuel getting aloft. It's far better to use other forms of 
transportation to reach destinations so close; Monbiot's own estimates 
suggest that it's about twice as efficient to travel that distance by car 
(with the British average of 1.56 passengers on board), over ten times 
more efficient to take the train, and around fifteen times more efficient to 
travel by bus.129 
Wouldn't it be possible for airplanes to use renewable sources of 
energy? Not yet. Ethanol and other biofuels do not burn well at the 
extremely cold temperatures found in the troposphere, and a hydrogen-
fueled plane would contribute thirteen times more to global warm-
ing than today's jet airplanes.130 Amyris, a biofuel company, has created 
a renewable jet fuel suitable for actual use and is currently testing it for 
release in a few years.131 But whether it can be produced cheaply enough 
and at an appropriate scale without causing too great a damage to cur-
rent ecosystems is doubtful. So far, there is no available alternative to the 
kinds of aircraft we fly today.
Facts like these fill a good number of us with outright dismay. Those 
who live far away from family or friends, whose professions virtually 
require us to get around by plane, or who simply love to explore the 
world would do almost anything rather than give up air travel. We might 
even regard the very thought as a kind of personal affront. But that is the 
very fact that makes this example so powerful and so instructive. The 
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biosphere doesn't really care all that much about how we feel; the reality 
is what it is, and we must bear with it.
Our first reaction might be that we should simply stop travelling by 
air. For many of us, that is no doubt the best option. We may be lucky 
enough, or smart enough, to live near all those we wish to see. Most of 
the rest of us should be able to visit with family members or colleagues 
using phone calls, Internet video links, or videoconferencing. If we do 
need to travel, we might be able to do so by bus or train. In fact, given the 
harm that air travel does, we should set this as our default response: we 
should determine to fly as little as possible, regarding it as a harmful act 
that we should undertake only when we have no other options.
But for millions of us, adopting such a response seems to ask too 
much. The most crucial part of this discussion thus arises when we must 
decide how to adjudicate between the harm of air travel and its appar-
ently necessary place in our lives. It may be useful to pause here to pon-
der a series of motives for travel and imagine a plausible response to each.
Many of us use air travel as a way to take a break. What happens to 
the family vacation, the weekend getaway, the mid-winter trip to see 
sunshine? What about that week in Hawaii or the visit to the Caribbean 
resort? These outings are pleasant, but scarcely necessary, especially in 
the midst of the climate crisis; we would be wise to forego them entirely. 
Changing our habits in this regard will not be easy. It will alter our 
relationship to the very idea of getting away from it all; we will have to 
rethink our sense that the biosphere exists in part to assist us in enjoying 
leisure time.
Cutting back on air travel also raises a number of tougher questions. 
Should students apply to the best colleges, wherever they may be; should 
workers relocate to wherever the jobs are good; and should seniors retire 
to Arizona or Florida—if doing so requires that somebody travel by air 
to join the family gathering at Thanksgiving and Christmas, if not the 
summer holidays? What must give way: personal ambition and satisfac-
tion, the notion of family, and the satisfactions of retirement, on the one 
hand, or the threat of climate change on the other? If we care at all about 
the survival of the biosphere, the answer over the long term is clear: we 
must learn how to become a far less mobile society, to abandon our belief 
that something fabulous will happen to us if we settle hither and yon or 
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venture continually to the far pavilions. Yet because we inherit the con-
sequences of that mobility for our own lives, we may find ourselves far 
removed, and perhaps permanently, from family members. 
Perhaps a good compromise is to be honest about what we can do, but 
also what we cannot give up; perhaps we should accept what has already 
taken place—such as our moving far away from family members—and 
thus accept occasional air travel to see them. But such a reason cannot 
serve us forever. As time goes by, we should take steps, wherever we can, 
to rejoin those we love and find far more local and settled ways to live. 
Adopting an environmental ethic will inevitably force us to rethink our 
improbable attempt to combine distance and intimacy.
Similar pressures abound elsewhere. Should members of various 
professions attend annual conferences intended to keep them apprised 
of developments in their fields? How well could they share information 
without meeting face to face? To cover contemporary events, journalists 
fly to destinations here or abroad in order to observe developments first-
hand. How urgent must developments be to justify such a large environ-
mental footprint? Salespeople, consultants, businesspeople, board mem-
bers, and executives—to give a partial list—are among the nation's most 
frequent fliers; how are they to conduct their business? 
Insofar as these professions take for granted that flying should be rou-
tine, that it must become in part a frequent activity over the year, they 
have accepted what amounts to the perpetual abuse of the biosphere. The 
assumption that actions of such harm should be ordinary must go. As 
a result, those professions must evolve very quickly into another form, 
relying instead on alternative forms of contact, such as videoconferenc-
ing, to conduct ordinary business. Such a change is in fact plausible if 
those in such fields make a concerted effort over the next few years. But 
calling for an absolute ban on face-to-face encounters might go too far 
and create a backlash against this entire effort. Here again, one might 
justify occasional flights on the basis of the most pressing needs or most 
fruitful encounters.
Even further questions arise when we contemplate our place in the 
international community. How are we to break out of an insular nar-
rowness if we cannot travel to other countries, learn their languages, 
and partake in their cultural traditions? Artists, performers, filmmakers, 
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musicians, chefs, cultural critics, and people in the world of fashion can-
not remain on the cutting edge without being exposed to cultures else-
where. Would we welcome the results if they travelled less, if mutual influ-
ence took place in another way? Diplomats, workers in nongovernmental 
organizations, and employees of aid groups travel frequently around the 
world, but in a severe irony, by doing so they contribute to harming the 
planet. How are they to do their work without relying on air travel?
The consequences of globalizing trade relations are at stake as well. 
The increasing volume of goods moving between nations, especially by 
sea, are inevitably accompanied by an increase in international air travel, 
at least to support bilateral business arrangements. Globalization is also 
felt in cultural exchanges of all kinds. Nowadays people who live in large 
towns or small cities assume that they will have access to good French 
and Italian food, a nice Mexican place, good Chinese food, a sushi restau-
rant, Thai and Indian food, and maybe even a tapas place as well. In any 
large city, we assume that we'll experience some real multiculturalism, 
too—that there will be sizable ethnic or cultural communities integrated 
into the mix. In the last several decades, the United States has invited 
highly skilled or educated immigrants into its society, creating an influx 
of people from many nations around the world—migrants who may wish 
to take flights back to their homelands from time to time. All these trade 
relations, cultural contacts, and family ties rely on a mode of travel that 
does immense and ongoing harm to the biosphere. Is it possible to main-
tain anything like this openness to the world without doing further harm? 
However greatly we may value these cultural benefits of globaliza-
tion and the gradual shift from insular to more cosmopolitan attitudes, 
we cannot give those benefits absolute priority over the survival of the 
biosphere. Converting the planet into a multicultural ash heap does not 
serve humanity well. To the extent that we can, we should sustain the 
vibrancy and creativity associated with these international exchanges 
while dramatically reducing the number of international flights. And 
because those flights have a staggering carbon footprint, since they dam-
age the biosphere more than any others, we must consider cutting them 
back as far as possible. If we do so, however, we will inevitably relinquish 
many aspects of globalization on which we have come to rely—the easy 
exchange of goods and fashions included. Our cultures and economies, 
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our sense of multicultural contact, will have to evolve as we do so. We 
may thus end up in this case as in the compromises above, accepting 
occasional journeys for truly urgent purposes but otherwise giving pride 
of place to the planet’s survival. 
How do things look so far? On the broadest scale, we could pressure 
governments to adopt a greenhouse gas untax of the sort I described ear-
lier in this book. An increase in the price of fossil fuels would raise the 
price of air travel and could prompt us all, whatever our sense of the cli-
mate crisis, to change our ordinary practices. If necessary, we should also 
ponder how to change the attitudes that our professions take for granted. 
Workers could insist that their employers allow them to travel visually 
rather than in person or to find other workable alternatives to flying. 
We could all begin to think creatively about how we can meet, exchange 
information, socialize with professional peers, and forge workable bonds. 
All these changes will be necessary if our societies take real action; we 
might as well get a start on that massive cultural shift before it is too late.
Moreover, if the compromises I outlined above sound plausible, we 
could then commit ourselves to flying only on specific occasions, nar-
rowing the number of flights over a year to one or less, and over a lifetime 
to a few: to study abroad, to return to an ancestral homeland, or to make 
a few visits to specific, long-desired destinations. This severe reduction 
in the number of flights might rightly inspire us to do the most with each 
one, to make those air miles count as much as possible. If our lives allow 
us, we might for example stay at our destination for several weeks if not 
months, substantially reducing the climate impact per day of the visit. 
Wherever we fly, we could take into consideration research that sug-
gests we could reduce the environmental impact of air travel if we fly 
when a plane’s vapor trail can reflect sunlight back into space—that is, in 
the daytime and in the relatively bright seasons of the year. (One study 
suggests that travel from December through February, only one-fourth of 
the total number of annual flights in southeast Britain, caused one-half of 
a year's warming effect from contrails; travel at night, around one-fifth of 
the total there, caused 60 to 80 percent of the effect.) However, because 
contrails may constitute only a portion of flying's overall impact on the 
atmosphere, taking this step may have no more than a partial benefit.132 
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Although these compromises might seem sensible, flying to this 
degree would still contribute to climate change. As a result, the approach I 
have sketched so far is still inadequate. A key further element, then, is the 
opportunity to purchase carbon offsets for each of those flights—that is, 
to contribute to organizations that use the money for projects that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Surprisingly, such offsets are fairly cheap: you 
can offset the emission carbon dioxide through a credible and certified 
organization for around $12 to $15 a ton. Doing so responsibly, however, 
takes a bit of research. For such offsets to be effective, they must fund 
efforts that would not otherwise take place, do not merely shift harm-
ful activities to another site, and are not already being counted under an 
existing environmental policy. Furthermore, such offsets should support 
interventions that truly make a difference now. If you fund projects for 
planting trees, for example, they may not begin to pull carbon dioxide out 
of the atmosphere for many years, and already, as I mentioned in earlier 
chapters, many forests under the pressure of climate change are drying 
out, decaying, and are thus on the verge of emitting more carbon diox-
ide than they absorb. It is thus much wiser to fund programs that choose 
other strategies, that reduce the burning of wood or charcoal for cook-
ing fires, for example, or help construct renewable energy plants whose 
power local consumers will actually use. (Those cooking fires, by the way, 
typically produce great quantities of black carbon, which researchers 
have recently found may be far more harmful than previously thought; 
funding efforts to reduce that harm may thus be far more helpful than 
we knew.133 ) Fortunately, others have done careful research on all these 
concerns and have made the results available online, along with links to 
those carbon offset companies whose efforts seem to be making the most 
difference.134 
If we travel only on occasion and purchase offsets when we do so, we 
would go far toward reducing our overall carbon footprint and do much 
to fulfill the demand for reparation. What’s more, by purchasing offsets 
we would be contributing in our own small way to efforts that the inter-
national community could sponsor wholesale if it so chose; we would in 
effect begin to bring about the ecological revolution we demand. By liv-
ing in this way, we would declare our commitment to that revolution and 
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thus begin to make good on our choice to take responsibility for the eco-
logical disaster now unfolding around us.
One problem with offsets, however, is that they are so cheap and so 
easy to purchase that they may become too convenient. If one can afford 
that minimal cost, why not simply continue flying as much as one pleases 
and offset it all? Such a strategy is certainly better than flying without off-
sets; at least it helps cancel out the harm of one’s travel. But the purpose 
of offsets is to compensate for those emissions we cannot eliminate, not 
to enable us to travel as much as we might wish. Otherwise, it becomes 
a tactic to allow people to live in continued extravagance, as if they 
can do all the harm they please as long as they buy the sense that they 
are doing none.
Offsets are limited in this way because our eventual goal is both to 
reduce emissions we might cause and help reduce emissions elsewhere, 
for a total reduction much larger than offsets can make possible. While 
it does much good to fund projects that decrease environmental harm, 
our eventual purpose is to do so while also reducing the harm to which 
we directly contribute. Our eventual goal, then, must be to eliminate all
of our contributions to climate change while also enabling those in other 
regions of the world to do the same.
These considerations inspire some people to deplore offsets entirely. If 
we can potentially abuse them to excuse doing harm to the biosphere, the 
logic goes, then we should avoid them altogether. But those who make 
this point almost inevitably still travel by air; the virtue they espouse by 
excluding offsets is thus illusory. The only responsible way to avoid using 
them is to eliminate one’s carbon footprint in the first place.
Nevertheless, we should take this hesitation to rely on offsets seri-
ously. Ultimately, offsets will be of value to us only if we see them as tools 
to help us as we construct new practices that will do no direct harm. If 
we decide to use offsets, we must commit ourselves to doing so sparingly 
over the course of a transition in our actions—so that eventually we would 
reduce our air travel so much we would no longer need those offsets at all. 
Thinking of offsets as a transitional strategy may be our best option.
This is only one example of how we might shift our habits in the era 
of climate change. How well does it represent a transformation in all our 
activities? How can we build on it to rethink the whole pattern?
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It shouldn’t be too difficult to apply many aspects of this example 
to others. Setting a low threshold for a carbon footprint, sorting out 
whether we should make any exceptions, and offsetting those exceptions 
carefully—while regarding those offsets as a temporary measure—will 
enable us to reduce our overall carbon footprint responsibly.
But in that case, this example teaches us that we should begin to offset 
every aspect of our carbon footprint, in effect, to offset our lives entirely. 
Since offsets are relatively inexpensive, most of us could afford to calcu-
late all our greenhouse gas emissions annually and compensate for them. 
Because most of us use energy in rough proportion to our income, it fol-
lows that most of us with more money could afford more offsets, and 
those who need them the least would need to purchase the fewest. Even 
then, of course, they might be too expensive for some. Nevertheless, if all 
of us did our best, and all of us who could afford to do so offset our lives, 
we would make a real difference for the biosphere even without govern-
ment action. And because we would be linking this practice to a prior, 
systematic attempt to reduce our carbon footprints as far as possible, we 
would be going even further to eliminating the harm we do to the planet.
By taking these steps, we would be following through on our commit-
ment to make reparation. Indeed, that reparation would be visible both 
in the greatly reduced harm we cause in our own lives and in the active 
transformation we would make possible here and elsewhere. As people 
around the world shift to less harmful practices, as renewable energy 
plants come online, some version, however limited, of undoing harm to 
the Earth will take place.
But if that is the case, why stop there? We should also contribute to 
organizations that restore ecosystems where we live, that actively protect 
wild spaces, waterways, wetlands, and wildlife preserves, and that not 
only protect but also dare to restore damaged landscapes. Even further, 
if purchasing offsets can do so much good, why shouldn’t we contribute 
money to those organizations quite apart from offsetting per se, enabling 
them to go much further than they would otherwise? If our lives are truly 
about reparation, we could commit ourselves to purchasing twice, or 
even three times, what we would need to do to offset our carbon foot-
print, doing what we could to decrease the harm brought about by the 
society in which we live. 
Making Reparation: Offset Your Life 171
Making these compromises and accepting the cost of these offsets 
may be no easy matter; at first, for people in many professions, tak-
ing these actions might pose a tough challenge. But it’s pretty clear that 
our current crisis requires us to change our whole way of life. In these 
specific ways, it may push us well beyond the comfort zone, demanding 
what we do not really want to give. Yet we simply must make changes 
of this kind if we want to tackle the challenges that face us. If we do not, 
we are no different from those who proclaim against all the evidence that 
there is no problem at all—or are even worse, since we become far more 
inconsistent and hypocritical than they. We have no choice but to do all 
that we can.
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Chapter 11
Bear No Children
Let's say a person who is already unusually responsible in all the obvious 
ways—who uses very little gasoline, expends very little energy to heat 
or cool the home, recycles, and much more—decides to take the seem-
ingly drastic step of no longer flying. Would that be enough? Wouldn't 
dramatically reducing travel by air make a huge difference? Certainly it 
would. But thinking about our challenge in these terms, however neces-
sary, still relies on a fairly narrow assumption about the task before us. 
For the most part, we tend to focus on how we as individuals can lower 
our greenhouse gas footprint through various practical actions. But that 
approach leaves out of view another key question—whether to bring more 
individuals into the world in the first place, each of whom will, in turn, con-
tribute a lifetime's worth of emissions to the atmosphere. 
Insofar as bearing children is a personal choice, the decision to have 
a child properly belongs within the domain of one's personal impact on 
climate change. Yet because our culture regards that decision as in some 
sense absolutely private, as the very essence of personal liberty, we have 
so far seldom examined the ethics of reproduction as such. Typically, 
even the toughest commentators on climate change keep silent on this 
question or approach it with fear and trembling, as if examining the poli-
tics of reproduction would somehow violate a taboo. They have a point: 
it does. But keeping silent on this question makes a mockery of the pre-
tense to have considered the broader impact of our individual decisions 
on climate change with any thoroughness. The decision about whether to 
have children is so enormous in its implications it dwarfs virtually all oth-
ers; if anything, it is the question individuals must face when considering 
how to lead an ethical life today.
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As we consider the full range of what we as individuals can do, then, we 
cannot remain content with the options I outlined in the previous chap-
ter. We must examine the issue of bearing children as well, for it is central 
to any serious look at the question of how best we can make reparation.
Even the briefest consideration would tell us what a huge impact bear-
ing a child must have on an individual’s contribution to climate change. 
If you have a child, you've added another entire lifetime's worth of green-
house gas emissions to the biosphere. You can basically assume that 
your child's impact on the environment will largely replicate your own, 
or what yours hypothetically would be over the lifetime of that child. At 
the very least, then, you will have increased your imprint by half (since 
you will share the responsibility for conceiving the child with your part-
ner). But because that child might well have further children, who may 
have further children in turn, that imprint is likely to be much larger 
still. Under what they call the constant scenario—the assumption that 
individual greenhouse gas emission rates of the parents will continue 
indefinitely for their children—Paul Murtaugh and Michael Schlax, in a 
paper published in 2005, estimate that an American woman (on whom 
they focus, rather than a man, for technically statistical reasons) who 
drives a more fuel-efficient car, reduces the number of miles she drives 
each week, installs energy-efficient windows, uses low-energy light bulbs, 
installs an energy-efficient refrigerator, and recycles will over her lifetime, 
using the emissions averages of that year, keep about 486 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere, but a woman who reduces 
her offspring by one child will over her lifetime save 9,441 tons. If emis-
sion rates rise or fall over the course of the child's life, the picture changes 
dramatically. But this estimate fairly represents the ethical choice facing 
a potential parent today. It's worth emphasizing what these researchers 
have found: an American woman who has two children will add “nearly 
40 times” as much carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as she might save 
through her eco-friendly activities.135 
All this follows from a fairly straightforward look at an individual's 
environmental footprint. But if we consider as well the fact that humanity 
as a whole now vastly exceeds this planet's carrying capacity, the case for 
not reproducing becomes even stronger. As I argued in an earlier chapter, 
if we manage to shift to renewable energy sources on a scale vast enough 
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to make a difference, we will greatly expand the presence of our energy 
infrastructure across the land and sea. As a result, that action will make 
the sheer overabundance of human beings more visible to us than ever 
before. Reproducing our current numbers into the foreseeable future—
even with zero population growth—simply hands this pattern of devasta-
tion down to future generations, who will have many fewer options to 
solve it well. If we want the life forms of this planet to thrive, we have to 
reduce our numbers as soon as we can. The only humane way to do so is 
to reduce our birth rate.
The implications are unmistakable: a person who wishes to forestall 
severe climate change should not bear children. No doubt saying so vio-
lates one of the strongest taboos in our culture. But for that very reason, 
it is all the more necessary to speak the unspeakable, speak it repeatedly, 
and speak it now. If we are to have the slightest chance to reduce the dam-
age our culture causes the environment, we should begin with the activ-
ity that causes the most harm, and without question, this is the one.
I freely concede that simply thinking this thought is enormously pain-
ful to most of us. The idea that we should not bear and raise children cuts 
against a host of assumptions we may have about “normal” life. Although 
American society no longer so openly disapproves of people who remain 
single or childless and is becoming increasingly tolerant of nontraditional 
families of all kinds, including those headed by gay and lesbian couples, 
people still speak about “getting married and starting a family,” as if the 
people in question do not constitute a family in their own right but “start” 
a family only when they bear or adopt a child. Our society also tends to 
assume that starting a family in this sense is a sign of maturity, an indica-
tion that a participating adult is becoming responsible. Moreover, we also 
take for granted that parents are somehow more nurturing and unselfish 
than childless adults, more likely to care about the coming generations, 
and thus more responsive to humanity's fate. All these assumptions are 
reinforced by the desire many people feel to bear children. That desire 
can feel so natural, so self-evident, that they might assume other people 
feel it as well, and that people in general should have the right to satisfy 
this desire. Needless to say, that desire is often so profound it can define 
an entire life.
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The environmental consequences of childbearing, however, should 
inspire us to reverse these assumptions, however difficult and nearly 
unthinkable it may seem to do so. We need to define our notion of family 
anew so that the very phrase “start a family” takes on a new meaning. We 
should contemplate the possibility that not reproducing is more nurtur-
ing and responsible, more loving to others and to humanity, than bring-
ing more people into the world. Clearly, we should not simply assume 
that childless people are automatically responsible in these ways: leaping 
to that conclusion is simply not justified. But we should not only respect 
but admire the decision to remain childless if it is part of an individual's 
broader effort to reduce harm to the environment. The corollary is true as 
well: we should seriously consider the possibility that having children is 
not responsible. No matter how strong a person's desire to have children 
might be, we should not assume that it automatically overrides every 
other concern.
The absence of any serious discussion about these matters permeates 
our culture. The leading political and economic theories in the Anglo-
American tradition, for example, start from the notion of rational self-
interest, an assumption that takes for granted the adult status of all par-
ties. But that sort of analysis does not explain what brings individuals 
into the world in the first place. Apparently the principle of self-interest 
includes one's decisions about reproduction, but that possibility is not 
discussed explicitly in the theories of, say, John Locke or Adam Smith, 
the people whose ideas shape the American traditions we adhere to even 
today. Perhaps a child is simply an extension of oneself until coming of 
age, when she presumably turns into a rational adult (but then Locke and 
Smith also don't seriously consider the possibility that women are ratio-
nal adults as well). Such theories never examine whether a rational adult 
should have children in the first place, nor do they ponder how childbear-
ing figures into the consequences of self-interest for society as a whole. 
This question constitutes an immense blind spot throughout the modern 
tradition of political and economic reflection.
The consequences are immediately clear in the rather muddled state 
of our constitutional law. Since Roe v. Wade, Americans have typically 
invoked the right of privacy to defend a woman's decision to have an 
abortion or attacked that right in the name of the unborn child's right to 
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life. Typically, then, we end up putting one version of individual rights 
against another. Yet the terms of that debate mask a more honest discus-
sion about whether the principle of equality between men and women 
should override the woman's traditional role as the bearer of children—
whether the principles of modern individualism, now finally applied to 
women, are more important than the ancient endorsement of reproduc-
tion. In this debate as it is currently conducted, the modern notion of 
individual liberty confronts traditional norms, as it has so often over the 
past three centuries. 
But in our time, that debate is hopelessly outdated. Given the 
immense pressure of climate change on us all, the abstract liberty of the 
individual—male or female, born or unborn—cannot take precedence 
over the basic question as to whether humanity as a whole has any further 
right to use the Earth for its own purposes. The answer to that question is 
simple: we do not. But if we as a species have no such right, neither do we 
as individuals. In that case, the liberty we take for granted—to reproduce 
or not, more or less as we please—no longer applies. It follows as well 
that elevating the life of the unborn child over all other considerations is 
utterly blind to its consequences for the life of the species, as well as the 
life of the biosphere as a whole. For sexually active people, a “pro-life” 
position is actually “pro-death,” for it favors human reproduction at the 
expense of all other forms of life, and, in the end, at the expense of human 
life as well. Neither the “pro-choice” nor the “pro-life” viewpoint can be 
very persuasive today. 
The same blind spot appears as well in discussions about the falling 
birth rate in the developed world. Demographers, policymakers, and 
journalists often ponder what it means that women in the industrialized 
nations seldom bear children at a rate that would replace the current pop-
ulation. That fact leads to questions about how to support increasingly 
elderly populations on the labor of a diminishing workforce, for example, 
or how to provide new incentives for women to reproduce. But few par-
ticipants in this discussion mention that a lower birth rate is a good thing 
ecologically speaking, that it may be a sign that some people are awake to 
the challenges facing us and are acting responsibly.136 
This blind spot in our thinking shows up even in contexts that sup-
posedly encourage environmental responsibility. Websites that help you 
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calculate your carbon footprint, for example, include all kinds of details 
about the gas mileage on your car, how much you travel by air, or how 
much energy you use to heat your home, but they seldom ask whether or 
not you have decided to bear children. That concern evidently just doesn't 
figure into our thinking, even in eco-friendly circles. The neglect of this 
question permeates our culture from start to finish, from top to bottom. 
Either we're afraid to raise the question or it just doesn't occur to us.
What will happen when we break this silence is a good question. 
Although it will no doubt be difficult to do so, we desperately need to 
reexamine all of our attitudes and theories in this new light, to start think-
ing about our reproductive assumptions for a change. Here, as in so many 
other areas, facing the consequences of climate change really does require 
us to revise the most basic elements of our common culture. It's impossi-
ble to know in advance what new policies, theories, legal interpretations, 
or actions that endeavor could lead to. The most fundamental working 
hypothesis to guide us throughout that work, I would suggest, is that not
reproducing is the most ethical choice we can make today. The burden of 
proof, the challenge of providing a clear and thorough justification, falls 
on those who would take the opposite course of action.
Because this is an immense topic, one that requires an extended and 
focused public debate, I can only touch on a few themes in this brief dis-
cussion. Perhaps the most useful thing I can do here is raise a number of 
the most likely objections to this argument and reply to each in turn.
The first objection might well be the most basic of all. Let's say a loving 
couple shares a strong desire to bear children; why should they not sat-
isfy that desire? But can our desire on its own justify a decision that may 
cause environmental harm? Suppose someone with excellent taste and a 
large income wishes to build a huge, beautiful, and inspiring home—one 
that will have an enormous carbon footprint. Do we think that's ethically 
acceptable? No doubt the wish to bear children is more defensible. But in 
the end, unless the potential parents have something more than desire to 
go on, they still haven't explained why their plans are ethical.
Evangelical Christians and conservative Jews (among others) might 
insist that God himself has commanded us to reproduce. According to the 
book of Genesis, as soon as God created human beings, he told them, “Be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion 
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over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living 
thing that moves upon the earth.”137 In effect, God wanted human beings 
to participate in the process of creation, to extend his founding act over 
generations of procreation. So far, humanity has fulfilled this command 
very well indeed: have we not filled the earth and subdued everything 
that moves? In fact, haven't we already exceeded the earth's capacity to 
sustain us? Aren't we in the process of subduing even the climate itself? 
Should we go right ahead and help kill the Earth? Doing so would hardly 
keep faith with a command that sees us as part of the creation, not the 
agency of its destruction. To reproduce unthinkingly would hardly do 
justice to the divine plan.
Some might object that if everyone chose not to reproduce, before 
long the human race would come to an end. They have a good point. If 
this practice became truly universal across all humanity and were sus-
tained long enough, it would indeed result in the end of the species. If 
the ideas outlined here became widespread enough to influence a good 
part of the human race, we'd obviously need to collaborate intelligently 
as a species to reduce our numbers while still guaranteeing our survival. 
Anyone who feels responsibility for the fate of all life must greet the pros-
pect of such a development with joy, not dismay; if we as the human race 
proved ourselves capable of cooperating for such a purpose, we would 
at last demonstrate that we had grasped our place within the network of 
life and were capable of acting accordingly. Until then, individual actions 
will have a very positive impact in their own right. The point is not to 
end reproduction forever for the entire species, but to make a differ-
ence in humanity's impact on the biosphere now, at a moment when it 
really counts.
Some people raise a much more mundane objection, arguing that 
they would like to have kids who could take care of them in old age. One 
problem with this idea, of course, is that parents cannot know whether 
their children will live nearby or have the time or inclination to help 
out. Moreover, having kids for personal convenience scarcely takes into 
account the situation of other people, much less the good of the bio-
sphere; it places one's own potential interest above the survival of all 
others. Finally, and most crucially, it takes for granted that there will be 
a future to worry about in the first place. If everybody reproduces in this 
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way and continues to live this kind of life, the last thing to worry about 
is how we'll do after we retire; at that rate, having kids will help destroy 
our chances for a peaceful old age. These reflections apply as well to the 
argument often cited in the United States that we need to raise children 
so they can pay into Social Security and Medicare. But why would we 
worry about one version of the future—the financial support for us after 
we retire—if we will not trouble ourselves about another—the conse-
quences of climate change? It would be far more ethical for us to put the 
interest of all humanity above our own, not have children, and save up 
enough money over our working years to support ourselves in old age. If 
we're truly self-interested, let's do the work ourselves. And if we're look-
ing for personal support as we age, we should build an active, loving com-
munity of friends and neighbors where we live.
Ecologically minded parents might insist that their kids will grow 
up as good citizens of the Earth. They will use less energy than others, 
recycle carefully, and do all they can to support the environmental cause. 
All that may be true, but even responsible adults in the United States still 
cause more damage to the climate than nearly anyone elsewhere in the 
world, far more than the biosphere can sustain. Even when we are doing 
our best, we do very badly indeed. Adding more people to the equa-
tion won't help.
But these parents have one more idea. What if one of their kids turns 
out to be a genius who comes up with the technological invention that 
will save the world? But this rationale falls apart almost immediately. 
The very notion that we should wait for such an invention is part of the 
problem in the first place; it encourages us to keep going with business as 
usual while engineers come up with clever schemes to get us out of our 
dilemma. That plan will get us nowhere fast. Moreover, any child born in 
2015 won't be ready to reveal her invention until, say, 2040—far too late 
to prevent serious harm to the planet.
Some potential parents might ask whether it would be ethical not 
to reproduce but to adopt children. Wouldn't it be fine to raise chil-
dren that others brought into the world? Judging by basic principles, 
it might be. But because American couples are increasingly adopting 
children from around the world, where the average carbon footprint is 
relatively small, in effect they are greatly increasing the lifetime impact 
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of those children on the environment. Whether we have given birth to 
children is less crucial than whether we replicate our destructive habits in 
another generation.
Parents who already have little ones might object that this argument 
ultimately accuses them of doing wrong. But this argument does not 
lead to such a conclusion at all. Most people in our society have never 
given this viewpoint a moment's thought; accordingly, we can't assume 
that parents have deliberately chosen to put their wishes above the future 
good of humanity. People are not to be accused if they have transgressed 
a principle of which they are unaware. Once they have heard this argu-
ment, however, we might wish to hold them accountable, at least to jus-
tify their eventual decision. But doing so is not the same as making par-
ents feel guilty for loving children they already have.
Others might comment that choosing not to reproduce reveals a sub-
tle hatred of humankind, a sneaky sort of misanthropy. In fact, the oppo-
site is true: those who choose not to reproduce place the future interests 
of humanity—as well as the Earth's living systems—above selfish con-
siderations. Doesn’t that sound more like the love of humanity? But it's 
worth pausing to take this objection literally. If we love dogs, for example, 
does it follow that we'd like to see, say, eight billion dogs roaming the 
planet? If not, does that make us dog haters? Not likely.
The same response goes for the idea that this ethical position some-
how reflects a hatred of children. This objection is no more convincing 
than the previous one, but it has the great merit of bringing a basic ques-
tion to our attention. If we are quite sure that the biosphere will be in 
worse shape over the coming decades, that our society will suffer enor-
mously as a result, and that those in the next generation will face increas-
ing difficulties as time goes by, is it more responsible to bring children 
into the world to face all these challenges—or not to do so? Is it an act of 
love to choose a difficult life for those who have no say in the matter? Is it bet-
ter to give kids the gift of life, whatever difficulties they might face, or to 
protect the unborn from the potential disaster to come? Needless to say, 
we should bless the life of children who are already with us. We should do 
everything we can to help our young descendants thrive. But choosing 
a tough life for people before bringing them into the world is an entirely 
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different matter. In fact, it is far more an act of true love for the unborn 
not to force them to accept a difficult life.
What about those who love children but choose not to bear their 
own? They have many opportunities they might pursue: they can work 
in professions that allow them to care for infants, the young and grow-
ing, the curious and learning, training them to live and thrive responsibly. 
These adults can heal kids when they are sick, coach them as they play, 
and include them in a range of adult activities where doing so might be 
fruitful for all.
No doubt people might object in further ways, but in the end nearly 
all these replies boil down to the first one I discussed above. I'd like to 
return to it and ponder a somewhat more aggressive version, one that 
might reveal the stakes of this discussion even more clearly. 
Very well, someone might say. Not reproducing may make sense for 
most people, but my partner and I are well-educated, well-off, and capa-
ble of protecting our children from whatever happens down the road. 
Why shouldn't we have children if we want to? (Or, conversely, someone 
might say: My partner and I are quite poor, and the only profound joy in 
our lives is the opportunity to have children and raise them. Why deny us 
this joy if we have so little else?) The answer, as I have suggested above, 
is that our lives do not simply belong to us; whatever we do contributes 
to our common problem or its solution. To think we can do what we like 
while the rest of the world collapses is to see ourselves as a sublime excep-
tion, figures of total privilege. This is at once naive—since no one is truly 
such an exception—and hopelessly selfish.
Such a response ultimately reveals a willingness to sacrifice the well-
being of others for the sake of one's children. That attitude is just beneath 
the surface in much of American life. Occasionally American-produced 
movies capitalize on this feeling, inviting audiences to adopt as their own 
the belief that defending one's children justifies very threatening behav-
ior. In Flightplan, starring Jodie Foster, a woman does everything she can 
think of—including releasing the oxygen masks and turning off the lights 
in the passenger section of the aircraft on which she is flying—to dis-
tract the crew while she looks for her lost child. John Q, starring Denzel 
Washington, tells the story of an African American father who invades 
a hospital demanding an operation for his son. Neither of these movies 
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descends into celebrating aggression for its own sake, but each champi-
ons the notion that it is acceptable to frighten or threaten other people 
for the purpose of caring for one's child.138 
These movies deserve credit for telling a certain truth about American 
culture. They cast light on the blind spot in our political thinking, show-
ing that we don't give much credence to the notion that we all benefit 
from arrangements of mutual self-interest. Self-interest turns into some-
thing much uglier when children are at stake: it turns out that the child is 
so sacred that his or her well-being is more important than the interests 
of others. In comparison to the child, social relations are so much chaff to 
be tossed into the wind. In daily life, this attitude is expressed in the will-
ingness of many of us to buy the biggest, baddest SUV we can find to pro-
tect our kids from harm. If we get in a crash, it's the other guy who will suf-
fer, not us. We may even imagine that we show love for our kids precisely 
through this willingness to make sure that other people will die first. But 
because in doing so we are potentially harming others to protect those 
we choose to bring into the world, our attitude reveals that we will give 
up others for the sake of our own priorities. What's worse, the logic of 
this sort of selfishness collapses very quickly. When the SUV's emissions 
help destroy the biosphere, it's not just the other guy's biosphere that will 
go. What then? We may think we're looking out for our own interests by 
driving the biggest, safest vehicle on the roads, but in the long run we're 
destroying our own lives and those of our children, too. Ultimately, this 
sort of attitude reveals that strange paradox: a self-destructive selfishness. 
When we insist on our abstract liberties, on our right to destroy, we are 
also choosing to destroy ourselves and those we love.
This general attitude has taken on a kinder, gentler form in Cormac 
McCarthy's novel The Road.139 This novel suggests that it is a praiseworthy 
endeavor for a father to guide his son through a world bereft of any form 
of life and devoid of any kind of food except for canned goods stored here 
or there in ruined dwellings—or murdered human beings. Such a world 
promises no future for any living thing, yet we are asked to admire the 
effort of raising the son and passing him down to a nonexistent future. 
Instead of suggesting that it might be acceptable to torch the world for 
the sake of the son, as violent selfishness would have it, this story suggests 
that even if the world has already been torched, we should still bear and 
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raise children. But because the world of that novel could never exist—
for without other living things, human beings would have little oxygen 
to breathe—it is finally a metaphor for our world, and thus encourages 
us to think that even if the planet is dying, we should bear children just 
as before. In the world of the novel, such a belief is delusional: it is truly 
horrific to usher a child into a dead future. In our world, that belief is far 
more harmful, for it allows us to comfort ourselves that even if we are 
contributing to the planet's decline, we are still good people—because 
we are bearing and caring for children. But in that case, having kids helps 
us avoid facing the real ethics of our choices. In its gentler way, The Road
also reinforces a mode of ecocidal parenting.
Since we Americans now live in a society everywhere shaped by these 
ideas, since our destructive impact on the planet's life continues to grow 
apace even after we have become aware of that fact, we who wish to pre-
serve a future must consider adopting the opposite point of view—one 
that places the interest of the biosphere above our own wishes. Instead 
of raising a beloved child in a ruined world, our better option is to raise 
no children at all—on a thriving, beautiful, and beloved planet. It might 
sound like the basis for that choice is a joyous selflessness, an utterly 
altruistic commitment to the life of others. No doubt about it, this choice 
is altruistic. But only this choice preserves a future for ourselves as well. 
Only in a thriving biosphere can we live out our lives in the way we might 
imagine. Choosing otherwise might be selfish, but it would also be sui-
cidal—or at least would kill the future.
I admit that it is more than a little paradoxical not to have children at 
the same time as choosing for the future. After all, children have always 
served as the very emblems of the future, the embodiment of what is 
coming next, the carrier of what will be. Nevertheless, a choice not to 
have children today will make it possible for that understanding of chil-
dren to return someday. Once we actually transform our culture so that 
we do not eat the Earth as a matter of course, then we can restore the 
ancient alignment between sustainability and reproduction. A choice not 
to reproduce would make that eventual alignment possible. 
What would be the cultural consequences if many Americans took 
this ethics as their own? It goes without saying that it would transform 
our basic assumptions and practices almost across the board. We'd end 
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up living through a whole array of odd demographic realities that we 
would need to consider carefully in advance. For many people, it would 
be hard to explain what all the effort is for—all that hard work—if they 
can't come home to their kids. The children are the whole point; they, 
and the home of which they are a part, constitute a relief from profes-
sional stresses, a refuge from the rat race, a haven in a heartless world, and 
a hope for something more. If that is the case, they already help us endure 
what we see as unendurable or at least as not terribly delightful. But is it 
really impossible to think otherwise, to stop splitting our lives between 
the difficulty of labor and the joy of family? Can't we reimagine our work-
ing day so that it, too, can become a source of pleasure and joy? Must the 
experience of family be private, enclosed, aloof? Or can it be found in 
collaboration with other adults, in less private settings, and in common 
endeavors that also speak of a hope for something more?
Similar questions arise around our attitudes toward the communities 
in which we live. If you ask people why they live where they do, in many 
cases they'll explain that their town isn't all that interesting or thriving, 
but it's a nice place to raise kids. This answer says a lot: it suggests that 
people are capable of putting up with the absence of urban pleasures they 
might desire so they can raise their children in peace. But if they did not 
have kids and thus had to face the reality of life in the town more squarely, 
what might they ask it to become? What kinds of events and activities 
might they create? How might the entire community be transformed?
Some of our basic attitudes suggest that we merely tolerate our work-
places and communities and give our real love to our partners and chil-
dren. What would happen if we stopped segregating our lives in this way 
and expanded the range of our affections? What if we treated all the are-
nas in which we live with love and care, seeing those domains as the car-
riers of our future, the embodiment of our hopes? What if we extended 
this care to our local ecosystems, and beyond that to the biosphere itself? 
Why don't we already do so today? 
Taking the climate crisis seriously forces us to rethink our most fun-
damental attitudes. It asks us to contemplate what might seem impos-
sible—to question the core loyalties by which we live. If we hesitate to 
go that far, to question that deeply, we show that we finally do not care 
all that much about the future of the biosphere or indeed about how 
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our own lives may go a couple decades from now. We demonstrate that 
we think our lives are really about us and are indifferent to the ruins of 
the future. Most of us would not choose to live that way—but we may 
not really wish to cast off that attitude entirely, either. Climate change 
forces us to choose; its potential severity has the power to concentrate 
our minds. When it does so, it may inspire us to rethink entire areas of 
our culture, reexamine what family means, imagine a new relationship to 
place, reinvent our jobs and communities, and sustain a new relation to 
the biosphere. But how could it be otherwise? If the very context of our 
lives is at stake, to do it justice demands that we consider reinventing it 
all, from top to bottom. If we are to begin the task of owning the disaster 
we are already causing and make reparation to the biosphere as a result, 
we can do nothing less.
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Chapter 12
The God of the Whirlwind
Taking our current situation seriously requires us to reexamine our politi-
cal and ethical understanding of our ordinary practices, our life decisions, 
our relationship to others and to all earthly life. It asks us to reimagine 
what we do and who we are across the entire range of our experience. As I 
have suggested, it even requires us to own disaster—to put the enormous 
environmental crisis to our own account, take responsibility for what is 
unfolding, and to begin the endless task of making reparation.
But as I have suggested, in taking this last, most difficult step, we must 
also affirm our place within the planetary and biological history that pro-
duced us. To assume responsibility for the disaster we are causing, we 
must also affirm much else: the debt we owe to the forces that created us, 
to the web of life of which we are a part.
As a result, the ethical stance I outlined above speaks also of an unre-
served affirmation of those forces that ultimately reach far beyond our-
selves—those aspects of the natural world that are so vast, wild, and 
violent that we can only submit to them in genuine humility. That affirma-
tion, however, stretches well beyond a discussion of ethics per se; it raises 
questions that deserve their own treatment, challenging us with dilem-
mas we can understand only if we pause to consider them in their own 
right. If we are to absorb the full impact of climate change on our human-
ity, then, we need to move beyond the framework of political and ethical 
action and contemplate another set of questions, traditionally addressed 
through mythology, theology, and philosophy: What forces ultimately 
constitute our world, and how should we respond to them? Now that we 
live in a world without guarantees, possibly without a future that is liv-
able to us, what stories should we tell about our condition? What is our 
place in the cosmos?
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In this domain, as in all others, the near inevitability of severe climate 
change alters everything. The religious reassurances that once shaped 
many of the world's cultures no longer hold true—or at least not in the 
same way as before. In fact, the discoveries of climatology over the past 
two or three decades only sharpen what had already become a strong 
sense of the vulnerability of the world. 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, geologists learned that 
Earth's history was immensely vaster than they previously suspected, that 
ordinary physical processes, extended over many millions of years, had 
given the planet's surface its present shape. Confronted with this “dark 
abyss of time,” they could hardly encourage their audience to sustain a 
familiar sense of humanity's place within the history of life.140 Cataclysms 
and mass extinctions, it turned out, were ordinary events; as I will discuss 
below, the guarantees of the rainbow covenant, in which God promises 
Noah never again to unleash a flood to destroy his creation, were put into 
question. Furthermore, since so much of the geological record bore no 
trace of humanity, it was no longer clear that the creation centered around 
human beings. This sense of human vulnerability strengthened further 
over the course of the nineteenth century, especially as Charles Darwin 
and Alfred Russel Wallace found a core mechanism—natural selection—
that could drive the evolution of species and extended that mechanism to 
human beings. The twentieth century added many new elements to this 
emerging picture, notably when scientists proposed a theory of plate tec-
tonics according to which the continents had broken away from a single 
primordial landmass and drifted to their present positions. The ground 
beneath our feet, it turned out, also moved, floating on the molten heat 
within the Earth. 
But that is not all: in more recent decades, scientists have learned 
how regularly the Earth's climate has flipped back and forth between rela-
tive cold and heat, creating the conditions for ice ages and for temper-
ate eras. At times, the Earth has been almost entirely covered in ice and 
snow and at others has sustained warm temperatures from pole to pole. 
The changes in the Earth's distance from the sun or in the tilt of its axis 
have routinely generated alterations in the planet's dynamic systems, pro-
ducing positive feedback loops that over time cause a general warming 
or cooling of the atmosphere.141 As a result of all these waves of scientific 
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inquiry, we now have a broad sense of how Earth's dynamic systems are in 
constant transformation. The planet itself wobbles; the continents move; 
cataclysms come and go; the species appear and disappear; and the ice 
visits and departs. Everything ceaselessly changes.
The fact that some version of our species has lived on this planet 
through so many changes may give us hope. After all, if we've survived 
several previous big swings in the climate, it seems likely we will endure 
the challenges to come in the next several centuries. An enormous resil-
ience is our ancient inheritance; it may have arisen precisely so that we 
could cope with very rapid, climate-driven shifts to our ecosystems.142
We may have evolved to handle challenges something like those we'll face 
in the coming era. Because of our intelligence and extreme adaptability, 
we're a tough species to eradicate. That thought, of course, can hardly 
comfort us as individuals; the species will endure even if virtually all of 
us are wiped out, even if most people—and most societies—disappear.
But even these reflections scarcely do justice to the full import of 
what we face. Our evolutionary history is hardly the proper context for 
interpreting the present moment, for this time, rather than merely adapt-
ing to the climate change we face, we will have caused it. As I suggested 
earlier, that fact shows how little we respect the web of life from which 
we arose. Neither God nor Darwin, neither creation nor evolution, put us 
where we are today; we got here because we violated the limits imposed 
on us by the divine command or by our place within living systems. Thus 
it is entirely fitting that those who wish to honor the divine command, 
including Jewish, Catholic, and evangelical Christian leaders, call on us 
to do all we can not to contribute to climate change and to act with com-
passion for those who will be most harmed by it.143 
Our actions to this point, however, have placed us in an unprec-
edented position. Over two decades ago, Bill McKibben rightly com-
mented that because of climate change, we were no longer living in what 
we could call nature, in a world in which some ecosystems could thrive 
without a human imprint. Climate change shapes the conditions of life 
for all creatures, which cease as a result to be fully wild. In effect, he sug-
gested, we are witnessing the end of nature.144 Geologists designate this 
fact in their own way: in their view, we are moving from the Holocene 
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into the Anthropocene, the era in which human activities determine the 
context of existence for all living things.
But if nature ends in one sense, it endures in another. Although we 
may erase a nature free of human influence, nature nevertheless persists 
in altered form. Our activities may ultimately force massive changes to 
the planet's dynamic systems, but those systems, accepting the new con-
ditions of the biosphere, will go on doing their work. In its new mode, 
nature may no longer be “wild” in the sense that it is free of human inter-
ference. But because it is far outside our control, threatens the built envi-
ronment in which we live, and indeed promises to shatter the cultural 
continuity we take for granted, it may be even more “wild” in the rather 
different sense that it is now excessively powerful and seemingly hostile 
to human concerns. We may ultimately have given nature a new guise as 
something even less hospitable to us than before, something far more 
capable of reminding us of our weakness and vulnerability.
Most of the time our discussions of climate change ask how we might 
endure in this new world by focusing on practical, technological, and eth-
ical questions. But as I suggested a moment ago, we do not live only on 
those levels. We cannot grasp our situation through a bare rendition of 
the facts; we need stories, figures, parables—in short, myths—to make 
our reality come fully alive to us, to make it possible for us to do justice 
to our moment. The point, of course, would not be to replicate the sto-
ries by which we once lived; the myths we need today might well contest, 
undercut, or even destroy those familiar tales, revealing why they are no 
longer credible, no longer in some sense true. What stories might we tell 
to interpret our place in this wild domain? 
One story could be the history of a mind-boggling error whereby we 
ruined the Earth's living systems for all creatures. This would be a fairly 
implausible new story of a fall, in which we once again commit a great 
crime and are cast out of Eden—this time, the garden of the planet's liv-
ing systems over the last ten millennia. 
Or we might prefer to tell the story as a tragedy. In one version, we 
could narrate how the technologies that enabled us to liberate ourselves 
from an ancient scarcity also proved to be our undoing. In a more sweep-
ing rendition, we would see our actions as another episode in a much 
longer history of human ineptitude, achieving a tragic knowledge of 
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the self-defeating, obtuse, and pathological dimensions of humanity. In 
either form, that story would allow us to affirm our history in the midst 
of defeat, for rather than merely denouncing our actions, it would find 
moral complexity in them, discerning a certain dignity even in our capac-
ity to recognize that hubris.145 
We could also move to a more visceral mode of affirmation; by telling 
this story as dark comedy, we could put to test the power to laugh at our 
radical folly. In doing so, we might learn how to endure the world we cre-
ated through our great crime, to accept the unacceptable, to explode its 
pain through a burst of laughter. Through these and other tales we could 
carry out the gesture I mentioned near the end of chapter nine, daring to 
affirm the nullity that we are. 
Writing at an earlier but comparable moment in the wake of 
Hiroshima and Auschwitz, Samuel Beckett explored a version of this 
emotional terrain. In Waiting for Godot and Endgame, he gave us master-
works of bleak farce, of hopeless slapstick, where nearly every sign of life 
has departed, divine promises are never to be fulfilled, and the routines 
of everyday life expand to fill an utterly pointless passage of time.146 In 
these plays, comedy verges on making the human condition tolerable 
not by enabling us to affirm it outright, but far more subtly to make our 
peace with it by affirming it as laughable. Our situation may be hopelessly 
ridiculous, but it is one we can recognize, reenact, and through comedy, 
accept as our own. In these plays, we can glimpse laughter's ability to rec-
oncile us with nearly every sort of folly and degradation. 
But these plays also go a step further, showing us characters who can 
no longer laugh, who are no longer moved by their stories, who have 
lost their pleasure in rehearsing their condition; they give us moments 
when even comedy fails. If laughter in some sense affirms life and helps 
us go on, the radical absence of a future (especially visible in Endgame) 
threatens laughter itself, inspiring characters—and members of the audi-
ence—to ponder, in the midst of laughing, whether they should laugh at 
all. These plays put us on the edge of a condition after comedy, one that 
even its subtle stratagems cannot redeem.
What would a similar take on our present dilemma look like? Perhaps 
the best attempt so far is T.C. Boyle's A Friend of the Earth, which features 
a group of ecological activists whose attempts to save the world have 
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gone astray and whose excessive love or anger wreaks havoc on their own 
lives.147 Placed partly in the past, in the era of 1980's eco-terrorism, and 
partly in the future, when severe climate change has set in for good, the 
book acknowledges the attempt to bring about political transformation 
more openly than Beckett does but renders it comically, as if even activ-
ism is ludicrous. We could object that treating activism in this way comes 
close to authorizing passivity and indifference, but instead, as the novel 
looks back on those efforts from a defeated future, it makes comedy the 
antidote to a potentially overriding sense of political despair, treating 
even failure as part of a ridiculous and ultimately comic condition. The 
novel does not shrink from depicting that utter defeat, imagining a world 
when most large nonhuman animals are extinct or greatly endangered, 
fiercely intense storms are commonplace, and the forests of the American 
West have fallen to the earth. Yet because the book is set in a world with-
out ecological hope, it sharpens the perspective of comedy, daring us to 
laugh precisely at what is irredeemable, to affirm our truly grotesque folly. 
The novel focuses on the misadventures of a familiar comic type—an 
aging, easily enraged, sexually manipulable, often drunk white man who 
is well-meaning and truly loving but whose decisions almost always go 
wrong. By centering on this character, Boyle invites us to view the world 
of the novel through a position of radical error and ineptitude, using the 
ancient comic strategy of regarding the world from below, from that irre-
pressibly impulsive, desiring, persistent dimension of us that, no matter 
how much it might whine and complain, still endures. Here, as so often, 
comedy might evade a full confrontation with disaster, indulging in a lit-
erary stylization of loss, but in doing so it makes loss livable. It demon-
strates how human beings might adapt to an impossible world through an 
entertaining performance that conquers defeat itself through the minor 
powers of self-mockery and absurdist play. If activism cannot ward off the 
ruins, laughter can convert them into the material of an art.
But even comedy has its limits. Boyle is less honest than Beckett, 
for he does not directly stage the possibility that the shtick will get old, 
that the laughter may ring a bit hollow, that the absurd life it celebrates 
may not go on. If we are to live in the ruins, we need something more, 
something beyond all the genres I have mentioned so far—a kind of 
wild mythology, and perhaps even a mad theology, for the ruins. Tragedy 
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and comedy, in particular, are preoccupied with the task of affirming in 
retrospect the nullity of human being. But the challenge today is also to 
acknowledge and in some sense affirm the more intimidating, threaten-
ing, even disastrous face of nature. Comprehending the latter theme will 
no doubt require understanding its significance for us, to keep its impact 
on human beings in focus as well. Nevertheless, doing so forces us to ven-
ture beyond ourselves, to take up once again the ancient myths regarding 
the stability of the creation itself.
The best strategy to pursue in this regard might be to return to the 
theme I explored above, the transformation of nature into a force even 
more wild and implacable than before. What are the mythological over-
tones to such a shift? At first, the very attempt to interpret nature in these 
terms might seem impossible; the realities of Earth's systems no longer 
address us in an unequivocal voice. Thanks to climate change, nature no 
longer seems mythic to us, anchored in primordial, archaic truths; it is 
now historical, and like our built environment is a product of human 
activity. Virtually nothing in our experience now falls outside the realm 
of human history, thriving in a domain we cannot harm. Accordingly, we 
might imagine that nature's voice has fallen silent, that the old gods are 
dead. But as I suggested earlier, nature is not merely submissive to our 
will; our intervention, in fact, has caused its dynamic forces to become 
more powerful, less predictable, and thus more openly capable of defying 
human expectation.
As a result, we find ourselves in unprecedented spiritual terrain. The 
sacred is no longer what it used to be, but it has not simply disappeared. 
We might say that, like the climate itself, it has transformed. But how 
should we interpret that transformation? Should we imagine that divine 
forces have taken on a new shape and will henceforth reveal themselves 
to us with particularly terrifying features? No doubt those features will 
indeed terrify us. But if they do so, these gods are not all that unfamiliar 
after all. Encountering them, we may discern the return of the dark gods 
once defeated by the relatively humane divinities that have ruled over 
us for millennia. In forcing our way into a strange future, we may have 
revived a forgotten stage of our past.
Let me here take up the language of the central tradition of the west, 
the tradition that has informed all the Abrahamic religions—Judaism, 
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Christianity, and Islam. While the mythologies of Greece and Rome told 
how a given generation of the gods (the Titans, for example) were dis-
placed by another (the Olympians), we seldom imagine that the God of 
the Abrahamic religions arose within any such sequence. But the early 
chapters of Genesis describe a sequence of another kind, a transforma-
tion in God's attitudes toward his creation. We may be used to the story 
that God created the world in seven days and blessed his creation out-
right. But we might forget that before long, in later chapters of that story, 
he became horrified at human sin and repented of creating humankind 
at all—and accordingly chose to drown the Earth and nearly all living 
beings beneath the waters of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 6). The God 
of creation, it turns out, is also the God of the deluge—one who at times 
utterly hates what he has created. Perhaps this deep ambivalence is intrin-
sic to omnipotent power: any power that can create can also destroy. But 
in that case, we are not secure in our status as creatures, for at any time 
God can blot us out as well. No theology can come to rest on the pres-
ence of the creation itself, for the God that brought it into being can anni-
hilate it in a moment.
Thus the key moment in the Genesis story takes place neither at the 
creation nor the flood but immediately after the floodwaters recede.148
After leaving the ark, Noah offers a burnt sacrifice to God; in response, 
God promises never again to destroy the world, vowing that “[w]hile the 
earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and win-
ter, day and night, shall not cease” (8:22) and places a rainbow in the 
cloud as a “sign of the covenant” between himself and “all flesh that is 
upon the earth” (9:17).149 Here, the God who has the continual option 
to destroy the world renounces doing so forever. Only because of this act 
can his creatures finally have confidence that the creation they know will 
endure. The most reassuring act is not the creation itself but the divine 
vow never again to undo it. The core founding moment, in effect, is the 
rainbow covenant.
What, then, are we to make of the fact that disasters and cataclysms 
of many kinds have taken place again and again over the history of the 
Earth? As I mentioned above, modern geological knowledge casts doubt 
on the rainbow covenant. It suggests that we have always been abandoned 
to history, living in a world without guarantees. In mythological terms, 
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the world is under the sway of the God of creation and the God of the del-
uge—that ambivalent, dark figure who makes no promises. Nevertheless, 
we could argue that our sense of this dark God has retreated into a distant 
past, for it was once superseded by our trust in the kinder, gentler God of 
the covenant, whose promises seem to have been realized in the relatively 
stable biosphere of the Holocene. We could, in effect, match up the his-
tory of the covenant and of the Earth, construing God's promise as an 
appropriate sign of the very livable world we have enjoyed over the past 
ten millennia.
But in that case, our exit from the Holocene into the Anthropocene 
raises new questions. Now that our own actions will almost inevitably 
cause far more difficult living conditions, leading to drought, famine, 
and natural disasters of many kinds, we threaten to carry out the material 
equivalent of cancelling the covenant all by ourselves and of unleashing 
again the God of the deluge. Such a possibility is quite relevant in our 
moment because a countervailing belief in this covenant can inspire us 
to deny that human beings have any such power and thus to negate the 
reality of climate change itself. If we believe that God created the world 
and made the rainbow covenant with all living beings, we have a strong 
basis for repudiating climate change. Take as an example the statement of 
John Shimkus, Republican member of Congress from the state of Illinois. 
Speaking before the House Energy Subcommittee on Energy and 
Environment in March 2009, Shimkus quoted Genesis 8:22, the verse I 
cited a moment ago, and continued, “I believe that is the infallible word 
of God, and that's the way it is going to be for his creation. The earth will 
end only when God declares its time to be over. Man will not destroy this 
earth. This earth will not be destroyed by a flood.”150 
Although referring to the rainbow covenant in the midst of discus-
sions of climate change may be unusual, we should take this gesture seri-
ously. The passage on the covenant is a central statement on the viability 
of creation within the religious and cultural traditions of the West. If we 
are to understand the mythic resonances of climate change, we simply 
must grapple with that covenant's implications. Doing so may make us 
uncomfortable; after all, the rainbow covenant was not conditional on 
human behavior, for it constituted an outright promise to all creation. 
The possibility we could undermine the security of the creation, then, 
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challenges divine power, as if we are in the midst of wrenching the ability 
to destroy the Earth out of God's hands. In his own way, Mr. Shimkus has 
accurately identified the aspect of climate change that threatens to under-
cut one version of traditional belief.
We could object that climate change does not undo that covenant; we 
are merely changing the climate, not destroying it. But if we take the fur-
ther details of the covenant seriously, we cannot sustain this position. In 
fact, climate change will destroy “seedtime and harvest” in many places; 
what we now recognize as winter is likely to retreat ever further toward 
the poles, leaving more and more of us in a seasonal cycle quite unlike 
what we knew before—in an oscillation not between “cold and heat,” but 
between warmth and blistering heat. Furthermore, climate change will 
increase the intensity of atmospheric systems, unleashing much more 
powerful storms and making destructive floods far more likely. This is 
not the world guaranteed by the covenant. However impossible it may 
be to conceive, then, we have dispensed with the relatively kinder God of 
the covenant and revived that earlier, dark God, opting for a less friendly, 
more demented divinity—as if, in pagan terms, we have moved from the 
Olympians back to the Titans. We have embraced a far more difficult fate.
Some might protest that climate change is merely a consequence of 
human action, another example of how sin corrupts the creation, and 
that it cannot alter God's power over us. But in the covenant, God takes 
charge over the future health of the creation; he does not concede to us 
any power to alter it through the sheer abundance of our sins. Others 
may object that God is allowing global warming to happen as a judg-
ment on our actions; he promised to sustain the seasons “[w]hile the 
earth remains,” so the warping of the seasons might mean that the earth 
will not remain, that we are witnessing a slow-motion end of the world, 
a strange but legitimate version of God's judgment on humankind. But 
the Bible always attributes the timing and substance of the final judgment 
to God himself, never suggesting that human beings through their own 
actions might force that judgment to take place. If God is allowing the 
end of the world to unfold, he is a mere figurehead, for that judgment is 
coming down upon us without his needing to do a thing.
These interpretations of the covenant, however, ultimately distract 
us from how it is being used in the current debate. Mr. Shimkus quotes 
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the key verse and insists on its infallible truth in order to argue against 
any effort to ward off climate change. It won't happen, so we need do 
nothing about it. Case closed. The irony is thus quite stark: the more we 
believe that God guarantees the continuity of Earth's living systems, the 
less responsibility we take for them and the more we destroy them. Here, 
a reliance on biblical mythology is actually pernicious, justifying a great 
transgression against the divine command that we exercise stewardship 
over the creation.
But Representative Shimkus is not the only person caught in a con-
tradiction. What about a position that does insist on stewardship—but 
also admits that the covenant no longer holds? In that case, what divine 
injunction are we carrying out if we hold firmly to the notion we must 
be responsible to all life? We may end up in a dilemma opposite to that 
of Mr. Shimkus, carrying out our role as stewards of the Earth in the 
absence of a covenant. We would find ourselves complying with an ethics 
that has no divine foundation and on an Earth that may not be subject to 
our control.
How might we resolve this contradiction? We could argue that the 
absence of that divine foundation actually makes our stewardship neces-
sary; if God is totally in charge of the creation, what could we possibly do 
to assist him? Our activity matters precisely because there is no transcen-
dental guarantee that all will be well. Our ethical orientation would thus 
arise not from a divine command but from our responsibility to the web 
of life from which we arose. We could do without God—and without a 
story of the creation—and still have a strong basis for doing justice to our 
fellow creatures.
This is the kind of ethical position that arises from a secular and scien-
tific interpretation of our moment. But it does not fully take the measure 
of the mythic, theological challenge; because it tells no story, it leaves us 
without a language in which to depict our most fundamental situation. 
Would it be possible to resolve the contradiction in another way—one 
that takes seriously the presence of more-than-human forces, whatever 
they may be?
As it turns out, in looking at this split between the creation and a 
workable ethics, we are thinking about questions already asked elsewhere 
in the Bible, particularly in the book of Job. The book of Genesis need 
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not be our only mythic reference in the Jewish and Christian scriptures, 
for the latter includes many texts and places them all within a complex, 
creative tension—within a spacious spiritual legacy no single state-
ment, however sophisticated, could ever capture. That diversity of state-
ment, which arises from within a long and varied history, makes avail-
able a range of spiritual resources for people who live within varying 
historical moments of their own, so that the book of Job, for example, 
might become more relevant to us today than Genesis as we face our 
own unique challenges. We who are the heirs of this tradition, whether 
religious or secular, may thus draw on this often neglected rendition of 
God to understand the face the world may take in the coming decades 
and in this way to sustain something more than a pragmatic relation to 
the infinite.
The story of Job is very simple: he is a just man, yet disaster strikes his 
family and property and he is stricken with boils. Why did God do these 
things to him? If there is some link between God's rule over the creation 
and his respect for just action, then Job should not suffer. Yet clearly he 
does. His friends sit with him and talk to him endlessly, coming up with 
one explanation or another for his condition, exposing the vanity of all 
human chatter. In the end, God himself appears to Job in a whirlwind 
and addresses him, asking who he is to challenge what God does. Was 
Job present when God laid the foundations of the earth or set bounds 
for the sea? Can he tame Behemoth or lead Leviathan with a fishhook? 
Job responds, “I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my 
eye sees thee; therefore I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes” 
(42:5-6). Struck with awe at divine might, he gives up any claim to being 
rewarded for his right action, humbles himself, and repents.
Job is the great biblical text that splits apart the wildness and terror 
of the creation from any notion of divine justice. God is so powerful, so 
stunning in what he achieves, that he need not pay any attention to human 
concerns. We could regard this God as a kind of divine bully, a character 
very fond of throwing his weight around. Or we could adopt a humbler 
version of this interpretation, deciding out of an excess of piety not to 
contradict God in any respect whatsoever, even if we have no idea how to 
understand him. This latter stance seems to be orthodox, of course, but 
its hasty submission hides an unstated resentment against the bully and 
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thus surreptitiously agrees with the first, defiant response. But there is a 
third option: perhaps the creation is so stunning, the beast Leviathan so 
spectacularly terrifying, that we are genuinely moved, truly transported 
with awe, and no longer care about our petty concerns. The creation is so 
splendid that we renounce our longing to live in an ethical universe in the first 
place. At that point, our previous complaints look foolish, and we repent 
of even raising them in dust and ashes.151 
This, I think, is the reading of Job that makes most spiritual sense. If 
we take it seriously, though, it leads us far beyond the story of the cre-
ation, flood, and rainbow covenant. For one thing, this God doesn't 
affirm the beauty of a creation that might submit meekly to human con-
trol; on the contrary, he celebrates the fire-breathing, iron-hearted, invul-
nerable monster Leviathan. In the old myths and rituals from which the 
creation story comes, the heroic divine being produces our world by 
defeating chaos—or in the Genesis version, that state in which “[t]he 
earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the 
deep” (1:2). The creator God is a tamer of chaos, a dragon slayer, a victor 
over monsters; what's more, the God of the covenant promises never to 
release the waters of the deep again, as if to reaffirm the original achieve-
ment of his creation. But in Job, God celebrates the monstrous. Not only 
does this God show utter contempt for any covenant with human beings, 
he points to his creation's terrifying power as the utmost sign of his sov-
ereignty, indicating that the very thing that would violate the covenant 
is the most divine thing about him. It's not as if this God would unleash 
the flood because he despises human sin; on the contrary, he is indiffer-
ent to human assertion, for in the presence of his transcendental power, 
any human act has virtually no significance. It would not do, then, to 
regard him as the God of the deluge; he is even more threatening than 
that dark being.152 
It's worth remembering that this God declaims from amidst the whirl-
wind, as if to make absolutely clear that he is embodied in whatever is 
most formless, threatening, and terrifying. But this God is even more ter-
rifying than chaos, for his ability to defeat chaos and give it organic form 
in the monster Leviathan shows he is stronger than monstrosity itself. 
Rather than being a slayer of the formless, this God takes the formless as 
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his form, takes delight in its destructive qualities, and thrusts them in the 
face of complaining human beings.
Anyone who has encountered this God might have a few choice words 
for Representative Shimkus. This God makes no kind promises; if any-
thing, he authorizes his creation to humble humanity at any time. Under 
his sway, disasters might indeed be ordinary events, and mass extinc-
tions—and the emergence of all kinds of Leviathan-like creatures—
might become a regular part of Earth's history. I would thus suggest that 
we should take this God as the exact mythological counterpart of the 
forces that in the view of science have operated over the history of the 
biosphere; there is in fact little difference between the attitude the God 
of the whirlwind displays and the implicit tone of those dynamic systems. 
In our time, the gap between a mythic and a materialist sense of those 
superhuman forces has virtually disappeared. Both do their work on time 
scales and with a power far beyond human imagining; both manifest a 
chaotic inventiveness and casual destructiveness that dwarf our own; and 
both, having produced humankind, are indifferent to our well-being. This 
God would worry no more than biodynamic systems about the devas-
tating consequences of climate change; if anything, to speak in mytho-
logical terms, he would point them out as further demonstrations of 
his wild power.
It might be tempting to repudiate this God as a being who takes delight 
in humiliating us. But if we responded in that way, we would not be true 
to an important and revelatory dimension of ourselves, a dimension real-
ized in Job's response. We love wild creatures; the great predators—lions, 
cheetahs, tigers, sharks—move us beyond words. We take an astonished 
delight in the furious power unleashed in tornadoes and hurricanes—in 
the very forms that the God of Job chooses to clothe himself. When we 
see such things, we know we are in the presence of something infinitely 
greater than us, something that does not mind our concerns whatsoever. 
In such moments, we might even feel an immense relief, knowing that we 
will never experience the severe boredom and alienation of living within 
an entirely controlled environment. Our awe tells us that we seek tran-
scendence, that we rebel against the prospect of absolute human control. 
We are grateful in knowing that Earth's living systems and nonhuman 
creatures do not follow any moral norms, certainly not our own.153 
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To some degree, then, we share the awe that moved Job to give up 
his moral claim. Furthermore, as we look forward to the coming decades, 
we must also recognize that the extraordinary forces that climate change 
will release around the biosphere will inspire awe in us as well. However 
devastating such forces will be, however greatly they will harm our soci-
eties and our individual lives, we can still recognize in them the signs of a 
supreme power.
Thus our foray in the domain of myth, which can seem to take us far 
afield from our core concerns, can in fact sharply transform and perhaps 
even reverse an initial assessment of our condition. Our awe in the pres-
ence of this demented God—or of the implacable, anonymous forces 
that this figure of God personifies—can enable us to make peace with our 
cosmic inconsequence, affirm the absence of any moral concern in the 
universe, and thus embrace the very features of our condition that might 
otherwise fill us with despair. In a few years, we may, like the characters 
in Beckett's Endgame, be numbed by the apparent futility of our actions 
and the blank hostility of the natural world. The book of Job teaches us to 
respond with awe instead—to see Earth's living systems and creatures as 
inhuman, even monstrous, and for that reason all the more splendid. If we 
move deeper into despair, as it were, and come out the other side, as Job 
does, we will at last be released into a space much vaster than our petty 
concerns and be stunned by a great splendor.
This release inevitably alters our sense of nearly all the themes I have 
discussed so far in this book. The reversal from anguish to awe, baffle-
ment into astonished humility, can take place only if we give up our fierce 
arrogance, cosmic or otherwise. That renunciation, of course, would 
inevitably motivate us to give up our habit of subordinating the bio-
sphere to ourselves—to carry out, on a collective and individual level, 
a truly ecological revolution. A transformative politics is the immediate 
consequence of that spiritual breakthrough, for it would put into practice 
the equivalent of Job's repentance.
That awe would also change our response to the consequences of 
severe climate change. If that change should come, we would know our 
actions helped trigger it—but we would also recognize that we did not 
create the forces that it would unleash, forces that would perpetually 
humble us with their power. Its onset would remind us that the very 
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attempt to slay the dragon, to use the immense resources of the Earth for 
our convenience, eventually unleashes it, making the Earth less habitable. 
Our story would thus be much like Job's: by demanding that an indiffer-
ent universe comply with our expectations, we would have provoked it to 
respond with a stunning violence that revealed our true place.
Such a transformation would not put our ethical orientation into 
doubt but would actually give it new strength and sophistication. We 
who inevitably lead intentional lives, filled with a sense of responsibility, 
would learn not to expect that our intentions will also be those of the 
universe. Giving up our cosmic arrogance, we would also renounce the 
idea that our moral purposes for the cosmos will come true. If we choose 
to assume responsibility for the environmental crisis now taking place 
around the Earth, to own disaster, we would realize that this ethical act 
does not make us masters of the situation, but the reverse, for it asks us 
to do justice even when we are powerless to bend natural forces to our 
will. We would thus act with justice not because the universe will reward 
us or because everything will work out well for us if we do, but simply 
because such action is the right thing to do. This renunciation would have 
a double benefit: it would allow us to give the wildness of the world its 
due, to pursue a truly ecological ethics of humility in the face of nature, as 
I argued above, and would also relieve us of the notion that this wildness 
will necessarily operate in a manner we might expect.154 We would thus 
finally live with genuine humility, affirming through our actions our due 
place in the creation.
Once we learned to live in this way, we might also finally place the 
great emphasis on the future in its proper sphere—in the world of ordi-
nary prudence, beyond which lies an entirely different level of concern. 
We can and should still remain attentive to the practical matters of life, 
including how we emit greenhouse gases and the consequences of doing 
so for all forms of life. But beyond prudence lie the ultimate questions of 
who we are and why we are here. Our pragmatic concern for the future 
cannot eclipse the presence of forces that have always superseded us, that 
have perpetually revealed our cosmic vulnerability.
Accepting this gap between ethics and the universe, between prag-
matic concerns and a sense of the sacred, between prudence and awe, 
we would also relinquish any myth, any religious teaching, that would 
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attempt to unite the two. The rainbow covenant, however beautiful, 
can hardly serve as a resource of consolation in our time. But stepping 
beyond it is no small matter. If we do so, our entire sense of what religion 
might offer us also changes; in fact, as I have suggested above, the awe 
that arises out of the book of Job accords almost exactly with a humility 
in the presence of what a materialist science teaches us to see. It does so 
not because it finally reconciles faith and reason but because it pushes 
beyond them, cracking open both religious and secular interpretations of 
our condition. The God of the whirlwind demands that we give up any 
confidence that the universe will comply with our expectations. Awe in 
his presence obliterates those religious institutions that would translate 
his power into human terms, that would capture his voice in specific 
doctrines, and that would assure us of our place in an eventual cosmic 
triumph. By the same token, an encounter with such dark forces reveals 
there can be no ultimate basis for secular hope, no guarantee that utopia 
will come to pass, no prospect of historical closure, and no certainty that 
any political promise will come true. The same awe that destroys our reli-
gious arrogance would also demolish our confidence that through reason 
we will conquer those forces that challenge us. Through the experience 
of that awe, we would thus give up our confidence that God is a larger 
version of ourselves or that by speaking in his name we can subdue our 
fellow creatures—or that with greater effort we might gain a rational and 
systematic control over every aspect of our fate. We would be in the pres-
ence of what defeats us and for that reason takes us beyond ourselves.
By accepting our defeat, we would at last become capable of witness-
ing the unutterable wildness at the heart of things, the biological exuber-
ance (as Bruce Bagemihl calls it) that proliferates in sheer crazy inven-
tiveness and raucous excess without rhyme or reason, without hope of 
explanation.155 That wildness is the sense of the sacred of our time—a 
version of the sacred that supersedes and devastates nearly every prior 
experience that went by its name. In this version of the sacred there is 
no solace for human beings except for our astonishment at its limitless 
beauty and fragility, the splendor of what arises without origin or end, 
what flourishes in the dark abyss of time.
Dazzled by that splendor, we can endure nearly anything that may 
transpire. If we act in time, as we must, we will have withdrawn what 
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would otherwise have been a great crime—and will be blessed with the 
opportunity to dwell with a beautiful chaos henceforth. If we do not, as 
we almost inevitably will not, we can greet the coming horrors not only 
with regret and grief, indignation and sorrow, but also with the sense that 
what sweeps over us is an even more stunning revelation of the ultimate 
strangeness of things. In that world, which is almost upon us now, we 
would do well to endure the floods, embrace the ruins, and let the drag-
ons roam—accepting our due place at last.
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Appendix
Climate Change Is Real
What is the fundamental situation with climate change? Is it actually hap-
pening? Are human beings causing it? How much of climate science is 
truly reliable enough for us to accept?
This appendix is designed to help readers work through initial ques-
tions about climate science. It will rely in part on the background research 
and in part on common sense. I will organize it in reply to various objec-
tions in the hope that it will respond to the kinds of misgivings readers 
may have, or questions they have heard, about the basics of our situation.
The first objection is this: It isn’t real. A fully “skeptical” response 
would suggest, right from the start, that global warming is not happening 
and that in consequence there is no need for us to worry about the effects 
of climate change; we can put the entire subject aside and get on with the 
rest of our lives.
Right on the face of it, this position is wildly implausible. “Skeptics” 
like to suggest that the science on climate change is unsettled, that there 
are many grounds for doubt, that the current consensus among research-
ers is full of holes. But in fact, there is virtually no serious dissent from 
this consensus among qualified specialists in the relevant fields, special-
ists who are doing good research recognized as such by their peers.
Because of the controversy about climate change, several scholars 
have surveyed publications in the field to see how many scientists are 
raising doubts about the basic consensus, and they repeatedly find that 
the number of qualified dissidents is extremely small. One recent study 
examined research by scholars who have published at least twenty articles 
on the topic and ranked them by the number of articles they have pub-
lished. They concluded that only one of the top fifty relevant scientists, 
only three of the top one hundred, and only five of the top two hundred 
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are “unconvinced by the evidence.” These findings closely match surveys 
of expert scientists, 97 percent of whom state that they share the consen-
sus view. Although there are dissidents from that view, they are primarily 
scientists in other fields, scholars no longer doing active research, jour-
nalists, or laymen—in short, people who do not have as clear a knowl-
edge of contemporary research as those centrally in the relevant fields.156 
A series of similar reviews of the literature have taken place over many 
years and inevitably point to the same result.157 Yet a significant portion of 
the public continues to think that scientists are still in doubt about global 
warming. Researchers on climate change are of course acutely aware of 
public attitudes and are highly motivated to correct this false impression. 
Accordingly, organizations of scientists in several dozen nations and in 
specialties all across climate change science have issued clear, strong dec-
larations on climate change.158 
What’s more, given the urgency of this research for public policy anal-
ysis, the international community has organized the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to summarize contemporary science 
every few years for public consumption. The scientific portions of each 
IPCC report are written by scientists and the summary portions by oth-
ers for the benefit of government officials around the world. Scientists 
of various persuasions complain that the IPCC reports omit impor-
tant aspects of their research, whether by ignoring important questions 
about the consensus view or by refusing to endorse the most alarming 
recent research.159 Such complaints are inevitable about any document 
that strives to capture the most representative views within a vast field of 
knowledge. It’s also inevitable that a document this immense and com-
plex will contain at least minor errors. No human enterprise is infallible. 
But it does not follow that the entire consensus is therefore incorrect.
“Skeptics” nevertheless insist that the consensus view is unconvincing 
or false. Some of those who repudiate this view argue that most research-
ers act from venal motives, from the attempt to comply with the wishes 
of power-hungry bureaucrats, well-funded public agencies, and other 
parties offering money, power, and fame to scientists who endorse the 
mainstream view. Perhaps the most vocal advocate for this argument is 
the MIT atmospheric scientist Richard Lindzen, who scorns what he 
calls the fraudulence and hysteria of the consensus.160 But the notion 
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that researchers benefit from a conspiracy, that they collude with those 
in power and with each other for mutual benefit, flies in the face of reality. 
It can hardly explain why scientists in so many different nations around 
the world, in such a wide variety of disciplines, and with so many con-
trasting relationships to funding agencies agree on the basic claims. The 
world of climate change science is far too large and complex for such a 
conspiracy to work.
This refusal to accept the validity of the overwhelming majority of 
scientific findings is not really motivated by skepticism but by a distort-
ing, self-flattering tale about the lone wolf who defies The Man, who goes 
up against The Establishment and beats it at its own game. It calls out to 
the contrarian streak in all of us, our love of the tiny, heroic minority that 
exposes the foolishness of the mindless drones in power. This sensational 
scenario is splashed across the title pages of countless books promising to 
enlighten readers about the climate change conspiracy, the hysteria and 
fraud of those supporting the consensus view, or the science “they” don’t 
want you to know. Although ninety-seven of the top one hundred scien-
tists accept the idea of human-caused climate change and only three sci-
entists raise doubts, “skeptics” clearly want us to believe that these three 
lonely researchers—and only these three—are correct. Doing so may be 
especially foolish, for it’s not clear whether those three even agree with 
each other or are assured that an alternative paradigm is necessarily cor-
rect. Their doubts about the dominant view may be motivated by hesita-
tion rather than defiance. Nevertheless, “skeptics” capitalize on that hesi-
tation, hoping that it can justify repudiating the reality of climate change 
outright, as if the refusal to accept the consensus view is a sufficient 
reason to commit to an alternative. It’s clear that the position of heroic 
opposition hardly qualifies as a cautious, deliberative, and truly skepti-
cal viewpoint: it is actually much more like a risky, defiant, and absolute 
faith—a faith that simply knows that climate change cannot be real.
This idealization of the contrarian scientist collapses as soon as one 
examines the science carefully. For one thing, researchers have been 
examining climate change with special intensity for the last couple of 
decades, and the ideas of the dissenters have of course received serious 
attention during that time. The more carefully researchers look at dissent-
ers’ objections and replicate earlier studies to correct for possible errors 
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and flaws, the more accurate and persuasive their findings become and 
the firmer the basis for the overall consensus. The drift in climate sci-
ence over time has been toward greater, not lesser, conviction. Each suc-
ceeding IPCC report indicates as much, for the statements on the like-
lihood that climate change is caused by human activity have become 
increasingly confident. The Third Assessment (2001) was still somewhat 
hesitant: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming 
observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” The 
Fourth Assessment (2007), however, was much stronger, stating, “Most 
of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations,” with “very likely” elsewhere defined as a 
likelihood of 90 through 99 percent.161 
Nevertheless, some “skeptical” observers are unimpressed—or have 
evolved new ways to contest the consensus. Recently, contrarians have 
begun to concede that climate change is real and is caused by human 
beings, but insist that it will do far less damage than is claimed—and 
that with our current technology we can’t address the problem to any 
serious extent anyway. In effect, they have changed their tactics, pretend-
ing to accept the basic science but finding yet another way to dispute its 
significance. This new style of resistance may be found in a wide range 
of “skeptical” writings, the best example of which—and one that I will 
discuss here—may well be a book by Patrick J. Michaels and Robert C. 
Balling, Jr. 
Michaels and Balling hold that the virtual unanimity of the consensus 
results from the institutional structure of science. The nature of publica-
tion in the sciences, they argue, tends to exclude negative findings (those 
that find no correlation between variables or no statistically significant 
results), creating an intrinsic bias in favor of any prevalent theory, includ-
ing the consensus view. Moreover, in their interpretation of the opera-
tions of normal scientific research, scientists who adhere to a reigning 
paradigm tend to exclude alternative views. Finally, following the tenets 
of “public choice theory,” which holds that people tend to choose politi-
cal and economic options that promise “more” rather than “less,” prefer-
ring big claims over small ones, they argue that a systematic bias pervades 
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decisions about publication, public funding, and career advancement in 
the field.162 
These authors draw on credible ideas about how science operates, but 
they do not apply those ideas to the climate change controversy with suf-
ficient care. In the context of that controversy, research that undermines 
the prevailing view would be a positive finding, for it would establish a sta-
tistically significant result. The IPCC incorporates many findings of this 
kind, taking care to list many instances where research suggests that cer-
tain factors may not be causing climate change, or at least not through 
any clearly demonstrated mechanism (for example, atmospheric aero-
sols), and that certain consequences one might expect, such as the thin-
ning of ice over the East Antarctic landmass, are not taking place. 
Furthermore, researchers do not operate as if they are so many sheep; 
they take delight when they encounter convincing arguments to the con-
trary, when they see data that upsets the established view in the field. 
Scientists are interested in examining the dominant research paradigm, 
to be sure, but they also know that it can be more important and ground-
breaking to create a new one. Most of the major reputations in science 
are made when a researcher finds something genuinely different from 
what has gone before, shifting the general orientation of the field in a 
new direction. 
Finally, the claim that the consensus view is not credible is itself an 
example of “more” rather than “less,” for it inevitably gets an outsize 
share of public attention. To suggest that people would prefer not to 
hear a “skeptical” viewpoint simply ignores the public—and scientific—
response, since the public is just as interested in a contrary view as in 
the consensus. The popularity of “skeptical” books—including the one 
Michaels and Balling themselves wrote—exemplifies that pattern.
The relatively cogent ideas put forward by Michaels and Balling are 
more apparently responsible—and thus ultimately more devious—than 
Lindzen’s charge of a climate change conspiracy. But at least Lindzen 
attempts to explain what might motivate a conspiracy at all: a wish to 
corner the market on public funding for research. The problem with his 
theory is that it’s difficult to see why scientists would conspire to give the 
world such consistently bad news. If they might be tempted (according to 
this theory) by the promise of more grant money, nearly everything else 
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in their lives would tell them to disprove the consensus. Do any of us—
outside of hardcore disaster freaks—really have incentives to accept cli-
mate change? We enjoy our lives as they are, and typically we would like 
to be more wealthy, consume more energy, travel greater distances more 
often, and contribute to and benefit from steadily increasing economic 
growth. Nearly everyone from the poorest to the most wealthy likes the 
idea of an ever increasing abundance—an abundance, of course, that with 
current technology also implies an increasing emission of greenhouse 
gases. Who, exactly, wants to bother with rebooting the industrial capac-
ity at the basis of all this abundance? For most of us, climate change is 
the last thing we want to see happen. Our lives would be much easier and 
more casual, far more relaxed and enjoyable, if we didn’t have to worry 
about it at all. Nearly all the incentives are on the side of the contrarians. 
Follow the money. If the entire global economic system is on one 
side, and a handful of granting agencies is (hypothetically) on the other, 
which one wins? In the face of such an immense tide of longing for more 
wealth, the conspiracy of a handful of scientists for their own self-interest 
would soon be swept away. But that’s assuming scientists would ever wish 
to participate in this scheme in the first place. Scientists are people too: 
their assumptions, training, laboratories, and institutions are fully bound 
up with the technologies of an advanced industrial society and thus with 
the very economic systems that are also causing climate change. What 
they are discovering, in short, is inconvenient to them as people, too. In 
fact, it is especially inconvenient to them, for a change in our industrial 
economies would affect their technical labor quite directly. It’s ludicrous 
to imagine that they are concocting the tale of climate change for per-
sonal benefit. On the contrary, they are laying out findings that the entire 
international community would rather not accept. Instead of denouncing 
them as conspirators, we should see them as reluctantly discovering and 
investigating something that even they might prefer were not true.
Given the enormous incentives for all of us not to accept the science of 
climate change, it would be much more plausible to ponder whether the 
small group of dissenters is concocting their science for personal benefit. 
Dissenters, after all, have the entire world potentially with them, espe-
cially business-oriented groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
which continually pressures the U.S. Congress to take as mild a course 
Climate Change Is Real 213
of action as possible, and corporate advocates for the fossil-fuel industry, 
who of course dread the thought that the world might eventually wean 
itself of oil. One might expect such groups—which ultimately represent 
some aspect of consumer preference in which we are all implicated—to 
put their weight behind denying or dismissing climate change science, 
and indeed some of them have already done so. As James Hoggan dem-
onstrates in his book, Climate Cover-Up, starting around 1991, businesses 
such as the Western Fuels Association and the National Coal Association 
funded a massive public relations campaign to distort the science, mis-
lead the public, and delay the adoption of public policies meant to 
address the problem. In a parallel effort, the Exxon corporation created 
groups to funnel support to various conservative “think tanks” for simi-
lar purposes.163 This effort had significant results: one study showed that 
over 92 percent of English-language books expressing skepticism about 
climate change between 1972 and 2005 were “published by conserva-
tive think tanks, written by authors affiliated with those think tanks, or 
both.”164 A good example is the aforementioned book by Michaels and 
Balling, which was published by the Cato Institute, the well-known con-
servative think tank in Washington, D.C. Through these and associated 
efforts, national business associations and major fossil-fuel corporations 
successfully persuaded mainstream media outlets that there was a cred-
ible debate about climate change, with genuinely accomplished scientists 
on “both sides” of the question.165 
In doing so, these groups relied on a sophisticated strategy that they 
and others had long used in postwar America. In this instance, as in others, 
they relied on the gap between how scientists and the public see uncer-
tainty. Scientists seek out areas where knowledge is not settled in order to 
refine and deepen their understanding, whereas the public often confuses 
that level of uncertainty with doubt on the basic facts themselves. As the 
historians of science Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway show in their 
devastating book, Merchants of Doubt, since World War II conservative 
obstructionists have relied on a small number of scientists to exploit this 
gap and create the perception of doubt again and again. Climate change is 
only one of the most recent instances in a long sequence of public policy 
questions in which doctrinaire opponents of action have set aside a solid 
scientific consensus in the name of a supposed uncertainty. Over the 
214 Appendix
decades, these “merchants of doubt” have suggested there really was no 
strict link between smoking and a host of health problems, industrial air 
pollution and the problem of acid rain, or CFCs and the growing ozone 
hole over the Antarctic. They sought to undermine research showing 
how an exchange of nuclear warheads could lead to nuclear winter, and 
in recent years have even suggested that the ban on DDT was a mistake. 
All these campaigns took roughly the same shape, and all were effective 
in shaping public opinion: they show that once you suggest that a con-
sensus position is “bad science,” prompting responsible scientists to reply 
and defend research in the field, you create a public debate where there 
is none to speak of within the scientific community itself, produce the 
impression of uncertainty, and thus create the basis for inaction. The situ-
ation today around climate change is no different.166 
At one point a few years ago, however, many of the “skeptics” behind 
these efforts abandoned their intransigence. Frank Luntz, the Republican 
pollster, spinmeister, and leading participant in a public relations cam-
paign against action on climate change, recanted his “skeptical” views in 
2006, and in 2008 or so Exxon stopped funding the group behind most of 
that campaign’s activities.167 Around the same time, President George W. 
Bush, who doubted whether human activities are contributing to global 
warming and whose White House had often doctored statements about 
climate change by scientists working for the federal government, spoke of 
the urgent need to take steps to “confront the serious challenge of global 
climate change” in his 2007 State of the Union message.168 By this point, 
the increasing confidence of climate change science was beginning to 
change even resistant minds.
Despite the tendency of even well-known public figures to recant or 
soften their resistance to action, a portion of the public remains uncon-
vinced and is likely to stick with that position, no matter what scientists 
or policy professionals might say. This group, generally associated with 
the Republican party, is now permanently committed to a “skeptical” 
position, despite the partial change of heart by leaders as prominent as 
former President Bush. Candidates for office as Republicans are now 
virtually required to deny the human contributions to climate change if 
they are to receive the support of voters in that party, whatever the evi-
dence may show. Apparently, “conservatives” are not terribly interested 
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in conserving the planet, even though the preservation of cherished tra-
ditions—the core of the conservative position—will be impossible if we 
don’t also conserve the environments we live in. 
By now, “skeptical” opinion has very little going for it: the scientific 
research doesn’t support it, its leading spokespeople have been largely 
discredited, many of its former leaders have recanted or altered their posi-
tions, and a vast majority subscribes to the consensus view. Nevertheless, 
as a result many contrarians hold to their views with greater intransi-
gence. No doubt a certain lazy style of media coverage—which continues 
to speak of “both sides” of a so-called “debate”—helps sustain this degree 
of public misperception. But media coverage alone cannot account for 
that deep resistance. The ferocity of the rhetoric attacking climate change 
scientists, the hostility to all the suggestions for how to address the prob-
lem, and the general intolerance for the concerns of environmental jus-
tice suggest that something else is at stake. 
For some lay “skeptics,” the idea of climate change undermines the 
belief that God protects and sustains his creation. Acknowledging the 
consensus view would require giving up a particular version of the theol-
ogy of creation. In another version of this resistance, Lindzen is reluctant 
to give up his belief that nature is intrinsically capable of balancing out 
its own systems.169 For other “skeptics,” the consensus poses a threat to 
the notion of individual liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, and 
the prospect that the government might take action to decrease our emis-
sions smacks to them of an unwarranted intrusion into our private lives. 
This position amounts to a civil religion in which liberty trumps all other 
concerns, including the “general welfare” of the Preamble to that very 
Constitution. People committed to these fundamental positions have 
ample motive to seize upon the least doubt regarding the consensus to 
justify their “skepticism.” Clearly, what is at stake for them goes much fur-
ther than a reading of the science. (I discuss these aspects of the debate in 
depth in chapters four and twelve.)
Linked to these deep sources of resistance is another: a suspicion 
of the political and cultural power of experts. For good reasons, com-
mon people around the world instinctively mistrust the power of highly 
educated people, whatever their profession, to understand and govern 
them. The inevitable failure of those in the governing class to reflect on 
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the sources of their authority, as well as the willingness of those in that 
class to intrude into long established ways, to scoff at folk wisdom and 
received cultural values, and to demand compliance with the latest form 
of social improvement, have always been more than a little offensive, even 
if expert knowledge has often brought real benefits to common people. 
Popular ambivalence over expertise is deep, for it is intrinsic to the vexed 
relation between people of different social classes and different ways of 
seeing the world. Yet this ambivalence is not a feature only of certain 
social classes; it is present in nearly anyone who secretly defies doctor’s 
orders, follows an unhealthy diet, or finds a purely scientific definition of 
the world and the human mind limiting.
For all these reasons, the attempt to persuade “skeptics” through the 
endless rehearsal of scientific findings does not get at their real concerns. 
The conversation must take up questions about our bedrock values. In 
the end, a person fully committed to the “skeptical” position may simply 
resist the authority of science as such or acknowledge it only insofar as 
it complies with more important loyalties. But those who dismiss such 
“skepticism” too readily may also miss something essential, for none of 
us is truly free of the impulse to resort to similarly intransigent, and often 
unacknowledged, loyalties. We all have abundant reasons to evade the 
implications of climate change; we all on some level feel a deep surprise 
and resistance. In reflecting on the intransigence of the “skeptics,” then, 
we would do well to consider our own convenient evasions, our own hes-
itation to take the transformation in the world seriously.
The outright denial that climate change is taking place is only the 
most overt form of evading its claims. There is an entire series of increas-
ingly subtle denials of what researchers have found, each of which is 
instructive. Perhaps the next version of resistance arises in someone who 
doesn’t wish to be so harsh in repudiating the science but doesn’t want 
to accept it, either. Even if the “skeptics” are wrong to be so stubborn, a 
person might think, they are right to point out how much we still don’t 
know about the Earth’s climate. Accordingly, in this view there is simply 
too much uncertainty in the science for us to act now.
Hesitation of this kind is ordinarily a good thing. In fact, the position 
of so-called “skeptics” betrays the promise of a genuine skepticism. A truly 
cautious dissent from the claim that human beings are causing climate 
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change is beneficial to the public, for it forces researchers to account 
for their way of gathering and analyzing data much more carefully and 
to sharpen their research methods as well. Even the research—not the 
rhetoric—of contrarian scientists such as Lindzen who cultivate the lone 
wolf persona continues to benefit climate research today, for his challenge 
to the consensus view helps it sharpen its own account of climate change 
and prevent it from becoming too uncritical of its findings. Such contrar-
ian viewpoints serve an important public function. Because the news is 
so bad, and has such a huge potential impact on our lives, it’s only natural 
that we’d resist it with everything we’ve got—and force the experts to lis-
ten to a wide range of objections and doubts. Making researchers defend 
their findings is a good thing: there is no reason to let their work influ-
ence our lives until they make a case that is truly convincing. Skepticism 
here, as in so many walks of life, can be a real boon. 
But skepticism of this sort is non-dogmatic, open-minded, and curi-
ous; when it is true to itself, it hesitates to endorse any of the findings 
outright, including the work of contrarian scientists. (Nor would it, like 
Lindzen, describe those who accept the consensus as venal or hysteri-
cal.) This kind of skepticism, in fact, permeates the scientific commu-
nity; it is the lifeblood of research, its motivating force. No self-respecting 
researcher could get up in the morning without the perpetual suspicion 
that earlier work in the field was incomplete, that there are huge gaps in 
existing knowledge, and that another angle might reveal more. Because of 
this attitude, the statements about climate change that scientists give to 
the public even today are not declarations of absolute faith but carefully 
phrased descriptions of a plausible scenario, descriptions that have prob-
ability and hesitation built into them as a matter of course.
Such doubts are not present merely out of habit, merely because sci-
entists just can’t commit. On the contrary, it’s quite clear that there are, in 
fact, vast gaps in our knowledge. Nobody really understands what causes 
clouds to form, what effect climate change might have in creating more 
or fewer of them, and whether the ability of clouds to reflect potentially 
warming sunlight back into space may increase or decrease in the future 
(and thus affect the planet’s warming in some manner).170 Furthermore, 
the computer models that predict future warming are not yet capable of 
describing the incredibly complex, dynamic systems of the planet with 
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utter accuracy, and as a result there is no firm consensus on exactly how 
much warming a certain level of atmospheric carbon dioxide would 
cause. Specialists in each field related to climate change studies can easily 
add to this list. 
Yet those specialists have also declared their conviction that global 
warming is happening and is being caused by human beings. We can only 
conclude that for them this much is certain; the uncertainties arise in 
how to describe some of the mechanisms by which warming takes place, 
in how much warming might take place under certain circumstances, and 
what exact consequences might emerge in the course of time.171 The limi-
tations in our knowledge do not undercut the fundamental reality that 
we are changing Earth’s climate in an unprecedented way. The consensus 
position, in short, is now seen as so elementary, so difficult to dispute, 
that it is taken for granted by scientists in the field, who have moved on to 
examine other questions.
But the hesitation with regard to certainty nevertheless does reveal 
something crucial about our current dilemma. After all, very few of us 
have ever been asked to assess the state of scientific expertise before mak-
ing up our minds about something central to our lives. We’re not used to 
being in this position. What’s more, while scientists live with uncertainty 
as part of their profession, we laymen typically think in a different way: 
we want clear, concise answers and ask our politicians, journalists, and 
leading figures to supply them as often as possible. We don’t like the mis-
match between scientific caution and our everyday demand for clarity. 
Our dissatisfaction with the scientific response to our demand for cer-
tainty comes out of this mismatch.
But it’s worth asking whether our defensiveness on climate makes 
sense. Do we truly seek certainty in every area of our own lives? For 
example, do we buy fire insurance only if we know for sure we’ll need it 
down the line? When we go on a trip, do we take only those items we 
can prove we’ll need? As a nation, do we demand military preparedness 
only if we know precisely what other forces will threaten us—and when 
they will do so?
When we think about our situation in this light, it’s pretty clear that 
insisting on total certainty about climate change before we act gets every-
thing backwards. What would you do if you were told that if you drove 
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down a particular street at a certain hour, you’d face a 1 to 10 percent 
chance you’d have a terrible accident? Very few of us would take that 
chance. Those who insist on certainty, however, suggest that if there is 
somewhere between a 90 and 99 percent chance of a crash, we should 
still go down that road. After all, there is still a small chance we’d make it 
through without injury.
Such a response is ludicrous. When faced with the possibility of major 
harm, most sane adults would want to play it safe, to have an out, a Plan 
B, or at least good insurance and excellent medical care. We aren’t simply 
indifferent if there is a high likelihood something horrible will happen 
to us. Yet in the climate change debate, we’ve managed to get the whole 
thing upside down. A supposed uncertainty in the science has covered 
up a far more frightening uncertainty about our futures: are we going to 
make it through the next few decades in good shape? Do we actually have
a future? That’s the real uncertainty we should face, and if we think about 
it in those terms, our answer gets obvious very fast.
The question is not whether scientists have absolute proof that human 
beings are causing climate change. The core question is instead whether 
we are sure we are not putting our own lives and futures into doubt by 
how we live, especially by how we emit greenhouse gases. Even if you 
think the science on this subject could be sharper, you have to admit it’s 
already telling a pretty dire tale. Just hanging out until the consensus is 
even stronger isn’t very smart.
But wait a minute, another person might object, global warming is real, 
but we aren’t the cause. Earth’s climate has changed dramatically over its 
history, thanks to any number of natural causes; our present moment is 
no exception. For us to attribute climate change to ourselves is merely 
a sign of our own arrogance. We live on an unstable planet, this person 
might say; there’s nothing we can do about that fact. The cyclic changes 
in distance between the Earth and sun, the changes in the tilt of the polar 
axes, and variations in the brightness of the sun all change the amount 
of sunlight entering the atmosphere, alter the planet’s warmth, and over 
time lead to immense changes in climate.
This objection has a great deal behind it. Research has in fact dem-
onstrated, for example, that the slight changes in solar intensity (due to 
sunspots and changes in the sun’s brightness) have enormous effects 
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on temperature and climate systems and that these variations are rou-
tine events over the vast stretches of the planet’s history. But because 
those factors are relevant, scientists have worked hard to take them into 
account. Looking into this very question, scientists found that an increase 
in solar radiation caused the rise in temperatures up to the 1940s and that 
a decrease in that intensity—possibly along with the release of aerosols 
into the atmosphere, which may counteract warming—led to the global 
cooling from the 1940s to the 1970s. But average sunspot activity has 
not increased since then, while global temperatures have risen at a good 
pace, suggesting that solar intensity is not in fact a primary factor in the 
global warming of recent decades.172 The current change in temperature 
is anomalous, is taking place far more quickly than in the past, and is pri-
marily caused by human activities.
But this direct response to the objection may not do it justice. 
Evidently, many people feel that if climate change has happened before, 
we shouldn’t get too upset if it is happening again. This attitude may 
motivate responses to charts showing how much temperatures have risen 
since the late 1970s: for some observers, if current temperatures remain 
within the zone of temperature variation familiar in the planet’s history, 
what we see today is by definition not anomalous and thus not a source of 
concern.173 As a result, if they can show that current temperatures really 
aren’t higher today than they were at some point in the past, they feel 
they have refuted the consensus view.
But this logic just doesn’t hold true. If we say for the sake of argument 
that the planet may have been this warm or even warmer in the very dis-
tant past, that fact does not mean that the current warming is “natural,” 
part of the ordinary course of things. Nonhuman causes may have led to 
great warming in another era; it doesn’t follow that the current warming 
is “natural,” too.
This answer is already a sufficient response. But it is interesting to try a 
thought experiment as well—to take the contrarian objection at its word 
and see what happens. Suppose that the current warming is “natural,” that 
it is entirely the result of forces entirely outside our control. Does it really 
follow that we have nothing to worry about? Rather than helping us dis-
miss climate change, this argument only reinforces the problem—and 
makes it even harder for us to do anything about it.
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This position is ultimately quite puzzling. It’s just not plausible to 
assume that if sometime in Earth’s history it was as warm as it is today, 
we can relax. For hundreds of thousands of years, Earth’s average tem-
peratures have varied widely, far more than most of us learned in science 
classes. Until recently, in fact, the history of Earth’s climate had barely reg-
istered in the popular mind. A good look at charts of temperatures over 
the past 70,000 years or so—not to mention the last 600,000 years—will 
certainly get one’s attention: the lines on those charts bounce around 
far more than one might initially have thought, slowing down into rela-
tive stability only in the very recent past, in the 10,000 years or so since 
the most recent Ice Age—the period geologists call the Holocene.174
Civilization as we know it arose on a planet pretty much with its current 
characteristics. In this rather brief, exceptional period, the Earth’s climate 
has created conditions that are ideal for certain kinds of human activities 
to flourish. “Nature” for us is highly specific, very recent, and quite vulner-
able. Even for the first several thousand years after the Ice Age, we lived in 
mobile hunter-gatherer communities and could adapt to new conditions 
by changing our habitat. But with the rise and spread of the great seden-
tary, built civilizations, we are now rooted in specific places, much less 
flexible, and deeply reliant on the endurance of our familiar landscapes. 
The return of an Ice Age or the coming of a fully tropical planet, both 
with ample precedent in Earth’s history, would be an immense danger to 
our way of life. Nothing we are used to, and no aspect of contemporary 
civilization, would be the same if Earth entered one of these scenarios. 
Rather than allowing us to dismiss the danger of climate change, then, 
this version of “skepticism” only makes clearer how fragile civilization is, 
how recent and potentially temporary.
If we are merely caught in yet another climatic shift, we must still 
imagine how to cope. For the most part, those who claim that climate 
change is not caused by human activities fight against efforts to do any-
thing substantial about our situation. Such a position is indeed consistent 
with their sense that human action is not the cause of recent warming. 
But if that warming is taking place and we can do nothing about it, then 
how should we face the coming decades?
Anybody who actually believes that the current warming is entirely 
natural should pause and think about the consequences of that claim. If it 
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is true, then our attempts to reduce our contributions to climate change 
will have no effect and our future is truly bleak. Such a person should also 
be very interested in reflecting—at least in some fashion—on what it is 
like to live in a world with a disappearing future. The thought experiment 
in imagining this alternative rendition of our present dilemma ultimately 
takes us right back to the central questions of this book.
Very well, one might say, climate change is real and is caused by human 
beings, but the rise in temperatures isn’t that great—not enough for us to 
worry about. Some observers argue that if we gather data about Earth’s 
temperatures more carefully, for example by filtering out the “urban heat 
effect” (the drift toward higher temperatures caused by urban encroach-
ment into areas where weather data is collected), we’d find that the Earth 
simply isn’t warming as much as we thought.175 
At first, this sounds like an intriguing objection. What if the data 
about warming is exaggerated? On this score, skeptical inquiry is justi-
fied: shouldn’t we be fairly certain that we measure global tempera-
ture shifts accurately if we are to have a clue in understanding the pres-
ent biosphere?
Richard A. Muller of the University of California at Berkeley found 
enough flaws in previous studies of global temperatures that he led a 
research team in examining the entire question. As a result of this effort, 
he published an opinion piece in July, 2012, that began, “Call me a con-
verted skeptic.” Taking up a series of objections raised by climate change 
skeptics (regarding the urban heat effect, faulty data selection, and 
human bias) and subjecting them all to a comprehensive statistical analy-
sis, that team ultimately found that none of these objections held true—
and that the emission of greenhouse gases has indeed forced an increase 
in global temperatures of two and one half degrees Fahrenheit over the 
past 250 years and of one and one half degrees over the past fifty.176 That 
group further found that no explanation other than human activity bet-
ter accounted for this rise in temperatures—not even a change in solar 
intensity. Such a serious, apparently neutral, and thorough examination 
of the question should remove most doubts on this score.
But it’s also important to recognize that objecting to the reality of cli-
mate change on this basis misses the point. It looks for certainty in how 
we measure climate change rather than thinking about its results. The best 
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response to this objection is to try out another thought experiment. Let’s 
say this objection is correct: what follows?
The answer is immediate and quite damning. Evidently, the rise in 
temperature, however high or low, is already having surprising effects. As 
I mentioned in the first pages of this book, the sea ice in the Arctic—and 
the methane clathrates on an Arctic continental shelf—are both melting 
far more quickly than scientists predicted just a few years ago, suggesting 
that the effect of the warming we’ve already experienced is more severe 
than we recently suspected. If such massive Earth systems can transform 
so greatly and so soon, the rise in the planet’s average temperature, what-
ever the precise numbers might be, are enough to get our attention. Is it 
really wise to keep disputing how to gather temperature data for another 
decade or so and let the world’s ecosystems just take care of themselves?
There is very little doubt that we have a serious problem on our hands. 
Scientists have arrived at an overwhelming, nearly unanimous consensus 
that we’re causing climate change and that it is already causing devastat-
ing changes to Earth’s living systems. The fact that our knowledge about 
how it works is not yet absolute should not encourage us to ignore it for 
the time being, since the very great uncertainty about whether we’ll have 
a future dramatically outweighs the relatively technical uncertainties in 
our knowledge. The fundamentals of climate change science, in short, tell 
us that this problem is real.
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